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PREFACE 
After having explored the articles by Orley Ashenfelter and 
George Johnson, and Martin Paldam and Peter Pederson, it was 
discovered that there existed a strong relationship between 
strike activity and economic performance, But, how and to 
what extent that relationship existed was unknown., The or- 
iginal belief was that there existed a positive relationship 
between economic performance and strike activity. That was 
sufficient from a philosophical point of view, to allow for 
a more comprehensive study of the relationship. 
It was quickly learned that it would be an impossible task, 
given all the econometric limitations, to prove that this 
relationship existed. However, it was soon discovered that 
strikes result, in principle, from a breakdown in the collect- 
ive bargaining process, an impass at the negotiation stage. 
Since it was also known, that both sides prepare vast amounts 
of information during the pre-negotiation stage, it was assumed 
that when labour and management, or labour, management and 
government, as the case may be, enter into the collective 
bargaining process they utilize accumulated economic infor- 
mation as a basis for offers and counter-offers. Given the 
nature of these negotiations, particularly, in Canada, there 
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would eventually be an impasse, and a resulting strike or 
lockout. 
Therefore, it was concluded that the economic variables 
utilized in the pre-negotiation stage of the collective bar- 
gaining process would be related, in some way, to the level 
of industrial conflict. Thus, the development of this study 
was initiated. The study would explore the relationship 
between economic performance and strike activity through the 
use of an econometric model, as well as an analysis of the 
historical development of industrial relations institutions 
in each of the eight countries that will be analysed in this 
study I Australia, Austria, Canada, Japan, Sweden, the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. Later in the 
study, an entire chapter will be devoted strictly to Canada, 
No thesis can ever be written without an army of support 
people. Special thanks to my faculty advisors for their 
advise, suggestions, additions, corrections and deletions, 
as we struggled together to finish this project. Many thanks 
to professors Bahran Dadgostar, Chris Jecchinis, and Gerry 
Phillips; thank you for time and patience over the last two 
years. Special thanks to my typist Sandra DiSimone, who spent 
hundreds of hours typing, and retyping; once again, I extend 
to you my most heart felt appreciation for a job well done. 
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To my wife Mara, for whom this paper is dedicated, thank you 
for your patience and subtle encouragement as I struggled to 
maintain my sanity. Special thanks to my parents, Shirley 
and Wayne, for encouraging me to strive for more. To my 
friends Kon and Mario, special thanks for making this entire 
experience more enjoyable for me. And finally, to our 
special friend Pookey, for being the levity that we need to 
make everyday complete. 
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With whom it all seems 
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Throughout the past quarter* century there has "been a transi- 
tion (in the so-called industrialized nations of the west- 
-1 
ern capitalist world) from management-totalitarianism to 
industrial-humanitarianism with new and enlightened 
interests in concepts such as tripartite cooperation, 
various forms of workers' participation in management, 
human relations rather than control of human resources, 
and policies that reflect a true nationalism rather than a 
partisan individualism.^ 
However, this transition has not come without hard effort, 
occasional human sacrifices and large social welfare and 
monetary costs. Social services' cost in terms of higher 
production costs resulting from the upward spiral of wages 
(i,e. labour costs are downward sticky) as well as from 
production shutdowns and for slowdowns due to labour dis- 
putes. These higher production costs result in higher 
prices to the consumer and this in turn creates the v/elfare 
loss 
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Monetary costs in terms of lost wages and lost profits, 
and the ripple effect that this lack of spending on con- 
sumer goods and additional equipment and services has upon 
the entire economy. The multiplier effect shows us that 
a single dollar can create up to four additional dollars 
as it moves its way through the economic cycle. The 
multiplier is defined as the ratio of the change in 
national income to the initial change in expenditure that 
brings about it.^ 
What about this transition? Although not clearly visible 
in countries like Canada, Australia, Great Britain^ and the 
n 
United States, countries such as Austria, West Germany,^ 
Japan and Sweden are testaments to the role that industrial 
relations systems can have on improving labour-management- 
government relations. These improved relations can then be 
molded to reflect a new form of what may be called, socio- 
democratic nationalism that has the interests of every 
element of society reflected in certain socio-economic 
policies• 
In some of these European nations there is a wider commit- 
ment to the welfare state and planning which probably 
results in greater constraints on union-management conflict. 
When a state employs a variety of income, fiscal, manpower, 
and welfare planning policies in the pursuit of sustained 
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full employment and economic growth, if almost inevitably 
is led to bring pressure upon unions and employers in 
pursuit of labour-management stability. The grov/ing use 
in several European countries of the so-called '’social 
contract” device to effect income, inflation, and employ- 
ment trade-offs between governments, unions and employers 
Q 
is an important illustration. 
It will be these policies and trade-offs that will make up 
a large portion of this study, however, the main purpose 
will be an examination of a macroeconometric model that 
will attempt to explain industrial conflict and how each 
country copes with this very costly problem, A further 
examination will be made of some of the various industrial 
relations systems in place in each of the eight countries 
as well as making a brief commentary on each countries 
stage of development. 
The base for the decision-making process v/ill be the 
macroeconometric model v/hich will allow for a breakdown of 
the collective bargaining process and an examination of the 
subconscious elements that effect this process. The prin- 
cipal focus will be on industrial conflict^^, as measured 
by man days lost due to strikes and/or lockouts, and a 
nations’ overall economic performance, as measured by 
several key indicators of that performance. 
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This model closely resembles the models of Paldam and 
Pederson (81) and Ashenfelter and Johnson , however 
because of this studys orientation there are many struc- 
tural changes that set each of these models apart. This 
estimation is not restricted to the use of economic fac- 
11 
tors as expanatory variables, since it is not only 
economic variables that are considered important but there 
are relevant political and social factors which, although 
12 
difficult to quantify, may be introduced into the 
equations• 
One quickly realizes that strikes and lockouts go far 
beyond the realm of national economic performance; for 
example; they normally occur as a result of a breakdown in 
the collective bargaining process (those conscious elements 
such as employee benefits, wages, saftey conditions, hours 
of work, job security, pensions, and union representatives' 
participation in management, to name but a few, that cannot 
be agreed upon by both sides while the formal process of 
bargaining has been taking place),, or because of corporate 
economic necessity (which many people in Sudbury believe 
to be the main reason behind lengthy strikes and>6r lockouts 
between Local 6500 of the United Steelworkers of America 
and the giant multinational conglomerate International 
Nickel Company of New Yorki, or finally because of staunch 
union principles and ideas that supercede the need for 
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collective bargaining. These become the conscious elements 
that effect both sides desire to reach a mutually agreeable 
solution• 
13 
Kaufman (71) breaks down the determinants of strikes into 
the following categories; 
1. economic conditions 
2. political factors 
3. psychological factors 
4. institutional change, and 
5. rival unionism 
This study will consider some of these determinants as they 
apply to the conscious and subconscious aspects of the col- 
lective bargaining process. Since economic conditions and 
political factors are beyond the direct control of the 
union or its* employer, these two elements must be reflected 
in the model in order that an accurate study of the indirect 
effects can be completed. 
In retrospect, people read in newspapers or hear on the 
streets that a union is out on strike because it was 
defending a moral issue or principle that goes beyond the 
traditional'union demands of higher wages, better pensions, 
enhanced benefits, and job security - although one is 
normally hard pressed to determine exactly why this parti- 
cular union was on strike. Bach of these issues play an 
important role in a union-s decision to strike, however, 
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the single most important set of factors, that subcon- 
sciously effects the method by which every union negoti- 
ates with its' employer, are the overall economic conditions 
of the entire nation. 
Although job security is becoming increasingly more import- 
ant, the single most important item in the collective 
bargaining process, from a union standpoint, is still the 
amount of proposed wage increase. How much more money will 
each emplovee be receiving throughout the duration of the 
contract, and in w^hat stages or intervals? What is it 
that unions use as a guage for these demands? Undoubtedly, 
it is the nations annual rate of inflation, both the previous 
14 
rate as well as the expected rate over the future period(s) 
of any proposed contract. Therefore, if inflation is 
increasing at an annual rate of five percent, unions may 
demand an increase in excess of this amount in order to 
allow for a real increase in their wages and their spending 
power. It is important to note that an individual union 
negotiating with an individual employer,, bargains based on 
a national phenomenon - the annual year to year rate of 
change of prices as expressed as an annual percentage. 
Is this not conscious bargaining utilizing a subconscious 
(but yet valuable) element? 
For the purpose of this paper the determinants of the 
15 
collective bargaining structure have been ignored. The 
assumption will be that all unions bargain in the same 
manner and have the same goals and objectives. This is 
a very naive assumption, however if one analyses Figures 1.1 
and 1.2 one can easily see how this assumption would allow 
for the creation of a national scope which allows for 
avoidance of the topic of differentials. 
Figure 1.2: A Schematic Presentation of an Industrial 
System • 
Environ- Parties of which Interactiort 
mental affect Interest interact Process 
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Other concepts or perceptions that have a subconscious 
effect on the collective bargaining process include? 
A) a nations annual rate of growth of its 
economy as measured by the annual rate 
of change of the gross national product 
(GNP) and the annual number of employed 
workers 
B) the number of unemployed workers expressed 
as a percentage of the total civilian 
work force 
C) the present course of government policies 
in terms of trying to attain the goals of 
low inflation, low unemployment and con- 
sistent economic growth, as well as 
governments* attitude towards labour and 
big business 
D) time as a factor relating to socio-economic 
change (notably advancement in terms of 
technological change - the use of the 
microchip - and its association with unwel- 
come consequences such as higher unemploy- 
ment, redundancy, de-skilling, declining pay 
differentials, in±er-union disputes and new 
hazards at work; ^ the strengthening of 
unionized workers - in terms of bargaining 
position and in terms of the numbers of 
unionized workers^° - particularly from 
the end of the 1950's until the late and 
often turbulent 19?0’s), the change from 
individual independence to a social state 
dominated by welfare payments and other 
costly social programs and growing uncer- 
tainty in terms of economic stability - 
vis-a-vis the growing dependence on deficit 
financing which has become popular amongst 
western nations. 
How do each of these concepts or perceptions effect the 
collective bargaining process? In terms of measuring 
their effect, there is no methodology available that 
would allow us to make a firm and undeniable judgement as 
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to the specific effect that these concepts would have on 
the collective bargaining process. However, expansion 
and modification of the methods used by Paldam and Pederson 
and Ashenfelter and Johnson will allow for an analysis 
of breakdowns in the collective bargaining process, and 
then to provide for a comparative analysis of these results. 
The aforementioned concepts directly affect the subcon- 
scious component of the collective bargaining process and 
most likely affect the attitudes of both sides as they pre- 
pare to enter into the collective bargaining process. 
Assuming that each of the eight countries function within 
the same industrial relations structure, as shown in 
Figure 1.2, it can easily be seen how an individual unions' 
position could be influenced by factors outside its direct 
relationship with its employer. For example, when a 
nationalized union is bargaining with its employer it is 
likely to be asking for a package of benefits and concessions 
that are representative of those given to other unions in 
a similar situation. 
In Canada, members of the United Auto Workers unions in 
Oshawa, Oakville and Windsor willibe looking for similar items 
from each of the Big Three automobile manufacturers - 
i.e. General Motors, Ford and Chrysler, In more recent 
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times they would be looking for each of the following when 
entering into the collective bargaining process? 
A) 3^ or more increase in wages 
B) job security 
C) protection against technological advances 
as well as input into the utilization 
of these advances 
D) profit sharing 
E) better pension plans, and 
F) a better employee group benefit package 
How: do these, workers arrive at their decision regarding what 
they should be asking for during the collective bargaining 
process? These decisions are arrived at by members of the 
union who analyse national trends such as inflation, 
economic growth and unemployment. The union will also 
analyse its position of strength against its weaknesses and 
considers the importance of that particular industry/service 
to a specific towr^ region, province, state or country. 
The union must also take into account the political direc- 
tions that a particular governing polictical organization 
may take in the future. All of these aspects play an 
important role in determiningv^the bargaining positions to 
be taken by a particular union. 
The primary purpose of this study will be to examine the 
relationship that exists between the subconscious variables 
in the collective bargaining process, as well as their 
direct relationship on a nations socio-economic framework. 
The main thrust of the arguments utilized in this study 
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will come from the development of a macroeconometric model 
that will attempt to explain the relationship between man 
days lost due to strikes and/or lockouts - the break down 
of the collective bargaining process - and a nations* 
overall socio-economic performance - as measured by explana- 
tory variables such as unemployment, real wages, growth in 
gross national product, etc. 
This model will examine whether or not the explanatory 
variables have a significant effect on the collective 
bargaining process to be a determining factor in the 
employers' or unions' decision making process as to v/hether 
or not a strike or lockout is warranted. Undoubtedly, the 
structure of this model will make it difficult to establish 
specific criteria that will conform to the standards set 
forth by text-book econometricians, however as may be dis- 
covered in the following chapters, this model will have 
many practical applications as the model's results are com- 
pared to the various national socio-economic structures 
which affect the collective bargaining process. 
One of the main hypothesis of this thesis revolves around 
the various social policies employed within the economic 
framework of the eight countries mentioned earlier in this 
chapter. Those countries whibh lean more towards government 
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participation in influencing wage contracts and in labour- 
management cooperation at the level of the workplace through 
appropriate policy measures will have equations that are not 
significant, v/hile countries that lean more towards a con- 
trolled form of the free enterprise system - i.e, ’.vith some 
trade restrictions and bevy of f.oreigri multi-national 
corporations who exhibit an uncooperative attitude towards 
labour^*^ - will show a higher significance level for its equa- 
tions. There will also be some countries that for some part- 
icular reason will not fit into its pre-determined category 
and this will prompt the need for additional study as to why 
there was non-comformity with the hypothesis. 
This hypothesis believes that the eight countries being 
examined in this study can be accurately broken down into the 
following two categories; 
T) Category A - Tripartite Industrial Relations System 
1. Japan 
2. Sv/eden 
3. Vvest Germany 
4. Austria 
II) Category B - Non-Tripartite Industrial Relations System 
1 . United States 
2. Canada 
3. Australia 
4. United Kingdom 
An examination of this hypothesis will be done in the fol- 
lov/ing manner; the next chapter will provide a survey of 
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literature, an analysis of the two previous models, and a 
commentary on how and why this model differs from those? 
and an analysis of the distinction between the conscious 
and subconscious elements in the collective bargaining 
process. 
Chapter three will continue with the specification of 
model and an analysis of the model variables# Chapter 
four will analyse the results and look at problems that 
may have existed with the model# (Chapter five will be a 
second survey of literature that delves into the various 
socio-economic policies that are employed in each of these 
countries, including a historical perspective, and then 
will continue with an examination of how the results of the 
model coincide with the implementation of these various 
policies# Chapter six will more closely examine the dif- 
ferences between our hypothesis and the results that were 
actually obtained and will focus some attention on the 
relationship between the dependent variable and the explana- 
tory variables. Chapter seven will focus on Canada and its 
poor state of affairs - in terms of labour-management-govern- 
ment relations - and will make several recommendations for 
both short and long-run improvements# Lastly, chapter 
eight will draw some overall conclusions about the relevance 
of this entire exercise. 
Notes 
In the past there has been one concept that has char- 
acterized labour-management relations, and that 
concept has been that workers should not have any 
input into the decisions of the firm even though 
all decisions have a direct impact on them. 
In more recent times, particularly in some vVestern 
European nations, management has realized that 
workers have a key role to play in the present 
and future direction of the firm, through their 
input into decisions at the level of the enter- 
prise • 
Companies and Governments must begin to realize that 
that welfare of the nation is far greater than the 
individual profitability of a few large firms. 
Higher productions costs due to unwarranted wage in- 
creases, result in the consumer paying a higher 
price than they actually should be for a parti- 
cular product, and this excess becomiSS a consumer 
loss. 
Sherman J. Kaisel, Macroeconomics: Theories and Policies, 
New York: W.W, Norton and Company, 19dE, p, 93, 
Great Britain, Britain, and the United Kingdom, will be 
used unterchangeably throughout this thesis. 
West Germ.any imay be referred to as the Federal Republic 
o f Ge rm.any , or F . R . G . 
Everett Kassalow, "Industrial Conflict: The U,S, and 
V/estern Europe," in Benjamin Martin and i:.verett 
Xassalov/, Labour Relations in Advanced Industrial 
Societies: Issues and Problems, Washington: 
Carnegie Endow'm.ent for International Reace, 19b0, 
p. 5 6 • 
y. Ibid, 
Since there are only limited statistics available on the 
number of contracts settled without some form: of 
industrial conflict, it will be necessary to focus 
on strike activity as the measure of success for the 
collective bargaining process. 
10, 
Page 16 
11* Martin Faldam and Peter Pederson, "The Macroeconomic 
Strike Model: A Survey of Seventeen Countries, 
19^8-1975#" Industrial and Labour Relations 
Review 35 (July, 1982), p. 504* 
12, Ibid, 
13* Bruce Kaufman, ”Determinants of Strikes in the U.S# 
1900-1977»" Industrial and Labour Relations 
Review 35 (July, 1982), pp, 478-484, 
14, See Appendix V on adaptive expectations, 
15« Use of the determinants of the collective, bargaining pro- 
cess as proposed by Wallace Hendricks and Lawrence 
Kahn "Determinants of Bargaining Structure in U«S, 
Manufacturing Industries," Industrial and Labour 
Relations Review 35 (January"j 1982) pp, 181-195i 
would only extend the model beyond its original 
purpose and would tend to make the model focus on 
the non-economic aspects of bargaining, 
16. Gerald Phillips, Labour Relations and the Collective 
Bargaining Cycle. 2nd ed,, Toronto: Butterworths, 
1981, p. 10, 
17* Greg Bamper, "Microchips and Industrial Relations," 
Industrial Relations Journal 11 (Nov./Dec,, 1980), 
p. 9. 
18. Ibid, 
19* Gerald Phillips, p. 6. 
Duane Kujawa, "Labour Relations of U.S. Multinationals," 
in Benjamin Martin and Everett Kassalow, p, 22. 
See results of the Shearer study. 
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CHAPTER II 
The collective bargaining process is the main focal point of 
the relationship between an employer and a certified union. 
From this process develops the framework under which employer- 
union relations must operate for the duration of any mutually 
agreed upon contract. 
However, how do unions and management cope with problems 
that exists with the collective bargaining process? There 
are several ways., in which problems may be dealt with; 
the union has the option of work slowdowns, work shutdowns, 
deliberate absenteeism, continued negotiation with or with- 
out third party intervention or ultimatly a complete with- 
draw! of services - a strike. Management has fewer options 
than labour, however management could use stalling tactics 
when resuming negotiations, continue negotiating with or 
without third party intervention, or they could prevent the 
workers from entering their place of work,- the employer 
could lockout the employees. 
In practice the collective bargaining process is a psycholog- 
ical chess match where the employer and the union both plot 
independent strategies and make moves based on their perceptions 
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of their position of relative strength against the opposition. 
For example, power may stem from the manipulation of infor- 
mation , - strikes occur because each party to the negotia- 
tions uses different variables in estimating the outcome of 
bargaining and because each is not fully aware of the opponents 
position - expertise, or traditional relationships between 
the parties. Relations may also be affected by the power 
23 
one party ha.s to reward, coerce or threaten the other, 
Economists have begun to look at the study of the collective 
bargaining process and unions in terms of other social 
science disciplines. Psychology and social psychology are 
used to analyse individual and group behavior,.such as the 
formation of unions by workers and the.process of negotiations. 
Sociology is used principally to examine the structure and 
24 
functioning of organizations, including labour unions. 
From this, the dynamics of the collective bargaining process 
has become a leading area of behavioural research with the 
specific focus of attention being the contract or negoti- 
2 3 
ating zone. ^ “V/alton and McKersie, Stagner and Rosen, and 
others have distinguished between the parties preferred out- 
come and their tolerance limits or resistance points. Parties 
to bargaining start out with preferred outcomes and gear their 
initial offers to these preferences. As bargaining continues, 
the parties tolerance levels are revealed, offers are modified. 
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and concessions are made. Two general type of bargaining 
outcomes are possible, namel^^ settlement and impasse, with 
the latter sometimes accompanied b^;- a strike or lockout, 
The fact remains that the collective bargaining process is a 
socio-psychological process the utilizes economic infor- 
mation in arriving at decisions related to preference. 
This process is a two-sided affair with a one-sided outlook. 
What is meant by this is that neither management nor labour 
trust one another enough to be fully open with the flow of 
information and the exchange of ideas. This means that both 
groups are individualistic and,self-oriented as they approach 
their role in the collective bargaining process. 
However the introduction of industrial relations systems 
and the more systematic study of industrial relations has 
led to a shift av/ay from the common antagonistic bond that 
controls the relationship between employer and union. 
Economists like Beaumont and Gregory (^6), Clegg et al (53)» 
Timperley (95), and Collins (5^) to name but a few, have 
noted that there has been a changing attitude amongst mana- 
gers as they rethink the vital role that industrial relations 
can play within their firms. 
"Two different employers interests have predominated in 
bringing about union recognition. In some industries, with 
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competitive product markets, employers have been interested 
in the assistance which trade unions could offer them in 
market control, at the very least in taking wages out of 
competition. In other, mainly large scale industries, on the 
other hand, the main motive has been to secure assistance 
in managerial control, in making and upholding rules to 
regulate work and wages for the sake of gaining employee 
consent and cooperation and avoiding costly strikes. ' 
Timperley attempts to discuss some of the key issues relevant 
to the management of industrial relations in organizational 
2 8 
settings and he believes that through managerial decisions 
og 
and actionj^. leading to a concept of a desirable organization 
could be regarded as both a managerial responsibility and 
30 
organizational necessity.^ Clegg et al discovered that 
most managers were broadly in favour of industrial democracy, 
and felt that almost all of them valued 'pragmatic' objectives 
which the majority believed could be met through direct forms 
of participation.^^ 
Collins examined the role of industrial relations as an 
occupation and noted that management considered the role of 
o O 
personnel management/industrial relations as a profession^ 
or in the process of becoming one, and these individuals are 
viewed as "insiders" with-an organization.^^ However, he 
also noted that these "professionals" were oriented to the 
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authority/- structure of their organizations and locked into 
the control system through the application of the line and 
staff concept^^, yet,* the emphasis has shifted towards educa- 
tion and professionalism as this role develops into a key 
part of the organizations infrastructure. 
Yet, industrial relations and their application varies from 
region to region, country to country and enterprise to enter- 
prise. For example in some parts of Europe it is a community 
affair. The European Community affects national industrial 
relations through its legislative function, by its involving 
the trade unions and employer organizations, by its new 
institutions, through collective bargaining issues and 
through plans to change both company structure and the influ- 
ence of workers on company decision-making,Countries 
36 like the United Kingdom - which is an ascending^ member of 
the European Community - and Japan utilize industry-wide 
negotiations but differ in the nature of their approaches. 
Countries like Canada, the U.S.A. and Australia still func- 
tion under the polarized system of unit bargaining and there- 
fore have poor strike records. 
Even with industrial relations systems and the widespread^ use 
of the collective bargaining process there are still strikes 
and lockouts. Attitudes between union and management are 
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changing but slowly. Unions have some support for joint 
programs that are directly related to issues that they 
support - for example union support is fairly high for 
issues related to quality of work-^ - but lack support 
for the more traditional issues.Without the unions 
complete support there remains room for industrial conflict 
to take roots and become a viable alternative to the process 
of negotiation. 
The collective bargaining process encourages dialogue 
between both sides. This dialogue may be friendly or hos- 
tile, but it still provides for a means of coromunication 
that is essential if the workplace is to survive. This 
paper does not distinguish between private and public sector 
collective bargaining, but since the wage rate in manufactur- 
ing has been used it must be assumed that a case for collec- 
tive bargaining in the private sector must be presented. 
"Four claims are made for private sector collective bargain- 
ing. First, it is said to be a way to achieve industrial 
peace. This point was made as early as 1902 by the U.S. 
Industrial Commission: 
The chief advantage which comes from the 
practice of periodically determining the 
conditions of labour by collective bargain- 
ing directly between employers and employees 
is that thereby each side obtains a better 
understanding of the actual state of the 
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industry, of the conditions which confront the 
other side, and of motives which influence 
it. Most strikes and lockouts would not occur 
if each party understood exactly the position 
of the other. 
Second, collective bargaining is a way of achieving indus- 
trial democracy, that is, participation by workers in their 
ov/n governance. Third, unions that bargain collectively 
with employers represent workers in the political arena 
as well. And political representation through interest groups, 
is one of the most important elements that the individual can 
have. Governments at all levels act in large part in response 
to the de.mands made upon it by the groups to which its citizens 
belong. Fourth, and most important, as a result of a belief 
in the unequal bargaining power of employers and employees, 
collective bargaining is claimed to be a needed substitute for 
individual bargaining. 
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So far the need for private sector collective bargaining 
and an adequate form of an industrial relations system have 
been established. An individual industrail relations system 
that promotes the free flowing exchange of information and 
ideas that will ease m.anagem.ents discontent with its em.ployees 
and end the unions suspicion of management. Attention must 
now focus on clearly defining the difference between the 
conscious and subconscious elements of the collective bar- 
gaining process as well as an analysis of the two most 
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popular m.acroeconometrie strike models. 
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As has "been pointed out in the introduction, the collective 
bargaining process can be broken down into two main components. 
Component one - the subconscious elements - focuses on the 
pre-negotiation stages and the information gathering process 
that the union and employer must go through. Component 
two-- the conscious elements - focuses on the development of 
negotiation preferences and the actual stages of negotiation, 
compromise, solution and ratification. Because of the 
assumption that strikes and/or lockouts occur as a result 
of a breakdown in Component Two, another assumption must 
be made that one purpose may in fact be to test the Hicksian 
43 
accident theory of strikes. This assumption must be made 
because the model attempts to identify variables that increase 
uncertainty for one or both sides in the collective bargaining 
44 
process. 
What this leads to is the fact that this type of macro- 
econometric model,, as aspoused by Ashenfelter and Johnson and 
expanded upon by Paldam and Pederson^ must focus on the 
individual variables and how they lead to a critical break- 
down in the collective bargaining process. In order to 
reduce the risk of a breakdown Phillips (32) has noted that 
preparation for bargaining requires an understanding of at 
least five vital topicsi 
1 . the employing enity - those involved should 
be knowledgeable about the objectives, facilities 
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strengths and weaknesses of the other side? 
2;; the existing agreement - both sides should 
do a thorough analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of an agreement; 
5. benchmark settlements - both sides should 
be knov/ledgeable of precedents established 
by other unions, companies and industries; 
4, present objectives and limits; 
5, the opposing negotiators and the group they 
represent 
and in addition 
6, economic conditions - know the national and 
regional trends of vital statistics such 
as unemployment, economic growth and infla- 
tion 
\ social conditions - try and establish a 
network of information that will allow for 
the immediate interpretation of proposed 
government policies and new legislative 
measures that have been introduced since 
the last agreement. 
By being better prepared for the negotiations both sides are 
more likely to attempt to get a compromise rather than develop 
an impasse. The seven components, as have been presented here, 
represent Component One of the collective bargaining process - 
the subconscious or indirect elements that have a vital role 
to play in the overall process. As one can clearly see 
Component One is a prepartory phase that concentrates on the 
gathering and producing of information relevant to the overall 
process. 
A union and employer will take all the information that they 
have received and enter into head-to-head negotiations to 
arrive at a collective agreement. It is at this point that 
the subconscious elements give way to the conscious elements. 
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Conference Board Report #765 examines many of these elements 
from a corporate point of view. 
In their study of 788 corporate enterprises it was dis- 
covered that competition within the industry and local 
labour market conditions and wage rates had the most import- 
46 
ant influences on wage and benefit targets. National 
labour market conditions and wage rates, the inflation rate 
and major union settlements in other industries had little or 
47 
no effect on wage and benefit targets. This would indicate 
that in the U.S. and in U.S. owned foreign multi-national 
corporations the company would be compatable with the unions 
in that nationalistic policies and collective bargaining 
should be ignored in order to promote better relations at 
the level'of the enterprise. 
In a similiar Conference Board report (ll8), a study of employe 
benefits noted that uniformity was becoming a major issue. 
Uniformity of treatment for all employees under the various 
benefit plans seem to have grown over the previous decade 
- 1.964-1974, There had been a rise in noncontributory bene- 
fits such as health insurance, accident and sickness insurance 
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long-term disability, pension plans, life insurance, etc. 
The two main reasons behind these trends were that companies 
now felt that it was a desirable policy goal, while unions 
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wanted to get more out of working, rather than just a com- 
pensation package based on wages. 
Issues like employee benefits, technological change,, job 
security, workers right to participation in management, etc., 
have become .much more important issues in the collective 
bargaining process. Report #765 has shown that although 
wages were still an important issue, they were not as import- 
ant as they once v;ere. Vv’ith the addition of these types of 
issues the collective bargaining process has become m.uch more 
volatile since there is more at stake for both sides. Unions 
no longer strike for monetary issues but rather for issues 
that effect their own future well being. 
Collective bargaining has become two dimensional; it is not 
only a short-term process (i.e, monetary issues) but it is 
also a long-term process that.has implications on the future 
fiscal viability of the firm as well as its workforce. And 
with all that is at stake there are bound to be disagree- 
ments that lead both sides into industrial conflict which 
may include a strike or lockout. 
Since this study focuses in som.e detail on a miacroeconometric 
strike model it is necessary to examine the two principal 
models of this type and to differentiate them from the work 
that is being done in this study. 
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The model that pioneered the-study of macroeconometric strike 
models was the model of Ashenfelter and Johnson.In their 
model Ashenfelter and Johnson wanted to examine certain 
perceived theories of the firm, trade union behaviour, and 
bargaining in order to derive testable implications concerning 
the conditions under which labour disregarded the traditional 
theory that collective bargaining was a two-party affair but 
instead focused on collective bargaining as a three-party 
affair - management, the union leadership and the union rank 
and file.^^ 
Ashenfelter and Johnson also assumed that the union leader- 
ship was placed in a *'no win** situation, and that they had 
only one of two alternatives; (i) signing an agreement which 
is less than the rank and file expects or (ii) incurring a 
strike.Ashenfelter and Johnson assumed that because the 
union leadership had to be placed in this situation that 
they could set up an "essentially political model of the 
function of a strike to examine the firm's choice between 
giving into the last union demand, which is the wage increase 
the rank and file finds acceptable as of the date of contract 
expiration, and "taking a strike" in order to obtain a lower 
settlement. 
In the Ashenfelter and Johnson models the probability of a 
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strike was the dependent variable in the linear system and 
the unemployment rate, nominal wage rate, a distributed lag 
function of current and former real wage increases, time, and 
a lagged ratio between profits and wages were the explanatory 
variables. This eo_uation was then reestimated by including a 
dummy variable to measure the effects of the Landrum-Griffith 
Act introduced in the U.S. in 1959* This model has been 
referred to as a political theory model of strikes. This 
model has also been designed with American industrial relations 
in mind and therefore would not necessarily be relevant in a 
more centralized industrial relations environment.^-^ 
The results also indicate that although a high r-squared 
coefficient did result there was some positive autocor- 
relation as given by the Durban-V/atson statistics. Because 
of the nature of the explanatory variables, one must assume 
some degree of multicollinearity, The Ashenfelter and Johnson 
model does set out to study the effect of a strike within 
a very limited environment and the results indicate that 
with the proper expansion and modifications as more realistic 
global model could be developed. 
That was the goal of Paldam and Pederson. These authors 
attempted to expand on the theoretical foundations laid down 
by Ashenfelter and Johnson and attempted to create a model 
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that restricts the analysis of post-war strike functions to 
economic factors as explanatory variables. After the initial 
estimation had been completed, two additional variables were 
introduced to consider relevant social and political factors. 
The authors then apply this function to seventeen different 
countries, including the eight to be studied in this paper - 
although because of data problems these authors were unable 
to study West Germany and Austria. 
The Paldara and Pederson model is first set-up with the number 
of conflicts (utilizing an index with national average set at 
too) as the dependent variable and nominal wages in manu- 
facturing, price increases for consumer goods, unemployment 
rate, real growth rate for Gross Factor Income, increases in 
real wages in manufacturing and changes in the net wage share, 
as the explanatory variables expressed in percentages. Paldam 
and Pederson then introduced the two dummy variables; (i) govern- 
ment composition (-1, 0, +1) and (ii) election years (1 for, 
0 not). 
The Paldam - Pederson model draws five main conclusions; 
**1.. nominal wage changes have a superior over- 
all explanatory power compared with real-wage 
changes; 
2. the dominating signs on both nominal and 
real wage increases are positive; 
3. the coefficient on the rate of unemployment 
is generally unstable 
4. conflicts are more plentiful under left-wing 
than right-wing governments, at least in the 
short run; 
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)• regressions using, as the dependent 
variable, number of conflicts (as 
opposed to man days lost or workers 
involved) produce the most significant 
and stable coefficients. " 
However just like the A.shenfelter and Johnson model the 
Paldam - Pederson model is again burdened by correlation and 
multicollinearity problems. Three of the six variables are 
dependent upon wages in the manufacturing sector; and the 
principal statistics - i.e. the r-squared, the ?-statistic 
and the Durban - Watson statistic are, in general, v/eak 
and/or inconclusive, particularly in regard to the eight 
countries that this paper will later study. 
The other problem with both of these papers is that they are 
singular in their approach. Both papers focus on the rela- 
tionship between wages and strikes in the two-dimensional 
framework of management versus labour. Both papers fail 
to regard government as an equal partner in industrial 
relations but rather they focus on government as a legislative 
outside entity that by virtue of policy implementations or 
formal legislation would have an external effect on the 
industrial relations system. 
It is here that this paper greatly differs from the previous 
two - even though it may seem quite similiar structurally. 
This model was established to reflect a type of tripartisan 
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relationship that must exist between government - labour 
and busineSvS, The variables are set-up in such a manner that 
each party shares an interest in having knowledge of the 
nations vital economic statistics. Governments' economic 
goals and industrial relations institutions and policies appear 
to be more important in this context then elections and poli- 
tical policy alliances. Economic growth, unemployment and 
inflation are all variables that have a direct bearing on the 
attitudes of each of the three participants as they cope 
with the economy and deal with each other. Time and wages 
have a direct bearing as well, particularly in changing the 
structure of the organization and in focusing on the future. 
However this model, although structurally similiar yet 
structurally dissimiliar, is utilized in a different manner 
when one considers the entire scope of this study. The model 
is not the singular element in this study. The model results 
will be used to interpret the internal domestic relationships 
that exist in each of the eight countries. A large part of 
this study will focus on the individual nations and the types 
of industrial relation policies that are being utilized as a 
means to promote tripartite cooperation. 
This study will then examine industrial conflict as a func^ 
tion of the bargaining process and examine the role of Component 
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One in the collective bargaining process. The paper will 
also provide a historical briefing on the development of 
industrial relations institutions and policies for each of 
the eight countries and will relate these to the results 
obtained from the model. Therefore, the model in this 
study is only a means by which to achieve an end and it 
should be accepted on its own merits and contributions 
to this study* 
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CHAPTER III 
The fundamental objective of this econometric model is to 
establish whether or not a relationship exists between the 
variable that monitors the breakdown of the collective 
bargaining process - average annual man days lost per employee 
due to strikes and/or lockouts - and a country's overall 
economic performance. By analysing the resulting econometric 
statistics, one will be able to determine if the collective 
bargaining process is at all affected by that country's overall 
economic performance, in cooperation with the various social 
institutions being utilized. 
To determine whether or not such a relationship does exist, 
one must first specify an econometric model that accurately 
reflects the goals of this study - a model with the right 
equation and an appropriate number of variables. Therefore, 
the criteria for analysing this relationship must be established. 
It is inevitable that the collective bargaining process must 
at some point choose between one of the two options? a) to 
agree to a new contract or b) declare an impasse and utilize 
a strike or lockout as a form of obtaining concessions from 
the other side. Since the only data available for all the 
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countries to be studied was data that focused on industrial con- 
flicts, this study will focus on the breakdowns on the collective 
bargaining process. The data comes from published International 
Labour Organization statistics-^^ that focus directly on indust- 
rial conflict and the ILO.titles "Man Days Lost Due to Strikes" 
Strikes must be qualified' as not only being a result of a break- 
down in negotiations or disagreement over the implementation of 
an existing agreement, but also because of disagreement over 
issues such as technological changes, health and safety, shut- 
downs or government policies. 
Access to these statistics will enable a study of the rate of 
occurance of this type of conflict and to relate it to break- 
downs in the collective bargaining process. The explanatory 
variables, which as a, group, represent our estimation of the 
nation's economic performance, will be used to develop this 
critical relationship, and then, a comment on their contribution 
to industrial conflict. For example, if the economy is going 
through a period of boom and economic conditions are such that un- 
employment is at a low ebb in its cycle, then a union may choose 
to strike their employer, knowing that it may be difficult and/or 
costly for that employer to find an adequate supply of skilled 
labour to assume their positions. A second scenario could be that 
the union, after years of mediocre corporate performances, 
knows that the company(s) has to put together back-to-back 
strong fiscal periods, and realizing that it is their work 
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skills that have led to this corporate turnabout, now want 
higher wages, better benefits, including pensions and a general 
improvement in working conditions. The union feels that these 
demands are justified given the company's new found fiscal 
strength. These are only a few examples of how a union can 
evaluate economic performance both on the national and the local 
level prior to taking the position that a strike is necessary. 
It is necessary to evaluate the importance of a nation's economic 
performance and its various labour-related socio-economic programs 
on the collective bargaining process, (or ultimately on the final 
decisions regarding the strength of one's position in the col- 
lective bargaining process), an econometric model that will allow 
for that purpose, must be established. As has been stated 
earlier, attention must be focused on breakdowns in the process 
rather than on successes because of the limited nature of avail- 
able data. What this means, is that average annual man days 
lost per employed worker, will be the dependent variable in 
the equation, man days lost in terms of strikes and/or lock- 
outs that result from a breakdown in the collective bargaining 
process. 
On the independent side of the equation, will be a combination 
of explanatory variables that best represent an accurate measure 
of a nations total economic performance. These explanatory 
variables are; 
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• the real wage rate (wages) which represents 
the annual rate of change of deflated wages 
in the manufacturing sectors expressed as a 
percentage; 
the annual unemployment rate as of January 
1st of each year, and expressed as a percent- 
age of all available workers (unemployment)? 
)• the total number of employed workers (employ- 
ment) excluding those in the military services 
but including those directly involved in agri- 
culture ; 
the expected annual year to year change in 
the price of goods and services (inflation) 
expressed as a percentage based on January 1st 
of each year; 
»• the nominal annual rate of growth of the ecrr 
onomy (growth) expressed as a percentage change 
in the Gross National Product; 
>. the policy variable index (policy) which re- 
flects the type of labour related socio-economic 
policies being used in the country as well as 
a measure of how that country's performance 
in attaining the traditional economic goals 
of low unemployment, lower inflation and a high 
rate of economic growth; 
\ time (time) as a variable, measuring socio- 
economic change in terms of attitude changes 
and technological advances; and as time marches 
on all things must change*.. 
Each of these explanatory variables will be used to explain 
why there have been breakdowns in the collective bargaining 
Therefore, the equation can be eexpressed as follows i 
Yi = A BXi + BX2 ^ HX3 BX4 + BX5 ^ BX6 ^ B)L f 
where is the dependent variable 
A is the constant 
process that have led to industrial conflict* 
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Or, in terms of the model in this study, 
MLP = A -H Ej^XZNEF + B2XZRWR + B3XZURP + B^XZTEf.i -f 
B3XZPCG + B^XZTime + Br^XZPVI 
where 
MLP is the dependent variable, man days 
lost due to strikes? 
A is the constant; 
B is the coefficient of estimation for 
the explanatory variable; 
ENF is the inflation index; 
RWR is the wage rate index; 
VRP is the unemployment rate; 
TSM is the total employment 
PVI is the policy variable index; 
Time is the time expressed in chronological 
order; and 
PCG is the rate of growth in GhP. 
Now that the equation has been illustrated, the focus will 
shift to providing detailed explanations as to why these speci- 
fic variables were chosen. It will be necessary to provide 
some additional explanations of the mathematical calculations 
involved in converting some of these variables into a more use- 
ful form. Even though the main purpose of this study is an 
examination of breakdowns in the collective bargaining process, 
the emphasis has shifted away from direct involvement in this 
process and interest has grown in the socio-economic factors 
that are crucial to the development of specific opinions regarding 
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the possibility of a mutually acceptable agreement being worked 
out. As has been stated earlier, one must not be overly con- 
cerned with why the collective bargaining process breaks down, 
but rather be interested in developing the relationship between 
a nation's economic performance and its indirect effect on the 
collective bargaining process. 
So the ultimate question becomes, which variables should be 
used in order to guage economic performance. However, there 
are two underlying principles that must be adhered to when 
chosing the variables which will be used most effectively in 
the model; 
1) In this study, the O.L.S. method will be used 
in order to derive results. One of the primary 
reasons for chosing this method, was the ease 
by which statistics could be analyzed, partic- 
ularly with a limited number of explanatory var- 
iables. The explanatory variables were limited 
in order that a sufficient number of degrees of 
freedom would be left to make statistically 
significant judgements; and 
2) Since the success of any industrial relations 
system must be a tripartisan effort, one must 
include variables in the equation that accurately 
reflect this relationship. These explanatory 
variables may or may not effect each of the three 
participants in the same manner, however, each 
group will consider each of these explanatory 
variables when making policy decisions. 
Explanations for each of these variables follow. Perhaps the 
most non-controversial of all current measures of economic 
performance is the annual rate of change in the Gross National 
Product. This statistic provides insight to all three of the 
parties as to the nation's economic stability and whether or 
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not present policy measures are being successful in expanding 
the economy. The measure chosen to show the market prices and 
measure the inflated change in GNP as the percentage change from 
January 1st of one year to January 1st of the next is 
percentage change GNP - GNP(-l) IAQ 
in GNP = GNP(-l) 
Another of the explanatory variables that always seems to be 
in the national spotlight is the national unemployment rate. 
Business and labour have developed a pessimistic attitude 
towards government policy and the overall state of the economy 
when unemployment is at a significantly high level. When 
unemployment is at a low level, there is always renewed op- 
timism that things can only get better for each of the three 
parties. For the purpose of this study, unemployment has been 
expressed as the annual rate of change, expressed as a change 
from January 1st of one year to January 1st of the next. 
In order for any economy to consistently expand year after year, 
there must be consistent growth in the Gross National Product 
and in the key sectors of the economy. When there is consistent 
growth, it means that businesses and government are expanding 
and creating more jobs for labour. One measure of this consist- 
ency is the total number of employed workers. The gross figure 
is being utilized, as opposed to an annual rate of change 
figure, to avoid chronic serial correlation between the two 
employment variables. 
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Since this model focuses on the breakdown of the collective 
bargaining process, it is important to analyse the two statistics 
that play an important role in the preparations prior to enter- 
ing the collective bargaining process. The first of these statis- 
tics is the expected annual rate of inflation. The reason for 
choosing the expected annual rate of inflation, is based on the 
fact that labour is usually involved in negotiations that extend 
beyond the contractual obligations, and therefore, the decision 
making process is based on projections that extend over two or 
more periods. Therefore, an index has been developed that meas- 
ures how labour would arrive at its projected figure for inflation, 
and the arguement is based on the model of adaptive expectations> 
see Appendix V. 
For simplicitji and to avoid a lengthy arguement over a weighing 
scale, the assumption has been made that labour makes its decisions 
over two periods. This means that the variable equation was de- 
rived as follows: 
STEF ONE: determine the annual rate of change 
in the Consumer Price Index and express 
this as a percentage 
Inflation = C.P.I. - C.P.I.(-1)» 100 
C.P.I.(-l) 
STEP TWO: determine the expected annual rate 
of inflation for labour 
Expected 
Rate of = INF(-l) + INF - INF(-l) ^ 100 
Inflation INF(-l) 
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For labour, this figure would become the focal point of the 
wage increase that they would be asking for. One can be assured 
that the union would seek an annualized wage increase in excess 
of this figure. 
As a direct by-product of the annual rate of inflation there 
is the real wage rate. The real wage rate represents the net 
effect of an increase in a worker’s wage, (ie. the gross wage 
increase for that year minus that year's inflation rate). The 
real wage is calculated in two steps utilizing the average 
hourly rate of pay in the manufacturing sector, because although 
this sector may not have the highest percentage of unionized 
workers in a particular nation? it is this sector of the economy 
which is most associated with union activity. 
STEP ONE: calculate the deflated annual wage 
rate (D,WR) by utilizing the manufact- 
uring sector wage rate and dividing 
it by the consumer price index where 
1980 = 100 
Deflated V/age = Wage in Manufacturing ^ 100 
Rate Sector C. K^l, 
STEP TWO: determine the annual rate of change 
in real wages expressed as a percentage 
Percentage Change in = D .V/ .R. - D .W ,R. ( ~1) * 100 
Real Wages D.W.R.(-l) 
The welfare of the worker depends not on how much money he/she 
receives, but on the goods and services content of his/her money 
income, which depends on commodity prices. An increase in money 
income may or may not mean an increase in real income, depending 
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on the relative movements of prices and money wages If 
price movements exceed wage movements in an upward direction, 
- an event which occurred more than thirty times in the last 
twenty-five years, throughout seven of the eight countries 
being studied (the exception being West Germany) and more than 
twenty times during the last ten yearsthe welfare of workers 
will be diminished in spite of the increase in money wages. 
In reality, calculating the real well-being of the workers, 
requires an accurate measure of the cost of living, or failing 
that, of prices of goods and services purchased by wage earners. 
However, fully accurate measures of these prices are not avail- 
able. A reasonable proxy used for this purpose is the consumer 
price index^^ (C.F.I.), which comes closest to being an index 
6l 
of goods and services paid for by workers. It is for these 
reasons that this has been included in the annual rate of 
change of real wages in the model. 
Now that the study of the first five of the explanatory variables 
has been completed, attention must shift to the last two and 
most obscure of the explanatory variables. The first of these 
two variables is Time, and for the purpose of this study, 
Time has only been measured in terms of a chronological sequence 
being in 1955 and ending in 1981. But why include Time as an 
explanatory variable in the system? What has the last twenty- 
seven years brought forth that has a direct effect on economic 
performance? The answers are; 1) technological change. 
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2) aggression and war, 3) social change, 4) the formation of 
global alliances, 5) domestic changes and the development of 
new socio-economic policies, and 6) a better understanding of 
the importance of industrial relations system^s. 
One can look back and recall many happenings that may be used 
to emphasize the answer to the previous question. For example; 
1) in terms of technological changes, there has 
been the development of the micro and mini com- 
puters and the impact that these have had upon 
everyone; in 1969 we put a man on the moon 
for the first time ever; in 1981 came the de- 
velopment of reuseable space craft; 
2) aggression and war, in the 1960's it was the 
Vietnam War and the Middle East conflict, in 
the 1970*s the Middle East war continued as well 
as many coups in weak and unstable South American 
and African nations, since 1955 there have been 
three Soviet invasions of other countries (1956 
Hungary, 1968 Czechoslovakia, 1980 Afganistan) 
as well as a near crisis in Cuba; 
3) social change in terms of a liberation into the 
realm of one's own sexuality, the ever increasing 
role of women in our society, the increased 
emphasis on education as a means by which every- 
one can improve their future, and the development 
of peace movemehts and anti nuclear movements; 
4) the formation of global alliances, for example, 
there are three global alliances that affect 
economic activity and t^omote global segregation; 
1) the Warsaw Pact Nations made up of the U.S.S.R. 
and its supporters; 2) the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization - a military alliance designed to 
combat Soviet aggression; and 3) the European 
Economic Community which is an alliance of West 
European nations that tries to combat the economic 
problems faced by overpopulated and under resourced 
European nations; 
5) domestic changes and the development of new socio- 
economic policies, - it would be unheard of for 
a democratic nation to have not undergone some form 
of domestic change over the last twenty-five years, 
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if not in the governing party, at least in terms 
of its leadership. There has been the development 
of many new socio-economic policies; for example, 
in Canada there was the adaptation of wage and 
price controls during the 1970 *s,° in Germany it 
was the new V/orks Constitution Act in 1972 and the 
Co-determination Act of 1976,^3 in Sweden it was 
the 1976 L.O. Proposals; and 
6) the overall changing attitude of business, labour 
and government that cooperation and not confront- 
ation is perhaps the best way by which problems 
can be solved. In countries like Sweden, Austria 
and West Germany, human relations theory long 
replaced human resources theory and it is only now 
that countries like Canada, Australia and the U.K. 
are moving more towards these ideas and principles. 
These have been only but a few of the many events and a few of the 
many reasons as to why Time has been included as an explanatory 
variable in this model. 
The second of the obscure variables is also the most unorthodox 
of all the variables in the equation. This variable directly 
reflects each member of the tripartisan entity, because it takes 
into account current government policy regarding the adaptation 
of beneficial labour related socio-economic programs,and integrate 
them with the more age old tradition of economic goal setting. 
It all sounds very complicated, but. hopefully, the following 
explanation will be able to enlighten readers as to why this 
policy index was developed, and included in this model. 
The one central theme that has returned throughout the explanation 
of the previous variables has been the tripartite relationship 
that exists between business, government and labour. However, 
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except for an occassional mention of a secondary relationship 
that may exist, a clear definition of the role of government in 
our model has not been provided. Government has a direct influence 
on every decision that labour and business makes through its 
policies, and the role of the government is very complex. 
Most governments act in the following capacities? 
1) economic policy maker - what is going to be 
exported and in what quantities? What is 
going to be imported and in what quantities? 
What type of domestic economic policy is going 
to be followed? Nationalistic, Capitalistic, 
Social-Democratic, or Communist! Are they 
going to interfere in the market, or are they 
going to let the market forces dictate supply 
and demand? What about interest rates? Money 
supply? Taxes? 
2) social policy maker - what is the role of govern- 
ment in the society? the development of social 
welfare systems that promote industrial relations 
and tripartite co-operation; 
3) the government as an employer; 
4) the government as an intermediary to help settle 
disputes between business and labour through the 
use of conciliators or mediators; and 
0 the government as legislator and lawmaker - de- 
veloping new legislation that will help the 
country attain its socio-economic goals while 
not destroying the delicate equilibrium that 
keeps it in power. 
In each of these capacities, the government must be aware that, 
in a democratic society, the threads to government are very thin 
and can snap at any moment in time, and this helps to contribute 
to this very complex relationship. 
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However, for this study's purpose, an attempt must be made to 
simplify matters by setting up a policy variable index that 
examines the role of the government in light of its socio- 
economic policies that contribute to the development of an 
industrial relations system,as well as in terms of measuring 
the effectiveness of governments in attaining the most funda- 
mental of all economic goals. 
These fundam.ental economic goals that are being referred to 
include s 
1) a low rate of unemployment, 
2) a low rate of inflation, and 
3) modest annual economic growth. 
Given today's overall economic situation with most "western" 
economies using some version of deficit financing and combining 
this with the continued adoption of advancing technology ^5 
i.e, men being replaced by machinery, in order that nations 
may com.pete in the international market place; nations should 
be trying to obtain the following annual economic goals; 
1) a annual rate of unemployment 
2) a 6,5/^ annual rate of inflation, and 
3) a 3»0fc- annual rate of growth in GHP, 
These goals are in no v/ay unrealistic and are modest goals 
that each nation should be able to miaintain over a long period 
of tim.e. If a country has been able to achieve these goals, it 
will count for them and if they have been unable to achieve these 
goals, it will count against themi. 
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The other component of this index looks at the type of labour- 
related socio-economic policies employed in a particular coun- 
try? i.e. policies that make quality circles mandatory, incomes 
policies, wage policies, mandatory legislation or unofficial 
councils that control unions and management by enacting upon 
decisions to srike, and co-determination as a mandatory elemaent 
in the industrial relations system. The eight countries in the 
model vary in terms of the stage that they are at in developing 
a viable industrial relations system, therefore a series of 
dummy variables has been used to rate where each country is at« 
Dummy Variable one, reflects those countries whose main focus 
is the free-enterprise system and where the government does 
little to encourage the development of an industrial relations 
system, A country in this situation, would score a one under 
the heading IR3# which appears on the data pages in Appendix I. 
Dummy Variable two, reflects countries where through the use,.of 
legislative measures, and a general attitude of cooperation 
between business and labour, there exists an established foun- 
dation for the development of a workable industrial relations 
system, A country in this situation scores a one under the 
heading IR2, Dummy Variable three represents those countries 
where tripartite cooperation and co-determination are integral 
elements in a well established industrial relations system. 
These systems generally reduce the desire or need for indust- 
rial conflict. Nations in this situation score one under IRl, 
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Since this index must have some focal point, that relates it ;to 
the collective bargaining process and a nation’s economic 
performance, the following weights have been placed on the 
three dummy variables? 
1) IRl X 1.0 
2) IR2 X 0.5 
3) IR3 X 0.0. 
Next, adjustments were made to relfect a government's ability 
to meet the more traditional econom.ic goals, as had been es- 
tablished earlier. In equation form, the index would be; 
Policy Variable = 1 x IKl + .51R2^° + (.065 - (INF/100)) 
Index + (.055 - (URP/100)) + C{FCG/100) - .03) 
where I IRl and IR2 are the type of industrial relations 
system now in place in that particular nation; 
INF is the annual rate of change in the consumer 
price index expressed as a percentage; 
URP is the annual rate for unemployment, expressed 
as a percentage; 
PCG is the percentage change in GNP^*?^. 
All in all, and even though there may be some strong objections 
to the variables that have been included in this equation, one 
must agree that these variables and this equation best exem- 
plify the principle relationships that are attempted to be 
established in this study. 
Perhaps, the single most imprtant element in the development 
of this study, has been the derivation of the equation. Given 
limited resources, an equation had to be,, developed that would 
conform to the ordinary least squares technique, and that would 
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provide a solid base from which meaningful results could be 
derived. Therefore, the topic utilizing the macroeconomic 
strike model was chosen to attempt to explain the indirect 
relationship that exists between economic performance and the 
collective bargaining process. 
Thus, the equation was established using the fundamental prin- 
ciples of the O.L.S. approach? 
Yi = + where Xi = , X2  .Xy 
where Yi, the dependent variable, would be the elements that 
represented the results of the collective bargaining process 
and Xi, the explanatory variables, which would be the variables 
that best modelled economic performance. 
Once the equation has been properly examined, the following stat- 
istics will be examined in detail in Chapter Four in order that 
proper judgement could be passed on the merits of the equation; 
2 
1. R I R-squared statistic or coefficient of multiple 
determination. is a measure commonly used 
to describe how well the sample regression line 
fits the observed data. Note that cannot 
be negative or greater than one, i.e. 0 R^ 1.. 
A zero value of R"^ indicates the poorest fit, 
and a unit value the best fit that can be at^ 
tained. R2 = 1 - (sse/sst) = 1 - ( ei^/ 
that is the proportion of the variation of Y . 
that can be attributed to the variation of X*°° 
2*. R I The adjusted r-squared statistic (or corrected 
R^) provides for a correction factor where an„. 
irrelevant regressor has increased^r-squared. 
= (R2 - (k/n-l))((n-l)/(n-k-l))7^ 
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• Ts T-statistic is a measure of the level of sig- 
nificance of each of the explanatory vari- 
ables, If tne value of the t-s±atistic lies 
outside the acceptance region,^ the hypothe- 
sis of no relationship between X and Y is to 
be rejected.*^3 
- F* 
'. D/vV t 
F-statistic is another way of testing the null 
hypothesis that =0, Since F equals the variance 
explained by the regression divided by the 
unexplained variance,a series of tables are 
utilized to test the null hypothesis. If the 
value of the F-statistic is significantly 
low the null hypothesis is rejected. 
The Durban-Watson statistic is a measure of the 
level of autocorrelation in the equation. If 
the D/W statistic is signifiantly close to 
two there will be no autocorrelation. 
The "Sum of Residuals'* test will allow for a 
test of bias in the estimators. If there is 
no bias, this will mean that the estimator 
is properly distributed around 
Lastly, a visual examination of the plots of residuals will be 
done to ensure that the errors are random and uncorrelated. 
V/ith all of these results, one will be able to test the hypoth- 
esis relevant to the statistical significance of each of these 
equations/nations, This will allow for meaningful comments on 
the relationship between the various industrial relations in^ 
stitutions and economic policies in place in each of the nations. 
The cumulative results of each of these tests will be used to 
determine the statistical significance of each of the equations. 
In examining an econometric model one cannot draw firm con- 
clusions utilizing just one or two statistical indices. One 
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must analyse all the available information, and if, and only 
if, the indices point towards statistical significance, then, 
and only then can that model and its results be considered 
relevant. 
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CHAPTER IV 
An elaborate econometric model of this type may be able to 
provide some enlightened results, possibly even some results 
that will coincide with aspects of the hypothesis. The main 
purpose of this chapter will be to accurately relate the 
results of the model to the hypothesis, and the statistical 
limits that have been previously set forth. This chapter will 
analyse the various statistics individually. This has been 
done in order to emphasize the statistical strengths and weak- 
nesses of each of the eight nations in a comparative manner. 
Perhaps the most imprtant of the six statistical results to 
be analysed will be the r-squared (R ) statistic. Chapter 
one and two have set forth the premise that will enable a 
detailed sutdy of this statistic; chapter on grouped the 
eight countries into two very distinct categories, those 
countries with equations that proved to be st 3.i S "fc i- C 3- iiy 
significant (i.e. Canada, U.3.A., U.K. and Australia) and 
those countries whose equations lack statistical significance 
(i.e. V/est Germany, Japan, Austria and Sweden); and chapter 
two clarified the relationship between the subconscious 




The equations ca.n only be a partial measure of the total 
variance accounted for by the linear influence of the explana- 
tory variables.In particular there are many socio-economic 
factors which affect the collective bargaining process and 
which could have - if included in the model - been utilized 
to provide a large coefficient of multiple determination, 
V/ith all of this in mind, Table 4.1 provides the R^ results for 












Coefficient of Multiple Determination 
Australia, Canada, the U.K., Austria, Sweden, and V/est Cermany 
had results that coincided with the hypothesis. The U.3. 
and Japan had the most startling and least predictable results. 
It had been anticipated that Japan with its quality circles 
and employer, loyalist unions, would not have labour disputes 
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that focused on purely economic issues but rather v/ould have 
focused on more social issues like job security, (particularly 
in light of Japan's continuing dominance as the world's most 
highly techonologically advanced manufacturing nation), 
safety, and equal representation in management decision- 
making. In Appendix II it was discovered that the average 
cost per employee, per year, of a strike (in.constant I9S0 
U.S. dollars) over the last quarter century had been only 
$6.4l which, for Japan, made it the fourth lowest amongst the 
eight countries and only 19.4??» of Canada's trend setting 
rate of $32.91. (Por the most part it was the results of 
Appendix II that led to the hypothesis that was presented 
in Chapter One.) 
By contrast, the United States with its open attitude towards 
the so called free enterprise system* should have labour dis- 
putes that focus on the more traditional issue of wages. 
However, the results show that such may not be the case for 
p 
the U.S., or by contrast for Japan. Japan's value of O.8363 
2 was the highest amongst the eight nations while the U.S.'s R 
value of 0.3115 was the second lowest. This is in direct 
contrast to the annualized cost per employee of a strike over 
the last quarter century which was $21.6? for the U.S., and 
this was the second highest amongst the eight nations. One 
explanation offered for this situation is that Japanese workers 
were left behind in terms of wage increases despite Japan's 
remarkable economic success. 
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Sweden, Austria and Great Britain had results that, although 
not predicted - exactly - were not totally unexpected. A 
2 ... 
comparison of the R statistic, with the results of Appendix 
II, show that Sweden and Austria had strike related costs that 
were very low when compared with the other eight countries, 
w^hile Great Britain's cost was on the high side. The 
results show the same thing, Sweden and Austria are on the 
low side - below O.50OO - while Great Britain is above 
2 
0.5OOO and therefore on the high side. However these R 
results are not overly conclusive to make specific inferences 
at this time. 
The next group of statistics to be examined are the t-statis- 
tics. The t-statistics measure the significance of each of the 
explanatory variables in the equation. In the following table, 
the black numbers with asteriks, indicate those variables that 
are statistically significant, while the plain black numbers 
indicate those that are not. The benchmiark value for this 
77 group of statistics, at the 90% significance level, was 1.729. 
Countries Constant Inflation Wages Unem.ploym.ent 








0.8250 -0.8001 1.9459* -1.8101* 
2.6550* -0.7741 0.8084 -2.1563* 
2.1807* 4.0911* 2.4548* -3.2915* 
-0.2123 -0.5284 0.2517 -2.0423* 
2.2999* 0.3298 1.9840* -2.2838* 
-0.1902 -2.3660* -1.0211 0.3286 
-0.0082 0 -0.2610 0.3727 
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Table 4.2 T-statistics 
This means that the following explanatory variables were 
significant in each of these countries; 
1. Australia - wages, employment and policy^; 
2. Canada - wages, unemployment, growth and 
policy; 
3. U.K. - unemploymient, employment and time; 
4. Japan - inflation, wages, unemployment, 
employment and time; 
5. Austria - unemployment and time; 
6. Sweden - inflation and employmient; 
7. U.S.A. - wages, unemploymient and employment; 
8. F.R.G. - zero 
Since there were seven explanatory variables in each equation, 
there are at least two insignifleant variables in every 
countries equation. Only West Germany had an equation with 
zero significant explanatory variables, while there was at 
least two significant explanatory variables for each of the 
remaining seven nations. Cf the seven explanatory variables 
policy, in this case, refers to both economic and social 




39fo were significant (i.e, twenty-two of fifty-six) and if you 
include the constant^4l^ (twenty-six of sixty-four) were 
significant. 
These results do not detract from the hypothesis but only 
further strengthen the committment to persue valid explana- 
tions as to why these phenomenon occurred. The analysis 
continues by examining the individual countries; Japan had 
five significant explanatory variables, Canada four, the 
U.S., Great Britain and Australia had three each, while 
Sweden and Austria had two each. In terms of the explanatory 
variables, unemployment and employment were significant in 
five of the eight equations, wages in four, time in three, 
and policy and inflation in two and growth in only one. 
Without having completely satisfactory t-statistic results, 
it is important to cross-check the validity of the explana- 
tory variables. This was accomplished utilizing the following 
form: 
y* = A + ^x* 
where = man days lost per employee due to strikes - 
dependant variable 
A = constant 
= explanatory variable(s), 
and this provided an additional fifty-six equations for 
consideration. 
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To analyse the significance of the t-statistics from these 
new equations a new benchmark value of 1,708^ was established, 
given a 90‘'t significance level and twenty-five dregrees of 
freedom. Appendix III shov/s that nineteen of the expanatory 
variables were significant, and of these only six were repeats 
from the original^analysis• This indicates a minimal degree 
of significance that will have to be more thoroughly analyzed 
later in this paper. 
As had been discovered, each of the eight equations had at 
least two explanatory variables that are insignificant, and 
it is this cirumstance that leads to the study of the adjusted 
—2 
r-squared statistic, R • The adjusted r-squared assumes that 
at least one of the equatiorfs regressors will be irrelevant, 
2 
and then it makes the appropriate adjustment to the R statis- 
tic to emphasize this fact. Since all of our equations, have 
irrelevant regressors, the adjusted r-squareds have been 


















Table 4.3 Adjusted R-squared Statistics 
Page 65 
There have been changes that have occurred when the 
results are compared to the R results. As can be seen five 
of the eight countries still conform to the original hypothesis 
- Australia, Canada, Austria, Sweden and West Germany - ’while 
three countries - Japan, the U.K*, and the U.S.A. - still do 
not conform. Since the adjusted r-squared statistic is always 
lower than the r-squared statistic, the movement of the U.K, 
could not have been unexpected; given the fact that the U.K. 
was only at 0.5^45 for the r-squared analysis. However, the 
use of the adjusted r-squared result has done little to 
clarify the overall results. 
The analysis will continue by examining two statistics that 
will allow for a more accurate assessraent of the overall 
state of the equation(s). First, there is the F-statistic 
which is another alternative way of testing the null hypo- 
thesis that 0. If the value of the F-statistic is 
significantly low then one must accept the null hypothesis. 
Secondly there is the Durban-Vvatson statistic which measures 
the effect of serial correlation amongst the regressors. 
Country F-statistic 
Australia 10,0979'*‘‘ 














Table 4.4 F-statistics 
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In the F-statistic analysis one must accept the hypothesis 
that ^ = 0 when the value of the P-statistic generated hy 
the model exceeds the cut-off value, for F(7,19) at 95"^ 
significance, of 2.5^* In terms of this model the null 
hypothesis would be accepted for Australia, Canada, Japan 
and the U.K. These results strongly coincide with the 
earlier R results, and are an indication that there will be 
a fifty-fifty split in the number of statistically significant 
equations versus the number of statistically insignifleant 
equations. 
Next, there is the Durban-Watson statistic v/hich analyses 
the degree of serial correlation in each of the equations , 
by establishing boundaries by which all results can be 
monitored. The Durban-Watson test has been widely used in 
econometric applications, in fact in all studies utilizing 
time-series the value of the Durban-Watson statistic is 
calculated when the equation is being estimated. The question 
then becomes, what action, if any, is to be taken in response 
to a particular outcome of the test? If no autoregression 
is indicated, one can retain the least squares estimation 
without fearing a loss of efficiency and bias of the esti- 
mated standard errors. However if the test indicates auto- 
82 
regression then there is some reason to be concerned. This 
8 3 
Study's response is to re-estimate the equation and 
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alternatively take a look at the specification of the regression 
Q 4 , . 
model. Finally, if the result of the test is inconclusive, 
one may or may not want to respond. 
Given the statistical boundaries of = 1.9?^ and = 0.925 
8 S 
there will be no autoregression in the range 1,97^1 to 2.0259^ 
Q A 
and the two inconclusive ranges will be 0.925 to 1.974°° and 


















Table 4,5 Durban-Watson Statistics 
was situated in the inconclusive range. Japan and the U.S.A. 
had positive autoregressive traitSj while the other five 
countries exhibited negative autoregressive traits. Since 
most of the- results are in the inconclusive range there are 
two options that can be selected - leave the results as they 
are^ or choose to rerun the program attempting to correct for 
the autoregression that does exist. Since correcting for 
inconclusive amounts of autoregression would involve a 
lengthy reevaluation of previous results, the new results of 
the correction process have been included in Appendix IV, 
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However there is one rather startling point that must he made 
at this time. Utilizing the Cochrane-Orcutt first-order iterative 
technique as a means of correcting for inconclusive results, 
did not provide any new results. Once again all of the 
Durban-Watson statistics were inconclusive and although there 
were numerical changes^ these results were not significant 
enough to warrant any restructuring of the previous statis- 
tical results. 
In each equation there exists one of three possible relation- 
ships; l) a positive relationship between the explanatory 
variables and the dependant variable; 2) a negative relation- 
ship between the same or 3) no relationship at all, meaning 
that the resulting t-statistic for that particular explanatory 
variable was zero. For example, if one closely examines 
Table 4.6, one quickly notices that the coefficient sign for 
wages and unemployment are opposite in every case. For each 
of the seven explanatory variables as well as the constant 
there are at least two^each o:^ Type A,and Type B relationships 
in every column,and at least three of the same in every row. 
This indicates that the relationship between the dependant 
variable and the explanatory variable varies depending on 
the country that is being studied. 
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Country Em'ployment Growth Time Policy  
Australia + + + 
Canada — + + ~ 
U.K. - - + + 
Japan — — + « 
Austria + — — + 
U.S.A. - + + - 
Sweden + + — 
F.R.G. *f + + ** 
Table ^.6 Coefficient Sign for the Explanatory Variables and 
Constant 
In the case of the expected rate of inflatior, a positive rela- 
tionship could be interpreted as follows; the larger the expected 
increase in the rate of inflation then the higher the number 
of man days lost due to strikes, or as the expected rate of 
inflation continued to increase^in proportion to its own 
relationship with the actual rate of inflation, so, to,, did the 
number of man days lost due to strikes. Where a negative 
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relationship exists one could interpret this to mean that as 
the expected rate of inflation decreases the number of man 
days lost due to strikes will increase. This indicates that 
workers in countries where this second type of relationship 
exists would be more apt to seek improvements in the non- 
monetary issues of a collective agreement. However, a more 
comprehensive study of the sign of the coefficients will have 
to await Chapter Six, 
Finally there are two other items that merit consideration in 
this section of the chapter. First, there is the bias of the 
equations, and secondly a visual look at the plots of the 
residuals. The bias is the difference between the mean of 
the sampling distribution of a given estimator and the true 
value of the parameter; 
Bias = E ( ^ ) - 0 
When the mean of the sampling distribution of a given esti- 
mator is larger than the true value of the parameter there is 
a positive or right-hand bias. When the opposite occurs there 
is a negative or left-hand bias. 
Country Sum of Residuals Biasness 
Australia 0.291 E-10 Hight 
Canada -0.262 E-09 Left 
U.K, -0.582 S-10 Left 
Japan 0.273 E-11 Right 
Austria Zero None 
U.S.A. 0.582 E-10 Right 
Sweden -0.582 E-10 Left 
F.R.G. 0.728 E-11 Right 
Talbe 4,7 Sum of Residuals 
rage '/t 
Table ^.? provides the results for each of the equations. 
Only one of the eight equations had no bias, and that was 
Austria. The U.S.A., Australia, Japan and ^/'/est Ger/nany all 
had right-hand bias v/hile Canada, the U.K. and Sweden all 
had negative or left-hand bias. V/ith these very small 
results for the sum of residuals as well as the very small 
variances, knowledge of the bias leads one to believe that 
it really has no significant effect on the overall quality 
of the equations. Therefore it shall be assumed tha.t the 
equations are somewhat efficient and for the most part free 
of harmful bias that could distort the results. Minimally 
efficient would best describe these equations. 
The last result to be examined thoroughly is the plot of 
residuals - which have been reproduced in Figures h. 1 to 
h,8. These plots will allow' for an examination of spe- 
cific years, particularly, to see if any of them are con- 
sistently different from the norm, and to offer specific 
explanation for’such differences - in terms of historical 
or domestic events. 
Since the residuals represent the difference between the 
actual and the fitted values generated by the equation(s), 
large shifts in the residuals or large differences gener- 
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Figure 4*7: Plot;^ of Residuals 7G''-F,R.G. 
Figure 4,8: Plot', of Residuals "H” - Sweden. 
In most countries there was a distinct negative shift when 
the year 1973 was examined. This negative shift can be 
attributed to the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo of many western 
countries, in particular the United States, 
It is important to note that even though the United States 
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was hardest hit by the 19'?3 Arab Oil Embargo, the country 
itself was faced with a domestic political crisis, from the 
Watergate Investigation, as well as from the withdrawl 
of its troops in Vietnam, and the inevitable result of having 
to admit defeat. 
Sweden, the U.K., Canada, Australia and the U.S.A. exper- 
ienced some large year to year changes in the size of 
residuals, while Japan, Austria and V/est Germany experienced 
more minimal shifts. In Chapter five som^e historical facts 
about the development of each individual nations industrial 
relations system will be presented and will hopefully be 
able to provide more meaningful explanations as to ,why 
specific trends and/or abrupt changes happened ^ amiongst these 
nations. 
Before commenting cn the overall m.erit of the results, one 
.must focus on some of the problems that exist with the model 
and with some of the explanatory variables. The m.ost obvious 
problem in this model has been the problem, of serial correla- 
tion# The problem exists because the successive observations 
are dependant to some extent; thus, with positive autocorrel- 
ation, the second (or some later) observation tends to, resemble^ 
or repeat, the first observation, and hence gives little new 
information. Therefore, they give less inform.ation and tend 
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(and other influences) than ’*n” independant observations would, 
89 Consequently the estimates would be less reliable. Where 
there is negative autocorrelation the second observation 
would tend to be far apart from the first observation,^^ 
However, because of the nature of timerseries data, as well 
as the fact that most of the observations would tend to 
resem.ble one another, there is a problemi of positive auto- 
correlations, particularly, where man days lost, total employ- 
ment, expected inflation, unemploym.ent and the policy variable 
are concerned. There is a problem of negative autocorrelation 
for v.^ages and growth, because of the inconsistency of the 
rate of change of both of these variables. 
There are two solutions for correcting this problem; solution 
91 one might be to drop several of the first observations"^ in 
order to eliminate the repetitions and the very small changes. 
This would not be a viable solution because it would reduce 
the degree of freedom to the point where the results could 
becom^e statistically insignifleant. The second solution 
might be to correct for the problem through the use of a 
first-order iterative process, as has been done through the 
92 
use of the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative process - and recorded 
in Arrendix IV. 
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Since the OLS regression procedure produced a small error 
93 structure - a structure which appears to be random ~ and a 
small variance for each of its estimators it may still be 
. . 94 
quite efficient ; and although there is another more sophis- 
ticated technique - GIS - that is more efficient, the improve- 
ment it provides over OLS may be quite small.Therefore, 
it has been concluded that the OLS point estimates ^ and o<:: 
are unbiased and the OLS point estimates may be relatively 
efficient^ , and serial correlation can be ruled out a.s being 
fatal to the results. 
There are other structual problems that exist with the m*odel. 
These include multicollinearity, hetroskedasticity and a 
problem with the specification of the model. The p^roblem of 
multicollinearity exists because of linear dependence amongst 
97 the following explanatory variables} 
a) unemployment and total employment, 
b) unem.ployment and the policy variable, 
c) inflation and the policy variable, and 
d) growth and the policy variable. 
However, the multicollinearity amongst the explanatory variables 
98 . . 
has not significantly affected the estim.ation }" specific 
estimates do not have large errors, the error structures are 
not highly correlated, and the sampling variances of the 
coefficients are also small. Therefore the structure of 
i‘ 
the equation and the use of the explanatory variables has 
substantially reduced the effect of multicollinearity on the 
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equation. 
One of the explanations offered for a model that displays 
all the traits of multicollinearity but yet does not statis- 
tically reveal any fatal form of this disease, is the use of 
dummy variables. Although dummy variables have been used only 
to generate a portion of a specific index, the addition of 
this specific index - i.e. the policy variable index - may 
have eliminated some of the multicollinearity caused by a 
poor sample design that provides insufficient information 
to obtain precise estimates of the selective effects of all 
99 the independent variables in the m.odel, ^ 
The problem of hetroskedasticity is a timxe series problem. 
since the regressor X is often related to time (or X could 
even be tim.e itselfThe use of time in the model makes 
101 
the assum^ption that a constant variance is unjustified and 
one must also assume that the errors are independent, 
since has been generated from^ the simple linear regression 
modelj 
10 3 
Y^ = c><h + 0yi + (I'l V/here i = 1, ...,?• 
It would no longer be appropriate to use the OLS technique, 
but instead a weighted least squares (V\/LS) technique^^^ would 
have been more appropriate. Since this study was continued 
using the OLS techinique, i.e. no correction was applied to 
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the model, a relationship must develop where as the variance 
increases the regressor also increases. 
An attempt has been m.ade to include all of the most important 
variables in this m.odel. It must be acknowledged that some, 
related explanatory variables have been left out, due to the 
fact that their effect is reflected in other variables that 
have been included in the model. By excluding these variables, 
the degree of m.ulticollinearity has been reduced, and the 
degrees of freedom., imiproved,. 
In the gathering of any type of statistical data there 
are alv/ays problems with how the data has been assemibled. 
Each of the variables presents its own unique proble.ms; 
for example, total employment does not include military per- 
sonnel - does this mean that they are not employed? The 
policy variable index has been built on the basis of the tra- 
ditional econom.ic goals of society - but one may not agree 
with the assessment that has been provided in the previous 
chapter. Typically, the unemployment rate does not include 
those people who are out of work and not looking for a job - 
are these people not unemployed? Therefore, one can easily 
notice the many problems that exist in the asseimbly of sta- 
tistical data. 
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Perhaps the two most statistically berated variables in the 
model would be the consumer price index (C.P.I.) and the man 
days lost due to strike (M.D.L,) numbers. Sylvia Ostry (31 ) 
has said that the C.P.I. has several limitations to its use- 
fulness, most important of which are that it; (a) takes into 
account only at discrete intervals of time changes in the 
relative weights of different goods and services in people’s 
budgets? (b) covers only a specific group of individuals and 
not all wage recipients; and (c) does not capture the effects 
of quality changes in the goods and services used. For these 
and other reasons, measurements of realwage changes have to 
be treated with a margin of error.- This would have a 
direct effect on three of the variables 
1) real wages 
2) expected inflation, and 
3) policy variables, 
since each of these is derived using some form of C.P.I. 
Malcolm Fisher (108 ) had spent some time analysing the 
measurement of labour disputes, and he has arrived at some 
very interesting conclusions regarding the measurement of 
labour disputes. For example, in the United States strikes 
107 and lockouts are not distinguished ', and a dispute is 
counted when six or more workers leave their job for one full 
day or shift^ , in the U.K. the minimum reprting size is for 
ten workers^^^ and the same holds true for West Germany. 
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In Canada stoppages of less than ten man days lost are not 
111 
recorded. 
In Austria, Japan and Sweden exact records of man days lost 
. . 112 
are kept and in Austria they are kept right to the hour," 
(Fisher had no information on Australia since it had not 
joined the O.E.C.D. at the time his book was published). 
However it is easy to see how the results could be somewhat 
distorted when pertinent information is ignored when keeping 
statistics. 
All models will have problems in either the structure of the 
model or the data collected for the explanatory variables. 
Hov/ever none of the problems that have been openly discussed, 
are serious enough to prevent one from obtaining some meaning 
ful results. 
After analysing this part of the results and providing some 
insight into the problems of a model of this type it may be 
repetitious to attempt to draw some, meaningful conclusions 
regarding the results as they have been presented. There are 
four equations that have sufficient statistical strength to 
be accurate assessments of the subconscious role that 
economic performance has in the collective bargaining process 
These equations are for the following countries; 1) Japan; 
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2) Australia; 3) Canada and 4) the U.K. There are also four 
equations that are statistically very weak and these repre- 
sent; 1) West G-ermany; 2) U.S.A.; 3) Austria and 4) Sweden. 
The results that have "been obtained are useful in that they 
provide enough sufficient empirical evidence to proceed with 
a nation by nation analysis of the various socio-economic 
institutions that are in place* One will be able to accur- 
ately depict their effect on labour as it prepares to enter 
into the collective bargaining process armed with its import- 
ant economic data. The next two chapters will focus on pro- 
viding an analysis of these results and relating them to 
each of the eight nations and their own socio-economic 
framework. 
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CHAP TilR V 
Each country has utilized (or should have utilized) a specific 
plan when preparing to establish an industrial relations system; 
policy measures through labour related legislation, voluntary 
government initiated programs to help bridge the gap that 
exists between labour, management and government, and the ini- 
tiation of continued studies to examine the role of each of the 
partners in the industrial relations system. These plans would 
allow nations to integrate economic policies v^ith their primary 
inputs, labour (i.e. unions) and capital (i.e. management 
through financial control) to obtain realistic economic goals. 
However, each nation maintains an overall approach to its own 
economy that can and does supercede the role that industrial 
relations can play. B'or exam.ple, the United States, with its 
more traditional capitalist system does not promote the for- 
mation of unions. In fact in many of the southern U.S. states 
there are workers v/ho are struggling to acquire somie of the 
basic rights that are taken for granted in many Western 
European nations. The United States economy (although extremely 
cyclical in nature) is based on the premise of promoting 
American products and companies through the occasional exploita- 
tion of less fortunate workers in other nations. 
85 
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’•American firms which operate in foreign countries 
usually premise their industrial-relation's policies 
on the base of values, assumptions, and habits they 
developed in the United States. They may or may not 
modify them in response to the different circumstances 
abroad. There are many instances in which American 
companies have successfully adopted their industrial 
relations to fit the environments of other advanced 
countries and ms.ny other instances where they failed 
to do so, often with costly consequences for the 
firm and.for their representation of American values 
abroad. ^ 
Many large American companies have developed multinational 
empires that can, and do try to liMt the impact of unionism 
on the American based operation. The multinational is able 
to diminish the bargaining power of union when; (1) key 
labour relations decision makers within the firms are 
inaccessible and local subsidiaries lack autonomy; (2) the 
multinational can continue operations in one country if 
struck by a union in another and thus generate financial 
inflows enabling it to sustain a strike longer; (3) the 
multinational can engage in production switching and con- 
tinue to meet market commitments and generate financial 
inflows regardless of a strike in any one country; and (4) the 
multinational export jobs and thus undermines union solidarity 
114 
and effectiveness. These are a few of the reasons why 
the percentage of unionized workers in the United States for 
non-agricultural wage and salary earners in 1976 was between 
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The positive impact of the use of industrial relations systems 
is best exemplified in the Western European countries of 
Austria, Sweden and West Germany, A quick examination of 
Table shows that, in terms of man days lost per thousand 
workers for the time period 1955 - 1981, these three countries 
have the best records for preventing industrial conflict. 
A historical examination, of the implementation of the various 
forms of industrial relations policies in developing an 
effective overall industrial relations system, will be used 
to analyse the effectiveness of Sweden, West Germany and 
Austria in preventing industrial conflict. In these cases 
an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. 
Part At A Historical Perspective Of The Development Of 
Industrial Relations Institutions 
As is well known, Sweden has highly developed institutions of 
industrial relations. The level of industrial conflict has 
shown dramatic changes over the years. In the beginning of 
this century Sweden had the highest relative levels of indus- 
trial conflict among western nations. In the post World War II 
period, however, Sweden has been renowned for industrial 
116 
peace. 
With the exception of 198O, when man days lost per thousand 
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employees exceeded one-thousand, Sweden would of had the lowest 
twenty-seven year average of all eight countries at 23,756. 
Since 1980 was included in Sweden's twenty-seven year aver- 
age of 62,071, this figure by itself would show Sweden's 
remarkable record of maintaining a low annual rate of 
industrial conflict. 
Walter Korpi ( 27 ) has done an excellent job of documenting 
the historical development of the institutions essential to 
Sweden's above average industrial relations system. When 
industrialization began in Sweden during the 1670's unions 
also began to form. However employers were not receptive to 
unions and tried to crush them.^^’^ Undaunted, employers 
also tried to use legislative measures to hinder the grov/th 
of unions, however union growth continued with industrial 
expansion. During the 1880's a number of nationwide union 
organizations formed, in 1869 the Social Democratic Workers 
Party was formed, and in 1898 the Swedish Confederation of 
119 
Trade Unions, the LO was formed. 
During the next few years, the LO continued to support the 
Social Democratic Workers Party and in 1902 a general strike 
was staged to support demands for universal sufferage. This 
show of solidarity, along with continued support of national 
unions to split the unorganized employers, led to the formation 
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of the Swedish Employers' Confederation, the SAP, and this 
organization quickly began to flex its muscle through the 
use of strategic lockouts. Later, after the SAP had recog- 
nized the legitimacy of unions, the "December Compromisev" in 
1906, led to the SAP's formal recognition of the right of 
unionization and the LO's acceptance of managerial perogatives 
at the work place. 
The earlier formation of employers* associations along with an 
already developed collective bargaining process at the level 
of the work place*, led to industry-wide agreements becoming 
commonplace. Through intervention from the state, the develop 
ment of institutions for the handling of industrial conflict 
121 
was enhanced. Mediation was provided through legislation 
is 1906 and amended in 1920 j in 1915 the Swedish Supreme 
Court ruled that collective agreements were legally binding^ 
24 in 1920 laws concerning arbitration were developed , and in 
1928 new laws made the legal force of collective agreements 
explicit and created a labour court to adjudicate disputes in 
1 2 'o 
the area of industrial relations. 
The LO opposed these laws by calling for nationwide protests. 
Even with these highly developed institutions for the regula- 
tion, prevention and containment of industrial conflict^ 
industrial conflict continued to be a major problem through 
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the early 1930‘s there had been nothing to indicate 
that a gradual decline would occur and this nation would 
become a nation dominated by industrial peace. 
However industrial peace did occur and in a dramatic fashion, 
127 
From 1935 - 1939 there was an average of 71 work shoppages 
per year which was less than 30'^ of the average number of 
work stoppages per year that had occurred during the previous 
two decades. But,, was there a logical explanation for this 
phenomenon? 
The primary reason for this dramatic turn around seems to be 
related to the election, in 1932, of a Social Democratic 
government. During the 1930's political power became 
separated from economic power, and employers could no longer 
depend on government support. The SAF soon realized that 
compromise rather than conflict was the order for these times, 
since it was becoming evident that the governmental hold of 
the Social Democrats would be long lasting. Thus the SAF 
decided to seek an accomodation with the LO and the government 
and to act as a pressure group in influencing the political 
128 process, 
A compromise between the Swedish labour movement and the 
representatives of the economic pov/erholders was gradually/- 
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worked out in the latter half of the 1930*s, and was based on 
a formula of cooperation between labour and capital to achieve 
economic growth.^This compromise led to government stab- 
ility, capitalist maturation, industrial development through 
favourable market conditions, and a government commitment to 
labour market neutrality. This led to the eventual signing of 
the 1938 "Main Agreement” between the LO and the SAP, and a 
whole new relationship between the two parties. This new 
course of action resulted in the centralization of decision 
making procedures within the LO, and in 19^i» the introduction 
of an LO constitution. 
In the 1950*s» the decision making procedures in collective 
bargaining were further centralized when the use of advisory 
referendums on contract proposals fell into disuse, and mem- 
bership consultations came to take place through indirect, 
representative channels only. The new pattern of centralized 
collective bargaining involved "frame agreements” between the 
LO and the SAP, which were introduced in the mid 1950's, and 
were a consequence of the new strategiesThey came to be 
important in the so-called solidaristic wage policy of the LO, 
aiming, in principle, toward equal wages for similiar jobs, 
irrespective of the profitability of the firm, and especially 
towards improving the wage levels of low paid workers.^3^ 
Another important element of the industrial relations system 
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in Sweden, has been the utilization of workers* representa- 
tives on company boards. This element of Sweden's industrial 
relations system was introduced through legislation, however, 
the extent of participation and the functions of participative 
bodies are negotiated between the parties concerned, through 
special bilateral agreements 
This law came into force in Sweden, on January 1, 1977$ and it 
gave employees the right to move towards co-determination at 
all levels of decision making in the firm, and at a pace that 
they themselves desire. This Act, did not state in detail how 
this was to be accomplished, but it is an instrument for the 
union organization to decide, on the basis of their own ca- 
pacities and conditions, where measures should be taken, what 
measures they should be, and when they should be applied. 
These types of laws do not extend themselves in order to tie 
the hands of one side or the other. But rather, they extend 
the need for consultation and cooperation at the level of the 
enterprise. Through this new found cooperation at the level 
of the enterprise, both sides seemed to benefit. 
"An independent study published in 1980 
found that the Swedish experience in 
participation was positive. There were 
decreased costs of quality control, fewer 
and shorter stoppages, more reliable 
material handling, decreased costs of 
instructors, decreased turnovers and 
decreased rationalization costs. 
The struggle for industrial peace is now a century old in 
Sv/eden, but yet it still suffers from the inevitable relapse 
of a general strike or an industry wide lockout as has been 
evidenced several times during the last quarter century, 
Sweden has struggled to maintain its record of industrial 
peace both as an example to the rest of the industrialized 
world and in order to maintain the strong values of Swedish 
society. The intitutions for Sweden's industrial relations 
system have been developed over the last century in 
for the last fifty years have been redefined to look after 
the interests of all concered parties. Labour-management 
and governemnt have found political, economic and social peace 
through the maintenance of a strong and solidified industrial 
relations system. 
The development of industrial relations in West Germany has 
taken a much different course than that of Sv/edens’, This 
is mainly due to the disruption of development during the 
Hitler era of 1933 - 19^5 and the single mindedness of 
unions and industry. Trade unions had been established in 
Germany during the l860's largely at the initiative of pol- 
itical movements of a socialist orientation and they continued 
to function until the end of the Wiemar Republic in 1933-^'^^ 
Many distinctive features of contemporary German trade 
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unionism,and the development of worker participation schemes» 
137 
have their roots in early labour organization. In the 
period prior to World V/ar I, Germany was an authoritarian 
monarch?,^ and legislation was utilized to control unionism. 
Bismark initiated a program of social reforms (health and 
accident insurance and old age and disability pensions) to 
counteract the trend towards unionization. However, unions 
continued to grow and to stengthen their desire to collective! 
represent the workers. 
Workers sought to protect their members through collective 
agreements, particularly in industries where advancing 
industrialization was having a detrimental impact on workers 1 
in terms of safty conditions, overcrowding, and the poor 
conditions made worse by the capitalist cycles of boom and 
1 38 
depression. Strikes were utilized as a means to acquire 
better working conditions, and this led to the introduction of 
collective' agreements in some German industries,, prior to 
v/orld War I. During World War I unions gained a legal 
representational status in important firms,, devoted to public 
supply and war production, through white and blue-collar 
coucils. Employers complied with the law as a means of 
reducing unrest and the spontaneous strikes caused by bad 
working conditions,, in order that the government could achieve 
1 39 
its expansionist goals, 
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After World War I, the introduction of a parliamentary system 
led to the instantaneous renewal of works councils. The new 
constitution recognized unions as the representatives of labour 
and the collective bargaining agreement as the principle means 
. . • 140 
to regulate wages and working conditions. In 1920, works 
councils at the shop level were introduced by law, and in 1922, 
the law was amended so that the works council could appoint one 
or two members to company supervisory boards, 
Collective bargaining became a widespread practice during the 
inter-war period, along with compulsory arbitration by the 
secretary of state for labour, and labour courts. However, 
142 these changes were accompanied by severe conflict. Unions 
(or groups within the unions) opposed collective agreements 
because of their capitalistic overtones, and because they dis- 
trusted the basic premise of works councils. This lack of 
cooperation contributed to the onset of inflation, the 
Depression and mass unemployment, which in turn led Germans 
to turn to the Nazis to look for solutions to their problems. 
The post World War II era and the revival of the West German 
economy, as well as the development of a strong sense of 
nationalism and global importance is a great story indeed: 
the rags to riches story of a country twice destined to 
become the worlds single dominant empire, and twice destroyed 
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by its own ignorance and greed, only to be able to rebuild 
itself into one of the most highly respected industrialized 
nations is truly remarkable. 
One of the major reasons for this remarkable turnabout has 
been the development of a tri-partite industrial relations 
system. After 1945tthe basic premises of the Weimar program 
of industrial democracy were reintroduced including national 
planning, nationalization of' key industries and worker part- 
14? 
icipation, Collective agreements were established to 
1 44 
regulate wages and working conditions" and a better system 
of worker participation was instituted. 
In 194^.the Federation of German Unions was founded and pro- 
ceeded to deal with the difficult task of obtaining equal 
representation for workers at the level of the enterprise. 
Unions felt that capital had allied itself with Hitler during 
his regime and that equal representation was the only way to 
prevent a reoccurrence. 
In 195V unions gained a 'legislated worker participation plan 
in the coal and steel industries. This plan gave labour 
equal representation with capital on company supervisory 
boards, as well as an executive board member in charge of 
personnel and social problems, who could not be elected 
Page 98 
without the approval of a majority of the labour representa- 
tives on the executive board, V/orker participation, or 
codetermination, in the coal and steel companies became the 
outstanding innovation in the German industrial relations 
system,^^^ Later, in 1952, works councils similiar to those 
that existed during the Weimar period were established by lav/, 
but^in industries other than coal and steel,, unions only man- 
14? 
aged to achieve a one-third representation. 
For the remainder of the 1950's and a majority of the 1960's 
recovery from the war became the only economic priority. 
Economic development initiated by the Marshall Plan and the 
reconstruction of the economy resulted in rapid grov/th, full 
148 
employment and rising incomes. V'/orkers, via the collective 
bargaining process, were able to obtain substantial wage 
increases without reverting to strike action. 
During the decade from 1966 - 1976 there were a number of 
positive changes that occurred that helped to improve the 
industrial relations system. A system of capital sharing 
was implemented in 1972 that would allow workers to influence 
general industrial policy without giving up a decentralized 
149 market economy.- ^ However, since there has been some oppo- 
sition to this proposal of capital sharing, it has not been 
1 50 
a high priority with the Federal Republic. 
146 
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V/ith the Federal Republic wavering under its own lack of 
economic stability the 196? Act was enacted upon to " avert 
socially damaging conflict by inducing a change in behavior 
on the part of the main economic groups. ^ '* The change had 
to be sought, moreover, only through the educative effect 
of the announcement of guidelines and the decision surround- 
ing autonomy of the two "partners to the wage bargain" by 
1 *52 
laying down binding guidelines, ^ This meant that the 
Federal Republic now had a form of wage policy to initiate 
some control over wages as a means to protect against economic 
instability. 
In 19T2 the Work Constitution Act provided substantial improve- 
ments for worker representation at the company level. This 
meant that unions were much closer to where the economic 
decisions were being raade^ and this led to a substantial 
increase in the importance of the collective bargaining process, 
since strikes could be called on specific issues. This act 
required that a works council be established in private 
enterprises employing more than five workers. The number 
and size of the council varies depending on the size of the 
workforce, (see Graph 5*1 S-nd Graph 5-2). 
The works council has various codecision, consultation 
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Gra'ph ^. 2 
GERT4AN EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION THROUGH WORKS 






Constitution Law. These rights are to be exercised, as 
stated in the law, in a spirit of "mutual trust" with the 
employer; action is to be avoided that might distrub indust 
rial peace at the shop floor; cooperation between unions 
and employers is required; and the procedure of collective 
bargaining agreements is to be observed. 
WORK COUNCIL RIGHTS 
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Graph 5*3 Works Council Rights 
Source; Facts About Germany 
The above graph outlines areas where works councils have 
specific authorities or rights. If agreement is not reached 
or should a deadlock occur on any of these matters where 
the works council is entitled to codetermination, either 
side can bring the case before an internal joint arbitration 
or conciliation committee with an outside chairman. Where 
statutory rights are involved,,the final decision lies with 
the labour court. 
In 1976 the Mitbestimmung law once again changed the realm 
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of codet’ermination in West Germany (see Graph This law 
provided a new emphasis for the collective bargaining process 
and other instruments by failing to give labour a fifty-fifty 
voice in controlling the companies. This law, although it did 
,not disrupt all the institutions in place, was controversial. 
Employees viewed the law as being a step backwards and pro- 
tested by walking out of the Fortieth Meeting on Concerted 
Action*^ essentially ending an already dead wage policy. In 
July of 197? the German Employers Federation appealed to the 
Constitutional Court asking that the law be declared uncon- 
1 '57 
stitutional but in the Spring of 1979 the court ruled 
that the Mitbestimmung Law was constitutional. 
'‘Worker participation in Germany has demonstrated 
the capacity to find solutions to major organ- 
izational problems before they evolve into 
hardened stands by one side or the other. As 
a result of continuous contact and exposure to 
issues of common concern, representatives 
of labour and management have come to trust 
and cooperate with each other to much greater 
degree than was once thought possible. Overt 
conflict has, as a result, been held to 
minimum to the benefit of all concerned. “ ^ " 
In 1975 Bernhard Wilpert (102) said 
"very little is known about the consequences 
(untimate humanistic or societal and philoso- 
phical goals) of codetermination. Aspects 
like 'self-realization' and 'societal-dem- 
ocratization' escaoe adequate operational- 
ization. 
Yet,.the results from the previous chapter indicate that 
worker participation can have significant socio-economic 
consequences. Worker participation does control the number 
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CO-DETERMINATION IN GERMANY AFTER 
197£ 
All Major Private Enterprises Except the Coal, Iron and Steel 
Industries Where Parity Representation Continues 
Number of supervisory board seats 
in firms employing 2 — 10,000 persons 
of which the following are: 
^ ,,White collar" 
and 
Senior staff ..blue collar" Trade 
members employees unionists 
<*='’'in firms employing 10 — 20,000 persons 
11^ ©###©!©# 
in firms employing more than 
20,000 persons 
Source: Social Report, Bonn 
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of man days lost through the collective bargaining process. 
Worker participation appears humanistic, in that it prom.aotes 
dialogue and interplay between both parties at the level of the 
enterprise. It allows both parties an equal say in the plan- 
ning and operation of the enterprise. If this idea is extend- 
ed to the economy, worker participation helps the country main- 
tain its economic goals and to promote cooperation at all levels. 
This type of participation does not escape criticism, in that 
it offers no guarantees for the workers, and appears to be 
within reach of management influences. However, it allows 
unions a chance to exhibit a unique form of individualism, and 
it engages unions to better understand the concerns of the other 
party, and to maintain the best interests of both parties when 
striving to realize their own goals. This is a form of self- 
realization and operational humanism that Wilpert has ignored 
in his paper; although this paper has the benefit of an extra 
decade of hindsight. 
The development of industrial relations in Austria has follow- 
ed a course similiar to that of West Germany, but with a more 
troublesome past. Austria was a nation dominated by a mon- 
archy from the beginning of the nineteenth century until the 
beginning of World War- I. This monarchy was known as the 
Page 106 
Habsburg monarchy, and was characterized by the same type of 
autocratic society that had characterized Germany during that 
same era. 
In fact, many times prior to 19^5» Austria was directly influ- 
enced by the policy decisions of the German government. Prior 
to the industrial revolution, Austria had become a constitu- 
tional state based on German Legemony.^^^ The constitution, 
drafted in 1867t tried to bridge the gap in philosophy between 
the German and the Magyar elements in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
However, the national identity of Austria continued to be its 
main social, economic and political problem until World War I, 
as various people tried to stke nationalistic claims to the 
lands known as Austria. 
The Habsburg Monarchy collapsed at the end of World War I from 
the pressure of the outside elements, but had left an indel- 
ible mark on the future development of the Austrian industrial 
relations system. In 1859* the Austrian Industrial Code was 
established and the Associations Act of 186?, provided for the 
Z o 
free right of association for unionized workers, ^ with the 
Social Democratic Party. In 188? and 1888, the Workers Acci- 
dent Insurance and the Workers Sickness Insurance Act were re- 
spectively introduced.^^3 in 1907* under the pressure of 
approximately 400,000 unionized workers, universal sufferage 
was attained.In the period after 1909* there was a 
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definite tendency toward industrial concentration and employers* 
organizations gathered strength.These organizations 
stepped up their activities against unions through the use of 
strike-breaking organizations, ”yellow-dog contracts” and 
’’company unions” and a united bourgeois front against the 
166 
Social Democrats in parliament. 
Because of the threat of war and the principle of defending 
the motherland against takeover, the War Service Law super- 
167 
ceded trade union laws on December 26, 1912T '; and on 
August 4, 1914 the Trade-Union Commission asked that union 
workers continue to remain involved in union activities even 
168 
though their rights had been suspended. During the war, 
industrial conflicts and strikes became a major domestic issue, 
particularly to protest food supplies. 
During the inter-war era, Austria began to function as a demo- 
cratic state and suffered through many growing pains. Hyper- 
inflation during the early I920*s and the pressure from both the 
east and west#,led to social and economic unrest. To help 
improve the domestic situation the Works Council Act was 
169 
introduced in 19i9« However, the union was very skep- 
tical about this legislation? 
"The Works Council Act has frequently aroused 
the fear among the trade unions that now 
the works council will take over the func- 
tions that have been performed by trade 
unions, " 
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This distrust continued through the next decade and a half. 
By the end of 1922 relations between the works council and the 
. . 1 71 
trade unions were completely liquidated"' , and in 1933 *tbe 
labour movement finally collapsed, 
"The development of the works councils in 
Austria was, therefore, largely determined 
by the trade unions. It moved along the lines 
of decreasing radicalism and increasing under- 
standing of«the responsibilities of the councils' 
position, ^ 
",..the V/orks Council Act threatened to destroy 
peace in industry and lead to many violent 
conflicts. 
With this type of mistrust amongst the parties to the works 
councils', and even though there v/as moderate' improvement 
174 
in relations during 1921 and early 1922 , the inevitable 
result would soon be the doom of this institution. 
The Nazi Revolution and World War II ended unionism in 
Austria for more than a decade. But with the end of the war, 
Austria began the task of building a nev/ identity and rebuild- 
ing a much divided country. The V/orks Council Act was reintro- 
duced in Austria in 1947. *^^ The Act was amended in 195'^ 
and a whole new series of socio-economic policies were intro- 
'i 76 
duced to promote a total system of tripartite cooperation,"' 
These policies were established in the form of a "Parity 
Commission for Wages and Prices." This committee was not 
based in law or legislation but is a voluntary organization 
that simply had as its original task the control of rising 
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prices and wages. 
The Parity Commission has two permanent sub-committees; the 
Sub-Committee for Wages and the Sub-Committee for Prices. The 
Sub-Committee for Wages has as its main task the approval or 
refusal of negotiation for a new collective agreement when 
such negotiations are applied for. V/ith no legal power, this 
committee cannot dictate the content of a collective agree- 
ment, but it does influence the time frame for negotiation, 
and this helps to ensure a blanced and well-coordinated wage 
policy. 
The Sub-Committee for Prices is a voluntary orgainization that 
depends on- th'e influence of the parent body to ensure that all 
costs are controlled, and that only necessary cost increases 
are passed on to the consumers. This committee serves to help 
smooth over the impact of avoidable increases. 
In 1963» the Advisory Committee for Economic and Social 
Question was introduced. This committee was introduced to 
cope with the increasing demands put upon the "Parity 
Commission" and to provide "the scientific basis for a really 
objective approach to economic policy, and to this end, it 
conducts studies into individual questions of economic policy, 
































The overall economic success of Austria over the last quarter 
century can be attributed to the development of a fully inte- 
grated industrial relations system; co-determination at the 
industry level complemented by tripartite cooperation at the 
national level,has helped Austria maintain a consistent 
growth level, very low unemployment and a moderately success- 
ful record of controlling inflation, Austria’s unions, 
employers, and the 3P0 Government^have realized that a 
successful social partnership, steeped rich in history, is 
the only way to combat global and domestic economic turmioil. 
Each of the three nations have a long history of policy and 
institutional development directly related to industrial re- 
lations. Even though, earlier attempts at developing these 
types of institutions were met with skepticism, mistrust, and 
.industrial conflict; nationalistic interests prevailed and 
each nation managed to develop an ideology of open communi- 
cation between the disinterested parties. Strikes and lockouts 
provided the leverage necessary to get both sides interested 
in the needs and desires of the other. 
Governments realized that strikes and lockouts have a detri- 
mental effeqt on the-overall economic outlook, and through 
moral suasion and legislation, tried to minimize the negative 
effects of industrial conflict. Therefore, it became necessary 
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to restucture the socio-economic goals of the nation to 
include legislation and policy measures that would establish 
a viable industrial relations system that minimizes industrial 
conflict and promotes industrial peace via settlements through 
collective bargaining. Such is now the case in Sweden, Austria, 
and West Gennany. 
The historical development of industrial relations institutions 
in the other five nations, with the exception of Japan, has 
not been as thorough and time consuming as the previous three 
nations. Even though, union were recognized as agents for 
labour in these countries in the early twentieth century, 
little or nothing has been done to promote the improvement 
of relations between management, unions and government. 
Canada and the United States are good examples of countries 
where little has been done to promote tripartite cooperation, 
and a better relationship between labour and management at 
the level of the enterprise. Japan has developed a more 
paternalistic system of cooperation between labour and manage- 
ment while continuing to abide by restrictions imposed upon 
it after World War II. Australia and Great Britain have 
utilized sporadic and inconsistent methods of applying the 
knowledge that they have attained through their association 
with nations that have good industrial relations systems, and 
throughsome forms of domestic experimentation, geared to 
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promote positive change in their industrial relations systems. 
Japan has developed from a country dominated by agrarian 
activity just over a century ago, to the second largest indust- 
rialized nation in the world. Japan is the world's second 
largest national economy, with a G.N.P. in the 1970*s, 
equivalent, partially as a result of a rapid appreciation of 
the yen, to almost one trillion five hundred billion dollars 
This development has occurred because of revolutionary labour 
reforms imposed on Japan by the seven year Allied occupation 
after World War and has continued because of the positive 
rate of industrial growth that has been acheived since the 1950* 
Industrial development began in Japan in 1868 with the Meiji 
Restoration, which signalled Japan's transition from 250 years 
pf self-imposed seclusion from the west, to an industrialized 
nation. This transition took nearly fifty years, and was 
achieved with direction from a highly centralized government, 
the concentration of capital in a few mammoth, privately- 
owned industrial and commercial conglomerates, and the devel- 
opment of a powerful military establishment 
The labour movement had its modest start in Japan, soon after 
the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), but this early attempt 
came to a quick end, mainly because of suppression by the 
government and partly because of a lack of experience. 
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on the part of workers and their leaders.In 1912, the 
Friendly Society was begun by Bunji Suzuki, who professed to 
aim at the moral and cultural uplifting of workers. 
Battling a climate intensely hostile to any kind of labour 
movement, this society and its philosophy expanded rapidly, 
in 1919f "the Friendly Society decided to become a full fledged 
union agent, and in 1921, the Society became the Japanese 
Federation of Labour. 
However, to the extent that Japan was expanding industrially, 
the country was also becoming more segregated as those who 
toiled during the pre-industrial times, persisted along side 
modern industrialization. Japan developed a dualistic 
economy, and therefore sharp differentials between the two 
sectors• 
"For Japan's emerging industrial relations 
system, the consequences of this development 
pattern included: slow commitment of the 
labour force even though constantly growing 
with steady increases in population, to work 
in industrial occupations. Segmentation of 
labour markets for workers destined for 
employment in large enterprises and those 
in small and medium sized firms, including 
agriculture; and development of policies by 
modern large-scale employers to train and 
deploy work forces within their respective 
companies in view of the lack of available 
worker skills for many new types of work des- 
pite large surpluses of unskilled labour. 
These underlying market forces, in turn, 
meant strong employer opposition, with govern- 
ment backing, to "outside" influences, such 
as labour unions or even minimum state 
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re,gulation of working conditions. To attract 
and hold desireahle workers, large-scale 
companies developed broad paternalistic wel- 
fare programs for their own employees, 
including housing, recreation, education, 
medical facilites and so on. In a continuing 
practice, wages in large companies were paid 
monthly on the basis of length of service 
rather than for the job or hourly or piece 
rates. Within this context, what labour 
unionism arose failed to gain legal recogni- 
tion, tended to concentrate among small firms, 
and turned to ideologically inspired but 
internally divisive political action. Through- 
out the prewar era, organized labour remained 
weak and divided. Collective bargaining was 
established in only a few cases, the most 
notable being the maritime shipping industry. 
Japan enjoyed a degree of political liberalism in the 1920's, 
and even though they joined the international Labour 
Organization in 1919i stnd the League of Nations in 1920 
and government tried to foster legislation to grant basic 
trade unions rights., however conservative politician^, favour- 
able to big business, blocked these attempts. At best, 
unionism was barely tolerated after passage of the Labour 
Disputes Mediation Act of 1926, although this was coupled 
. T 1 
with adoption of the repressive Public Peace Maintenace Law. 
Japan’s turn to militarism and ultranationalism coupled with 
the Manchurian Incident in 1931 and the invasion of China 
and World V/ar II led to end of the labour movement by the end 
of the 1930’s.^^® However,the militaristic government con- 
tinued to support paternalism at the level of the enterprise 
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as a means of controlling labour mobility, 
Jaoan was in virtual ruin after World War II, and under the 
control of the Allied Forces. The Allied Forces decided that 
Japan should be able to rebuild utilizing the American mold 
of free enterprise and mar-cet competition but also with 
. 89 labour unions that had guaranteed basic rights, ' -^ From 
1945 to 19^7 major pieces of legislation gave labour full 
rights to organize unions, conduct collective bargaining and 
carry on strikes and in April 19^7 a new Constitution went 
1 go 
into force embodying these rights. 
"The ten years surrounding 1950 were the most 
eventful of the postwar Japanese labour move- 
ment. The sharp rise in membership from 
1945 to 19^3gyas followed by a sharp fall 
after 1951This was due to government 
issued orders and legislation that restricted 
the union rights of employees. The labour 
movement failed to regain its strength until 
1957 after the formation of the Liberal 
Democratic Party in 1955 and the formation ofigo 
the General Council of Trade Unions' of Japan. ^ 
The election of the Liberal Democratic Party, which is still 
in power today, provided political stability. Japan's 
economy had returned to its prewar peak and had begun its 
takeoff and it was during the next quarter century that the 
labour movement once again regained its nemerical strength. 
Four major unions formed over the next fifteen years and 
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remained unaffiliated with any national center. In 1957 
unions began the “Spring Offensive” as a means of obtaining 
wage increase^ and this has been relatively successful, 
and has*been continued. 
Industrial conflict that did arise in Japan in the period 
after 1957 had two main goals; a) wage increases or 2) improve- 
ment of general social conditions, V/orkers generally had 
everything they desired at the level of the enterprise so 
strikes became protests against a rapidly growing population, 
inflation, urban congestion, and the like. 
Rapid economic expansion has generally provided the Japanese 
labour movement with favourable conditions for its development, 
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although it has not been an entirely unmixed blessing. 
With this developmentij coupled with Japanese tradition, a. very 
unique system of labour-ma.nagement relations has developed. 
The Japanese industrial relations system is based on “concensus 
decision-making.” This systen^ which is not etched in legis- 
lation, enables the Japanese to seek a consensus on all pro- 
195 ... posed actions in a company. Concensus allow each indivi- 
dual level of the company to express an opinion about a new 
proposal related to the company. Consensus is usually reached 
through a “rinai”, a written proposal that can come from any 
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level of the company. The proposal is passed up and down the 
196 hierarchial line for everyone to consider and discuss,' ^ 
And once everyone, at all levelSj, has agreed to the proposal, 
. . . 197 it can he swiftly implemented.' ^ 
Tradition has also dictated a work structure that includes; 
a "lifetime joh," separate unions for each company, and 
remuneration based on length of service, "loyalist" employees 
and employer who promotes cooperation. 
The development of industrial relations institutions in 
Japan has followed a very unique course. Its development 
has been based on the philosophical ideologies of Japanese 
society. There has been little need for legislative measures 
on the part of government to ensure the rights of unionized 
workers. Japan's rapid economic development in the post 
v/orld War II era coupled with its "paternalistic" corporations 
meant that labour-relations in Japan would not develop in the 
same "traditional" way of other countries. However; Japan 
managed to develop a system that satisfies the needs of the 
tyre of society that has developed. 
Great Britain is undoubtedly the most highly developed of the 
four remaining countries in terms of industrial relations. 
Great Britain has a^ long history for the development of 
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institutions and framework. Yet Great Britain has failed to 
introduce .. strong government measures that would promote a 
better system of cooperation between labour and management, 
yet through its association with the European Community, 
Britain.has learned that a sound industrial relations can 
contribute to socio-economic stability. 
Britain was the first country/' in the world to have an 
'industrial revolution'. Thus, Britain was the first country 
to experience the social problems associated with increaed 
i 
industrialization particularly from the workers* point of view. 
The development of the factory system did nothing to improve 
conditions for the ordinary workers. Many tasks were 
laboreous and did not require any skill. Employers were 
disinterested in the welfare of workers and concentrate solely 
on improving economies of scale and making profits. Prior 
to 191^ the only major developments that directly affected 
industrial relations in Britain were; 1) the Limited Liability 
Act of 1862 which allowed family businesses to change their 
legal status; 2) The Trade Union Act of 18?1; 3) Arbitration 
Act of Mundella in 1872 which repealled the Arbitration Act 
of 1824; 4) the Conciliation Act of I896; 5) Trade Disputes 
Act of 1906; and 6) Trade Union Act of 1913* These laws allowed 
unions to form, and offered them some specific legal immunities,, 
but did little to encourage the "peacetime" development of 
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industrial relations. 199 
V^orld War I led Britain into the so-called modern industrial 
era. Old fashioned processes were scrapped and replaced by 
more modern equipment, but nothing had been done to improve 
the conditions for labourers, particularly in the field of 
industrial relations. Goodman (2) has said; 
"The traditional system was based principally 
upon voluntary collective bargaining, imple- 
mented through non-legally enforceable agreements 
negotiatied by a multiplicity of joint multi- 
union and multi-employer industry wide negotiation 
committees. Following the removal of legal 
obstacles to union orgainization in the 18?0*s, 
and the granting of specific legal immunities in 
1906, the law relating to trade unions and coll- 
ective bargaining in peacetime remained sub- 
stantially unchanged until the 1971 Industrial 
Relations Act.^^^" 
The traditional system was deemed to have had some advantages, 
in that it provided freedom for the parties, flexibility, and 
a sense of responsibility for upholding their own agreements. 
From 1926 - i960, man days lost through strikes was generally 
low.^^^ 
However, in 1964, at the end of the post-war boom, public 
concern about inflation and wages led to the introduction of 
a voluntary incomes* policy. However, the economic system 
worsened, and a Price and Incomes Act was passed, in I966, in 
order to prevent economic chaos. This Act was abolished in 
1970 by the new Conservative Government. In 1971 came the 
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Industrial Relations Act; again amended in 197^i and 1976 to 
the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act; that set forth legis- 
lation governing trade unions and employers, and provided a 
more explicit framework in which labour-management relations 
could operate. Included were laws regarding employment stan- 
dards, conciliation, arbitration and mediation, the rights of 
. 202 
unions and employers, etc. 
During the mid 1970*s Britain had "Social Contract" arrangement 
which were chacterized by a lack of elaborate legal and 
administrative procedures. During this period there existed a 
Price Commission, that had been established in 1973> to ensure 
that any price increases were fully justified on the grounds of 
rises in costs, or, of the need to finance investment. These 
controls were set out in the Price Code, whose principles were 
to limit the extent to which prices may be increased on account 
of increased costs, and to secure reductions as a result of re- 
duced costs; to reinforce the control of prices by control on 
profit margains while safeguarding and encouraging investment; 
and to reinforce the effect of competition, and to secure its 
203 full benefits in the general level of prices. ^ 
However, there was no incomes commission. The "Social 
Contract" was based on an understanding reached amongst''the 
social partners and the Government, which established 
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acceptable limits of income increases. It was left to the 
T.U.C. and the C.B.I. and their member organizations to 
adhere to the agreed limits, and to guide pay negotiations 
accordingly. 
Independent observers had been impressed by the relative 
success of the "social contract" in Britain, not only in 
contributing to the reduction of inflation, but also to the 
reduction of industrial conflict. From 19?5 "to 19'^?$ infla- 
tion was cut from 26.3 percent in early 19’25 to 12.9 percent 
in 1976. Workdays lost through strikes fell to 1.58 million 
in the first half of the 19*76 from 3*91 million in 1925*^^^ 
The Government, in July of 1977, announced a guide to employers 
and employees dealing with the conduct of wage negotiations, 
and cost of living measures which were designed to improve the 
situtation of lov/ paid and fixed income group. Other measures 
included tax relief, increased child benefits and funding 
206 
related to employment. 
Outside and economic observers were impressed with these 
measures. However, some trade unions, especially the low 
paid workers were not impressed, and did not feel that the 
Government con.ld continue to check prices and .reduce differ- 
entials. In early 1978, they defied the Government guidelines 
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and in a series of strikes brought an end to the '^social 
contract” and contributed to the defeat"of the Labour 
207 Government at the polls. 
In 1981, under extreme pressure as a result of confined economic 
recession, the Conservative Government - a government which 
had ended the "Social Contract" in 1973 after marked improve- 
ments and instituted a "hands-off" policy v;hich ended all 
o A Q 
forms of effective tripartite cooperation - supported the 
plans of the Institute of Personnel Management of promoting 
employee participation with a series of guides designed to 
help industries introduce their own arrangement^ voluntarily, 
. . 209 
or through special-union management arrangements. 
However, beyond 198I, Great Britain's inflation and unemploy- 
ment rates skyrocketed, mainly because of Mrs. Thatcher's 
monetary policy, but also because of a lack of congruity in 
the development of industrial relations policy. Britain 
tried to adopt bits and pieces of the more successful insti- 
tutions being used in other countries but failed to recognize 
that these institutions could not be transposed from one type 
of socio-economic climate into another; although many have 
tried only a few will succeed. 
In Australia,the development of unions leading to industrial 
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relations institutions began in the mid nineteenth century, 
by 1900, six percent of the work force had been unionized, 
and union membership had followed the trend of economic 
activity, much as it had in the United States and the United 
^ 210 
Kingdom, 
Unionization in Australia continued throughout most of the 
twentieth century, but growth was characterized by a number 
of peaks and valleys. Membership peaked at 4?^ in 192?, before 
declining to 35% in 1933* Membership then grew, until reach- 
ing 60% by the mid 1950*s. It then declined to 50% in the 
early 1970*s before rebounding to 57% by the end of the decade. 
The development of national governing bodies and institutions 
had been much slower in Australia, than in many other nations. 
The Australian Council of Trade Unions was formed in 1927i and 
the Australian Council of Employer's Associations in 19^2, 
This was partly due to the regional differences that existed in 
Australia, and partly because of the autonomy given to the 
"states" by the federal government. 
The pre-19^5 period of development parallels that of Britain, 
The main reason for this was the Commonwealth asscoiation that 
existed between the two nations. This meant that much of the 
legislation that was introduced in Australia during this time 
period had the aim:'and names as the British Acts. The Combination 
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Acts of 1824 and 1925? the Trade Union Act and Criminal Law 
Amendment Act of I87I; and the Trade Dispute Act of I906, 
were all carbon copies of similiar British legislation,^ 
But as was the case in Great Britain little eas done on the 
national level- even with a labour government at several in- 
tervals, most notably in 1916, when labour controlled the 
Federal Parliament and five of the six states- until after 
World War II. Industrial conflict rose until World War II,' 
when it again rose to a new peak, and continued to increase 
steadily; with only a limited number of decreases; until 
1950, where it agian levelled off until the late 1960*s and 
once again took off. 
Australia, a country that has remained economically divided 
by agricultural activity versus manufacturing activity, should 
be a country with few problems at the level of the enterprise, 
but such has not been the case. Even though Australians are 
classified as easy going, and there ahs been little or no vio- 
lence in the social and political arenas; "National and cul- 
tural homogeneity, comparative lack of poverty and entrenched 
privilege, the Brithish tradition, and perhaps the Australian 
laziness and easy going character have all helped to keep 
violence to a minimum. " Yet, industrial conflict has been a 
problem. A problem that has been related to governmeht 
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attempts to control unionism and unionist activities, since the 
’’Australian attitude towards government is resentment at the 
use of authority over the individual. ^ 
The Australian government, in cooperation with the employers* 
association, has tried sporadic legislative measures to pro- 
mote industrial peace. However, with the states have autonomy 
over major parts of their own jurisdiction, each state has 
attempted to develop laws that will help to maintain economic 
stability rather than industrial peace; the exception here is 
Tasmania where a works council Law has existed since 1920, 
Therefore, the federal government in Australia has been re- 
gulated to public sector legislation, and to ensure that the 
basic rights of employers and unions are maintained. 
In more recent times, the Australian government has enacted 
legislation that coincides with the above goal; the institu- 
tion of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission and its* 
revision in the 19?0*s, the Trade Union Training Act, to train 
and retrain individuals, as well as in manpower planning 
and incomes policy in the traditional European sense. 
However, like Britain, Australia has failed to initiate poli- 
cies that would promote industrial peace in their own country, 
but have looked for an outside solution. But no solution has 
been found, and Australia must continue to depend on market 
Page 12? 
forces and the heavy hearts and greedy hands of capitalist 
corporations and dogmatic unions, for industrial peace. 
Canada and the United States are nations that are quite 
similiar in their treatment of labour and the development of 
industrial relations institutions. Both Canada and the United 
States had early development of unions, Canada’s coming mainly 
under the influence and direction of American, unions. How- 
ever legislation developed under the influence of British 
legislation,^ because Canada was a British Dominion. 
This legislation was aimed, not at developing industrial rela- 
tions institution, but rather, at maintaining the basic rights 
and freedoms of workers in an open environment. The earliest 
legislation was in 18?2 and was essentially the same as earlier 
enactments by the British Parliament, legalizing trade unions 
and exempting them from criminal conspiracy charges. 
Beginning in 1900, a series of federal acts, covering indivi- 
dual industries and usually passed after a major labour dis- 
pute, established a basic principle of Canadian labour legis- 
lation. Conciliation by tripartite boards became a necessary 
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conditions before a legal strike. ^ However, federal author- 
ity in the field of Industrial relations was successfully 
challenged on constitutional grounds in 1925, leaving the 
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federal government with control over service industries 
enumerated in the British North American Act while the pro- 
vinces assumed all other jurisprudence. Yet the provinces 
continued to uphold federal policy and provisions during the 
1930's and after the war had ended and emergency powers 
expired in 19^6*most provinces incorporated major features 
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of the wartime order into their own labour relations acts. 
Once bargaining rights had been determined, Canada followed 
the pattern typical of North America, there was little govern- 
ment intervention to establish terms and conditions of work, 
except to uphold the right of grievance procedures and con- 
ciliation. And except for periods, of price and/or wage 
controls, the Canadian industrial relations s^z-stem has been 
left to the whims of the market system and the discontent and 
mistrust - as shown below - of labour-management relations 
for the last forty years, 
”A recent study prepared for Canada's 
Department of Labour by George Sayers Bain, 
Director of Industrial Relations Research Unit 
of the University of Warwick in England, has 
concluded that the hostility of Canadian employers 
to trade unionism helps to explain why industrial 
conflict in Canada has been consistently among 
the highest in the world. And the fact that 
trade unions in Canada feel that they must be 
on the guard constantly to protect the shakey 
rights they struggled to establish is also a 
factor in unions' suspicion of any government or 
management initiative to improve industrial 
relations." 
Part of the problem of industrial conflict in 
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Canada is to be found in the intransigent and 
uncompromising attitudes of both labour and 
management, as well as in the unwillingness of 
the Federal and Provincial governments to in- 
troduce some necessary legislative and insti- 
tutional reforms.2^9 
The labour movement in the United States has not been, at 
times politically effective, and this has contributed to a lack 
of government policies, at the federal/state level, to pro- 
mote the development of more progressive institutions. The 
labour movement has lagged, at times, behind nationalist 
expansion and the industrial revolution in the United States 
and has not always been popular with the American public. 
American labour unions had modest beginnings in the early nine- 
teenth century and grew quite substantially in its early period 
Unions developed to ensure that the right of free-trade would 
not eliminate the right of an individual to work, particularly 
v/ithin the United States, where vast regional differences and a 
superbly designed transportation network meant lower costs of 
getting goods to market - i.e. the ’’American Way.” 
But like Canada, the balance of pov/er between the federal 
government and the states was divided, and this meant restric- 
tions on labour relations for both levels. Therefore as unions 
grew and became more unpopular with management, the power of 
coersion that management had over labour continued to restrict 
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its effectiveness well into the twentieth century. 
Then in the 1930's, as the United States was gripped by the 
wows of the "Great Depression" several laws were passed to 
deal with labour relations. In 1932, thaNorris-La Guardia 
Act restricted the courts's use of the induction and banned 
yellow-dog contracts. In 1935, the National Labour Relations 
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(Wagner) Act was passed. 
The V/agner Act made it illegal for management to refuse to 
bargain v/ith recognized representatives of the workers. The 
Act made it illegal for companies to interfere with the v;orkers 
right to organize, and therefore acted as encouragement for 
unions to organize. Thirdly, the Act established the National 
Labour Relations Board so that the exclusive representative of 
all workers was determined. After the law had been consti- 
tutionally upheld by the supreme Court, industry, wiio had 
earlier refused to obey the law, pushed to have the law changed 
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saying th^t the act favoured unions over management, 
V/ithin the end of 'World War II, opponents of the Wagner Act 
were able to achieve their goal, as in June of 19^?, the Act 
was proceeded by the Taft-Hartley Act, This act placed more 
restrictions on labour and argued that "interference to some 
degree in the procedures and content of collective bargaining 
was essential in order to protect the rights of unions, 
Page 131 
management, the public and individual members of society." 
This law has remained the principle foundation for the develop- 
ment of industrial relations institutions in the United States? 
with the exception of the Landrum-Griffith Act of 1959i which 
protected unions members against corruption by insuring their 
right to vote , and has insured that the American principle 
of allowing the market forces to determine wages and benefits 
between labour and management has been upheld; qnd this prin- 
ciple has been upheld, against the desire of labour, since 19^7* 
From this, it is easy to notice that there exists two distinct 
categories where industrial relations are concerned. There 
exists the "European-Ethnic" category, that has promoted tri- 
partite cooperation with formal legislation, or through more 
informal channels, where government uses moral suasion to pro- 
mote the development of a better industrial relations system. 
The economic experience of the "European-Ethnic" - through its 
system of utilizing policies such as income and wage policies; 
works councils; consensus decision making; and manatory worker 
participation - has enabled countries utilizing these policies 
to maintain a relatively low level of inflation, moderate levels 
of unemployment and a consistent record of economic growth, 
in terms of the year to year change in G.N.P. 
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The second system is the "Anglo-Saxon” system, which promotes 
limited involvement in the traditional relaationship between 
labour and management, and allows the market forces to take 
their course. However, what the advocates of this system have 
failed to realize is thatt a strong industrial relations system 
promotes industrial peace, and with little or no disruptions 
in the economic system, it will grow and adapt much easier to 
changes. This inevitably means a stronger economy and a 
better chance of meeting the nations economic goals. 
Part B: The Collective Bargaining System and How it Coincides 
With the Model 
The most basic right guaranteed in each of these eight nations, 
as a fundamental part of the industrial relations system, has 
been the guarantee of the unions right to bargain collectively 
with an employer. The union may bargain at the level of the 
enterprise, on a company by company basis; as is the case in 
Canada and the United States, and in some isolated instances 
in Japan, Australia, and Great Britain; on a industry-wide 
basis, which is the more popular choice in Japan, Austria, 
Australia, West Germany, and the United Kingdom, but is also 
utilized in some instances in Canada and the United States; 
or on a nation wide basis, which has been the case in Sweden. 
However, no matter how the union chooses to bargain with the 
employer, the rights to collective bargaining have been 
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legally established. 
Collective bargaining at the level of the enterprise involves 
a series of one to one negotiations between the union and the 
employer. The objective is to establish an agreement that 
best suits the individual needs of both sides. Each party 
is concerned with the long-run viability of the plant, but 
yet wants to move ahead in obtaining a feasible compromise 
with the other side. In this situation, the union is placed at 
a disadvantage because it lacks the necessary information 
about the viability of the operation, and therefore it is 
forced to make its own assumptions. This is the most frag- 
mented system of collective bargaining, and therefore strikes 
by a union bargaining at this level is unlikely to have 
significant national impact to warrant a quick settlement. 
Collective bargaining on an industry wide level is perhaps, 
the best tool that both the union and its executive have. 
Because of an unusually large membership, a union of this 
type has more information to bargain with the employers 
association. There still remains problems v/ith industry wide 
bargaining, in that it sometimes fails to take into account 
regional differences, and localized effects that a settlement 
or strike could have upon a particular region. This 
phenomenon has been most notable in the “Anglo-Saxon" nations. 
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In Japan, collective bargaining tends to begin at the industry 
level, particularly during the "Spring Offensive,'* but it usu- 
ally shifts to key enterprises in each industry, and once an 
agreement is struck in those, it spreads rapidly, with adjust- 
ments geared to the circumstances of each firm, to all companies 
in that industry.In West Germany, the process of collective 
bargaining has been well established in a legal framework that 
deals with industrial relations, and this system promotes bar- 
gaining on an industry wide level, because each industry and 
enterprise is covered under these laws. The "European-Ethnic" 
based nations have integrated industry wide bargaining into the 
industrial relations system, and therefore, there is less 
industrial conflict resulting from this procedure. 
In Sweden, national unions and employers^ associations, in 
each branch, negotiated settlements prior to 1950. However 
since 1950, centralization has taken place. Collective 
bargaining between the national unions and the employers' 
associations, has been/ superceded by active inference, in this 
process, by the LO and the SAF.^^^ These two top organizations 
now negotiate the general issues, and the national unions and 
the employers* associations, then try to agree on their spe- 
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cific issues. This system has the general support of the 
employers organization but only reluctant support from the union. 
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Therefore depending on the nation, the. collective bargainin 
process, inconjuction with the policies and institutions of 
the industrial relations system utilized, will have a direct 
bearing on the probability of a breakdovm in these talks. 
The following illustrates the collective bargaining system 
used in each nation: 
Australia - enterprise and industry-wide neo- 
tiations but tend to rely on 
enterprise level negotiations; 
Canada - enterprise and industry-wide nego- 
tiations but tend to rely on 
enterprise level negotiations > 
U.K. - enterprise and industry-wide nego- 
tiations but there is a trend 
towards mors industry-wide nego- 
tiations f 
U.S.A, - enterprise and industry-wide nego- 
tiations but tend to rely on enter 
prise level negotiations; 
Japan - industry-wide negotiations that are 
brought back to full key enterprises 
and then altered to deal with 
regional differences; 
F.R.G. - industry-wide but within the legal 
framework developed; 
Austria industry-wide but within the insti- 
tutional framework developed; 
Sweden - national negotiations that are 
general and then passed to the 
industry level for the develop- 
ment of specifics. 
The data indicates that industry-wide and nation-wide negO' 
tiations that have been developed with a specific legal or 
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institutional framework, is more conducive to obtaining a 
settlement without industrial conflict. Without industrial 
conflict, a nation's economy should be spared the inevitable 
suffering that coincides with conflict, and therefore should 
perform better on a domestic and comparative international 
basis. As well, in Sweden, Austria, West Germany, and Japan, 
economic issues are going to be less of a factor in negotiations 
where more emphasis may be placed on benefits that effect each 
individual worker - pensions, group health and life insurance, 
job security, safety, and workers participation in manage- 
ment - rather than issues of national concern such as unem- 
ployment and inflation. 
Therefore, there will be a more conscious effort on the part 
of unions and management to obtain a viable consensus, and to 
negotiate with both parties interests at heart, and therefore 
avoid the single-minded mentality that exists amongst the 
partners in Canada, the U.S., the U.K., and Australia. 
As expected, with the exception of Japan and the United States, 
the hypothesis set forth in Chapter One does correspond to the 
development and application of industrial relations systems 
in the nations that have been studied and include Australia, 
Austria, Canada, Great Britain, Sweden and West Germany. 
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In Sweden, Austria and West Germany there exists a long 
history of cooperative development of their industrial 
relations systems. In the late nineteenth century and the 
early twentieth century these three countries had established 
a rather simple form of industrial relations system that 
would act as the forerunner for each of their present day 
systems, but,yet a system which introduced industrial rela- 
tions based on mutualistic traditions. 
These simplistic systems had works councils as their primary 
attribute. As early as 1920 works councils had legal repre- 
sentation in the shops and plants of V/est Germany and Austria. 
This type of legislation was a direct result of the growth 
of unions during the industrial revolution and in direct 
response to how the other two parties - i,e, management and 
government - wanted to respond to the ever growing popularity 
of unions. 
Governments in these three nations felt a strong desire to 
maximize economic growth and economic potential so it became 
their responsibility to ensure that labour was in some way 
protected from the wrath of the greedy capitalist entrepeneur. 
This meant that government had to,and did introduce legislation 
that provided unions with the legal right of formation and the 
right to bargain collective!;^.;, and to have any resulting 
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agreement be legally binding on both sides. This occurred 
in each of these countries prior to the outbrak of World 
War I. 
The changes that happened both domestically and globally 
during the period from the outbreak of World War I to the end 
of World War II, forced each government to reevaluate its 
goals once the war had ended. These nations quickly realized 
that economic growth and political stability could be acheived 
by extending institutions to include labour and management 
in a cooperative milieu. These traditions have continued, not 
withstandi^ng some disruptions and some evidence of discontent, 
to the present time. They have etched themselves into the back- 
bone of each of these nations and are, in some way, directly 
responsible for the record of industrial peace and economic 
consistency that these three nations have. 
Table 5*1 ^as shown that these three countries, along with 
Japan, have relatively few man days lost per thousand workers 
per year during the last quarter century. The results of the 
i. 
model - Tables 4.1 to 4.7 - prove that these four nations, 
through the development of an industrial relations system, 
have been able to maintain economic growth and industrial 
peace in tandem. 
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Japan's r-squared statistic for the model was 0.8363* the 
P-statistic was 13.8693* The adjusted r-squared statistic 
was 0.7760 and five of the seven t-statistics were signifi- 
cant. Put hack into the context of the model, these statistics 
indicate that the collective bargaining process focuses on 
the traditional issue of economic performance and therefore 
wages are a central issue in collective bargaining. 
"In actual bargaining, initial demands and counter-demands 
are likely to be far apart as well as numerous. However, 
by the time they are settled, as in the"Spring Offensive" they 
usually dwindle down to a few key wage issues, such as the 
"base-up" (which is a flat sum or percentage increase in 
to total wage bill of an enterprise), starting wages for new 
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school graduates, and annual or semi-annual wage bonuses. " 
One reason for this "narrow" set of bargaining issue is that 
the basic labour agreement and money settlements are treated 
separately. Basic labour agreements set forth the general 
rights and obligations of each party and procedures for 
bargaining and administration, covering in detail such matters 
as management perogatives, union recognition, membership 
eligibility, dues check-off, union security, union officers, 
no-strike pledges, negotiations, working hours and work con- 
ditions, While the law limits duration of agreements to three 
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years, they tend to be renewed almost perfunctorily, and with 
little change.In this respect, wage and money benefits may 
be reopened and renegotiated at any time. 
It is for these reasons that the emphasis in Japan has been 
on wage increases and money benefits during the collective 
bargaining process, while more traditional union issues are 
dealt with through the process of consensus decision making. 
Therefore, Japan's equation should show a good fit and statis- 
tical significance when analyzing the model's results and 
comparing them to the institutions and legal framework presently 
being used. It should be noted that Japan is the exception, 
in terms of those nations classified as "European-Ethnic." 
The "Anglo-Saxon" nations have a very poor record of 
controlling industrial peace. These four nations are amongst 
the worst, statistically, in the capitalist world. Only Italy 
has a worse strike record than Canada over the past quarter 
century, while each of these four nations - the lowest of 
which is Great Britian - are all at least four times higher, 
than the highest numbers for the other four nations. 
These four nations - i.e. Australia, Canada, Great Britain, 
and the United States - had provided a minimum legal framework 
during the nineteenth century, that allowed workers the 
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iDasic right of unionization# as well as some rights to 
political association and the right to conciliation and 
arbitration. However, with their commitment to the laisse - 
faire capitalist economy, the political establishment per- 
mitted the exploitation of workers in general,and unionized 
v/orkers in particular, where they had survived the traumas of 
the union busting techniques employed by management. 
The political process also did little to promote the develop- 
ment of a workable industrial relations system geared to 
industrial peace and social progress. Since - with the excep- 
tion of Great Britain - powers were split between the two 
levels of government - i.e. the federal and state levels. 
The state and the federal government normally followed a 
similiar course of action; and although the state had the 
legal jurisdiction over labour relations in each of these 
nations,with only a few exceptions, a policy was adopted that 
extended the rights of unions to protection in a rather 
perfunctary manner. This meant that the policy of allowing 
market forces to determine wages and wage structures between 
unions and employers ..was readily accepted. 
The course of industrial relations remained relatively 
unchanged in the Anglo-Saxon nations for nearly a half cen- 
tury*. Of course there were additions to the legal system that 
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sometimes clarified old, antiquated laws, yet, there were also 
a number of important additions that provided for a further ex- 
tension of the rights of all three parties to the industrial 
relations system. However, tallc about change became more 
prevalent during the turbulent 1970*s, especially in Great 
Britain, Canada, and Australia. 
However, there has been little positive change resulting from 
"the 19?0*s crises in industrial peace" in these nations. 
Most nations reverted to studying the problem, however, these 
studies turned out to be little more than a goverm.ent charade 
to satisfy the needs of unions in public, while privately con- 
tinuing their support for "Big Business" and the free enter- 
prise system. That is why, even today, the "Anglo-Saxon" 
attitude towards industrial relations still prevails in these 
nations• 
For these reasons, along with the extensive use of enterprise 
level collective bargaining, countries like Australia, Canada, 
and the United States should have equations that show statis- 
tical slgnificance, Two of the three countries do, the excep- 
tion being the United States. Australia has an r-squared 
statistic of 0.7881, an adjusted r-squared of 0.7101, an F- 
statistic of 10.0979» and four significant t-statistics. 
Canada, on the other hand, has an r-squared statistic of 
0.6695» an adjusted r-squared of 0.5477» an F-statistic of 
5.4981, and four significant t-statistics. This means that the 
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hypothesis is correct for these two nations, and that 
economic performance,which is the underlying factor in the 
collective bargaining process, is significant in creating 
industrial conflict. 
So what has happened to the United States. The statistics - 
an r-squared of 0.3H5i an adusted r-squared of 0.0579i an 
?-statistic of 1.2281 - all indicate that economic perfor- 
mance is not a significant underlying factor in the collective 
bargaining process. However, all the previous literature that 
has been studied indicates that this should indeed be the 
case. 
“Collective bargaining, the process whereby 
unions and management negotiate the terms of an 
agreement that is binding upon and acceptable 
to both parties, is one of, it not the most 
important aspeci^pf labour relations in the 
United States, ' " '* 
“Collective bargaining agreements spell out 
who is covered by the agreement and for how 
long. A system of internal jurisprudence or a 
grievance procedure is set up. The contract 
enumerates certain rights of management, called 
the management prerogative clauses, which des- 
cribe the powers of management•;;_with no subject to 
union interference. Union protection clauses, 
such as the union-shop provision are included. 
The contract deals directly with bread and 
butter issues: wages, hours, and fringe bene- 
fits such as pensions and health and welfare 
insurance. The contract also defines the terms 
of job security. For many workers this is the 
important section of the contract, as it includes 
provisions concerning procedures for hiring. 
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promotion, laying off, discharge and 
reemplo^nnent• Finally, the contract covers 
incidental items dealing with working condi- 
tions: heating, lighting, sanitation and 
protective clothing, if necessary. These 
are the broad categories of provisions one 
finds in a^typical union-management 
agreement, 
’’But whatever the hopes for some within the 
labour movement for other goals to be 
sought in collective bargaining, the major 
sources of concern in collective bargaining 
still are money and job security issues. 
Thus, unions are continually pressing for 
wage increases, sometimes protected agg^nst 
inflation by wage escalation clauses. ^ 
These statements may help to enlighten the situation as it 
applies to the United States. This author concedes that the 
most important aspect of the industrial relation system in 
the.United States has been ,and still is the collective 
bargaining process. The collective bargaining process allows 
both union and management to obtain and legally secured rights 
th?.t are important to them. The system employed in the 
United States seems no different than each of the other three 
"Anglo-Saxon” nations, so why the statistical differences. 
There are two possible explanations as to whgA this has occurred. 
One reason lies in the fact that the size of membership in 
American unions has been on the decline. Labour Statistics 
show that although union membership increased from i960 to 
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1976 by 3.585 million but that the actual percentage of 
unionized workers has decreased by 3*3 percent from 23.6 
to 20.3 percent. The labour force for the same period v/as 
up 24.'775 million and this means that the percent rate of 
unionization was only 14.47;^,^^^ This shows a decrease in the 
continuing importance of unions in the United States and 
this probably had, to some extent,^weakened the power that they 
once may have had. 
Another explanation may lie with the workers themselves. 
Prior to the mid 1970's, American workers, in general, and 
unionized workers,, in particular, had the highest per capita 
income in the world, but since then, have fallen behind several 
of the other highly industrialized nations of Western Europer 
and therefore felt it was necessary to change their focus 
from the continuing issue of wages and monetary benefits, to 
other less traditional issues. As was noted earlier, job 
security has become an increasingly more important issue for 
unions, as has the fringe benefits, 
♦‘Workers are striving to expand fringes: 
improved retirement systems, sometimes 
starting earlier often with cost-of-living 
escalation clauses; better health plans, 
including dental insurance; new procedures, 
more time off work, including more holidays 
and vacations, and shorter work weeks; higher 
premium pay for working more hours than 
scheduled; tighter controls over the work 
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places to prevent acci^g^'ts and- improve 
health and safety;... ^ ” 
These may be only two of a number of explanations and 
prior assumptions, that may be utilized in reasoning, why there 
is a large statistical difference between the United States 
and the other ’’Anglo-Saxon” nations. However, to actually 
be able to pinpoint the reason(s) would be impossible given 
the social, political and economic scope of a country like the 
United States. 
In this chapter, the historical development of the industrial 
relations institutions of each of the eight countries has been 
fully explored. This perspective has been applied to the 
results of the model to see if a direct relationship did 
exist. It can be said that those countries who promote tri- 
partite cooperation and exhibit codetermination in their 
management techniques have a much better record of industrial 
peace and are less likely to be influenced by outside factors, 
when entering into the collective bargaining process. 
In countries, where they still rely on the market to determine 
wages, and continue to exhibit a "hands-off” government policy, 
there will undoubtedly be more industrial conflict. Cooperation 
codetermination and consultation are not promoted by government 
and management,while unions are leftj to determine from outside 
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influences, to make a number of key decisions regarding what 
they should or should not be asking for from the employer 
when the collective bargaining process begins. 
In the "European-Ethnic" nations, there is no subconcious 
mode to the collective bargaining process. This is due to 
the fact that all aspects of labour-management relations are 
discussed, and openly persued in an atmosphere of cooperation. 
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CHAPTER VI 
In conjuction with the nation by nation analysis that has just 
been completed, attention must now shift to an analysis of the 
individual explanatory variables and their effect on the 
dependent variable. This chapter will analyse the explanatory 
variables that were statistically significant in each of the 
eight nations, and then will do a comparative analysis of 
results from older studies. 
Table 6,1 recaps those explanatory variables that were 
statistically significant in each of these eight nations. 
Appendix VII provides additional information with regard to 
the other studies, many of which have different time frames, 
that have utilized man days lost as the dependent variables, 
while analysing the relationship between economic perfor- 
mance and strike activity. The studies that utilized man days 
lost provide an excellent point of reference for this study. 
Perhaps the most effecient way to focus on the significant 
explanatory variables is to continue with a nation by nation, 
and then a variable by variable analysis. Since V/est Germany 

































































































for the purposes of this chapter. 
The first nation to have its explanatory variables analysed 
is Sweden. In the initial anaysis, the significant expana- 
tory variables were inflation at -2.3660, as well as employ- 
ment at 1.9260. V/ith the sign of the coefficient being 
negative for inflation, one of two relationships exists at 
all times? 1) as inflation increases, man days lost due to 
strikes is decreasing or 2) as inflation is decreasing* man 
days lost due to strikes is increasing. The tendency in 
Sweden is, when inflation increases unions are more likely 
to reach an agreeable solution with their employer and avoid 
a strike. However, when inflation is decresing unions are 
more likely to strike, based on the premise that they can 
attain a much better settlement in real wages while experien- 
ing a lower opportunity cost. However, this is an unproven 
explanation, 
Where employment in Sweden is concerned, the sign of the 
coefficient of this explanatory variable was positive. This 
meant that as employment increases, man days lost due to 
strikes also increase and as. emplojmient decreases man days 
lost also decreases. This is to say that unions are more 
likely to strike at levels closer to full employment because 
the risk of losing their job has diminished, since the 
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number of qualified people to takeover their position is 
limited. Rees, has made the point that the propensity to 
strike increases in periods of rising employment, 
The negative relationship for inflation is very hard to 
explain, however there does exist a data problem with the ori- 
ginal series that when corrected may shed some livght on the 
Swedish equation. In any series of this kind, several large 
conflicts can dominate^^^, and such has been the case with 
Sweden, V/hen the large conflicts are removed from the series 
- i.e. 1966, 1971# 1975 and 198O - and replaced with the number 
1,0, and the series is rerun, the results strongly coincide with 
what should have been expected from Sweden, Appendix VI 
shows that there were no longer any explanatory variables that 
were statistically significant, and the strngth of all the other 
statistics had decreased significatly. 
This result would be more in line with a naxion, that had an 
overall average of man days lost due to strikes in the period 
1955 ” 1981 of 23*^56 when 1980 had been removed, and 9*397 
when 1966,1971, 1975 and 198O had been removed from the series. 
This verifies the fact that large conflicts can dominate and 
alter the statistical significance of the results in a nation, 
particularly in a nation not prone to a significant number of 
strikes. In reality, these four years represented nearly 85-^ 
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of the cumulative mans days lost due to strikes over the past 
twenty-seven years. 
However, the sam*e point can be made for each of the other seven 
nations, with the exception of Canada., who has remained consis- 
tently high throughout the last quarter century. If the worst 
four years are removed from the series for each of the other 





.237 Australia - total man days lost ^ down from 
9346 to 6311 or fram an average 
of 346.135 to 274.392 
- total man days lost down from 
760 to 267 or from an average of 
28.132 to 12.492 
- total man days lost down from 
1715 to 1122 or from an average of 
63.521 to 48.763 
- total man days lost down from 
761 to 314 or from an average of 
28.187 to 13.650 
- total man days lost down from 6354 
to 5015 O-C* from an average of 
309.405 to 218.049 
- total man days lost down from 
11554 to 8413 or from, an average 
of 427.913 to 365.788. 
U.K. 
^ U.3.A. 
Only in the case of Austria and West Germany would the difer- 
ences be significant enough from dropping the four observa- 
tions, for the series to merit an additional rerun. But since 
West Germany already lacks any form of significance, it will be 
necessary only to examine Austria at some future point. 
In Australia,the same relationship exists betweeji em.ployment 
and man days lost as existed in Sweden. The sign of the 
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coefficient of this significant variable is positive, and this 
is the type of relationship that had been expected. An increase 
in employment would bring about a resulting increase in man 
days lost and visa versa. Australia has two other explanatory 
variables that are significant. One is the policy index and 
the other is wages. The sign of the coefficient for both these 
variables is positive. A previous Australian study, by Bentley 
and Hughes, did not discover any level of significance from 
their analysis for the time periods that they studied, and 
they also used the assumption that wages were no longer very 
important issue with unions. This, they said,is primarily due 
to the relaxed nature of the Australian economy. 
But why would the sign of the coefficent be positive? 
Translating this, the relationship could be explained as follows, 
as the level of real wages increased, the number of man days 
lost would also increase, and as the level of real wages 
decreased, the number of man days lost would also decrease. 
This trend would not seem possible. Would workers go on strikes 
after having received higher wages? 
One possible explanation for this relationship lies in the fact 
that wage increases, normally occur based on activity that has 
occurred in a previous period or on a projection of what is 
going to occur in a future period. So as wages increased 
based on these projections, the striking employees on strike 
are looking for the difference in what they had asked for 
and what they had actually received. This relates to the 
time-lag theory of wage increases. 
Canada is very unique, Canada has four explanatory variables 
that are significant, and two of these variables directely 
contradict each other. The sign of the coefficient for the 
explanatory variable “growth" is positive. This implies that 
as'' economic growth increases, the number of m.an days lost also 
increases, or as grov/th decrease^ man days lost also decreases. 
But this is in direct contrast! to the relationship that 
exists with the policy variable. Since it has been assumed that 
this policy variable focuses on economic objectives, a negative 
sign for the coefficent means that strikes' are occurring 
because the economic objectives are not being met and do not 
occur when they are being met. This has been the actual case 
in Canada. Nation-wide, strikes are called to protest economiic 
conditions- normally high inflation and high unemployment - 
and in direct response to government policy measures - parti- 
cularly wage and price controls which have been utilized in 
Canada on several occassions. 
The unemployment statistic has counterparts from previous 
studies. The Vanderkamp and Walsh studies found that the 
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relationship between unemployment and man days lost was indeed 
negative in Canada.^38 what this means is that as the rate of 
unemployment increases, the number of man days lost decreases, 
and when the rate of unemployment decreases, man days lost 
increases. Yet, this was indeed the case in four other coun- 
tries, including; Great Britain, Japan, Austria, and the United 
States, all of whom also had negative signs on the coefficient 
for their unemployment variable. 
Evidence from Ashenfelter and Johnson, Skeels, Snyder (1975 and 
1977) and Edwards, indicates that this relationship has existed 
in the United States since shortly after World War II. A study 
by Pencavel, in the United Kingdom, also indicated the sam.e 
results. 
What about Okun's Law? Okun*s Law, simply put, states that a 
fairly regular relationship exists between lost output (the gap 
between the actual and potential output) and the rate of unem- 
ployment. Okun's Law takes the form* 
Q» - Q = F(U - U*) 
Q* 
where - Q is the gap between the potential and the actual 
Q* 
output, and where (U - U*) is the percentage excess of unem- 
ployment. What this really means is that a one percent unem- 
ployment rate in excess of the full employment rate, can m.ean 
240 
between two and three percent loss in real GNP. 
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Therefore, as unemployment continues to rise above the full 
employment rate, the rate of growth of the economy begins to 
lose some of its potential and therefore growth slows down. 
With high unemployment, unions are less likely to gamble v/ith 
their future since the economy cannot endure substantial union 
settlements, and the company may not feel the need to offer 
higher settlements because of the almost immediate availability 
of workers. Therefore, this relationship should be theoreti-. 
cally negative, and is negative for the significant variables 
in this model. 
There is still one more significant explanatory variable to be 
studied in Canada and that is the wage variable. The v/age 
variable was also significant in Australia, Japan and the 
United States._ The explanation provided for Australia, 
although weak, is the only explanation tha.t this study has to 
offer. Labour theory would indicate that this relationship 
should be negative., particularly since there are no lagged 
variables in this model. V/hen wages increase, the number of 
man, days lost shouid decrease. This would indicate that 
labour would have received a positive increase in "real” wages 
and therefore have not lost ground to prices. 
An American study by F.K. Edwards indicated that the relation- 
ship between real wages and man days lost was indeed negative 
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for the time period 19^6 - 1972. One might however be able 
to reason that the following scenario has occurred, although 
this must be done speculatively since there is no theorectical 
basis, since 1970. Workers began to receive substantial wage 
increases during the 1970's, particularly in manufacturing. 
Each year as the union received an increase in wages, it in 
turn decided to ask for more. So the union developed this 
insatiable appetite for large wage increase^ and by increasing 
their demands to levels unacceptable to their employer, they 
were inevitably, placed in the position of having to strike 
in order to gain substantial yearly wage increases. There may 
be some statistical merit in what has been espoused, since the 
largest real wages increases occured for each of these countries 
during the 1970's - i.e. Japan, 7.6-^ average increase per year 
during the '70's; U.S.A., 0.29;^» Australia, and Canada, 
2.12^ - these same countries also experienced their worst decade 
for strike activity, as well as their worst individual three 
year record for the entire period being studied - Japan dp*29 
man days lost per one thousand employees during the 1970's and 
141.841, nearly 2*5 times the twenty-seven year average, for 
1973 - 1975? U.S.A. 456.545 during the 1970's, and 591.145 
from. 1973 ” 1975; and Canada 807.393 during the 1970's, and 
956.629 from 1973 - 1975. This would certainly indicate that 
a much more logical reason does exist for these statistics. 
The wage and the unemplo\-mnent variables have already been 
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explored in the cases of Great Britain, Japan and the United 
States. Therefore emphasis must shift towards the unexplained 
variables from each of these countries. 
In Japan and Great Britain the explanatory variables time and 
employment, have the same sign for the coefficient. Employment 
is also similiar in sign for the coefficient to that of the 
United States. 
The first variable to be analyzed is time. Both the U.K. and 
Japan have a positive coefficient for this variable. What 
this means is that as time has progressed the number of man 
days lost due to strike has also increased. In general this 
has been true for both Great Britain a^nd Japan. Statistics 
show that average number of man days lost due to strikes 
increased, on avera,ge, from the 1960's to the 1970 *s. In 
Japan in the 1960's the average number of man days lost per 
year was 83.415 per one thousand employees and during the 1970's 
this figure increased to 85.29* In Great Britain, the figure'^ 
for the 1960's was 131*5^7» however, during the 1970's it soared 
to 524.977. This provides a strong indication as to why this 
posi-^ive relationship did exist. 
Another reason focuses on the relationship bet'.veen the a priori 
assumption related ^.o this variable and union activity. In 
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Great Britain for instance, the rate of introduction of tech- 
nological change has become a very contentious issue for labour. 
The traditional position of the union has changed from emphasiz- 
ing wage increases to obtaining concessions on areas such as 
job security and fringe benefits. As has been witnessed by the 
1984 - 1985 coal miners strike, over job security and wages, 
the unions are quite willing to take a hardline on issues 
like this» as their attitude shifts more towards self-pre- 
servation. 
In Japan, decisions regarding the implementation of work related 
changes are made through a consensus process which is negotiated 
on a three-year basis. But as had been pointed out in an earlie 
chapter, even though Japanese corporations have been quite 
profitable over the last quarter century, these profits have 
not always been turned over to the workers. Therefore the 
’’Spring Offensive” has become a weapon whereby labour has been 
able to obtain money benefits - i.e, wages, bonuses, etc., 
and as Japanese corporations have become more profitable, part- 
cularly during the 1970's, strikes were utilized by unions to 
get at those profits. 
In Japan, Great Britain and the United States there was a 
negative relationship between employment and man days lost# 
This would reflect the position of the traditional economist. 
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Since employment is increasing, then man days lost due to 
strikes are decreasing. When employment is decreasing, man 
days lost due to strikes is increasing. This implies that as 
unions are losing their jobs to technology, recession, etc., 
they would be willing to withdraw their services as a means to 
obtain leverage in bargaining to retain this position. The 
counter-theory of this is that as employment increases, the 
general population is glad to be engaged in employment, unions 
are increasing in numbers, or they should be, and no one really 
wants to rock the boat. However this argument is weak, and 
this author favours the position that unions gather strength 
as an econom.y is approaching full employment since the number 
of skilled and semi-skilled workers available has greatly 
diminished. 
There are only two significant explanatory variables that must 
be discussed in this section. The first of these variables is 
inflation in Japan, and the sign of the coefficient for this 
variable is positive, as well, the t-statistic is quite sign- 
ificant at 4,0911. But this is what should have been ex- 
pected of Japan, given the present industrial relations in- 
stitutions. The Japanese unions bargain with their employer 
utilizing a two tiered system. On the first level is the 
annual negotiations that focus on wage and money benefits. 
On the second level are the tri-annual negotiations that deal 
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with all other issues pertaining to the operation of the plants 
and factories. Therefore money is an annual issue with the 
Japanese unions and employers. 
Along with the assumption that unions utilize consumer price 
indices or other types of inflationary indexes in helping to 
determine the level of nominal wage increases, the relation- 
ship should be positive in thati high levels of inflation bring 
about industrial conflict as unions try to obtain high nominal 
wage increases in order to compensate. 
The second of these variables is time in Austria. The sign of 
the coefficient for this variable is negative, meaning that as 
time has increased - i.e. moved ahead in a chronological series 
the number of man days lost due to strikes has correspondingly 
decreased. This has been the case when the statistics for the 
1960's and 1970's are analyzed. Throughout the 1960's the 
average number of man days lost per one thousand employees v/as 
50.608, however, during the 1970's this figure had fallen off 
by more than SO/a and v;as now at 7 •908, And during the early 
part of the 19^50's - I.E, 19c0 - I98I - this figure had fallen 
■to 3*373» thus, showing that a strong negative relationship 
between time and man days lost should exist, 
Austria, as a nation is in the same situation as Sweden and 
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West Germany. The four largest strikes in the series account 
for 55fo oi* total man days lost during the twenty-seven 
year period. Therefore it v/as decided to rerun the original 
model, but that these four strikes would be ignored, in order 
that a much better composite picture could be drawn. Remark- 
ably the same results occurred as had earlier occurred with 
Sweden. There were no longer any significant t-statistics but 
the other statistics - including the F-statistic, r-squared 
and adjusted r-squared - had increased slightly, and was in 
direct contrast to the Swedish results. 
From the results for Swed-en and Austria, for this additional 
analysis, the new statistics indicate that the variables dropped 
from the series^were of importance. Since the t-statistics 
generally decreased from poor to extremely bad in almost all 
cases, the original set of statistics should be considered a 
more accurate indicator of the true relationship between the 
explanatory variables and the dependent variable, even though 
the adjusted statistics correspond much better with the 
hypothesis• 
One final analysis was conducted to test if the same relation- 
ship existed in West Germany. After all, the four largest 
strikes during the last twenty-seven years represent fifty-two 
percent of total man days lost during that same period. 
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However the results in West Germany were quite different 
when the model was rerun after dropping the four worst years 
in terms of man days lost and substituting them with 1,0. The 
r-squared, adjusted r-squared and the F-statistic all improved 
dramatically. The number of significant explanatory variables 
increased from zero to two; a positive relationship for un- 
employment, which is contrary to conventional theory, and a 
negative relationship for time; the structure of the covar- 
iance matrix improved, thus proving that this particular 
equation was highly multicollinear. 
What does all this mean for the analysis that has taken place? 
By analysing the individual relationships amongst the various 
significant explanatory variables and the dependent variable, 
the following comments can be made regarding their import- 
ance to this study. 
It -can generally be said that the "Anglo-Saxon” group of 
countries had more significant explanatory variables, meaning 
that the emphasis prior to entering into the collective 
bargaining process was still on economic conditions/variables. 
This means that, in general, wages remain the key issue in the 
collective bargaining process. In fact the t-statistics for 
the explanatory wage variable in Australia, Canada and the 
United States were significant, while in the U.K. it was not. 
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In terms of the explanatory variables, twelve of the twenty- 
eight were significant at ninety percent, in the "Anglo-Saxon" 
nations. While in the "European-Ethnic" nations, nine of the 
twenty-eight explanatory variables were significant, however 
five of these could be attributed to Japan, which turned out 
to be the statistical exception in this group. Japan was the 
only country in this group where the wage variable was 
significant. This can be attributed to the fact that there is 
an annualized system of collective bargaining that focuses only 
on wage and money benefits. Almost all strike activity in 
Japan can be, attributed to the "Spring Offensive," a time of 
year when workers negotiate for their wage and money increases. 
The development of a fully integrated tripartite system of 
cooperative industrial relations, which includes measures of 
consultation and codetermination which exist in the "European- 
Ethnic" system, has had several effects on this model. Since 
this type of system acts as a "buffer" to limit industrial con- 
flict, through works councils and worker participation in man- 
agement at the level of the enterprise, many of the tradi- 
tional disagreements between workers and employers regarding 
working conditions, health and safety programs, introduction 
of technological change and therefore issues related to job 
security^can all be discussed at the level of the enterprise, 
and a compromise can be reached prior to both sides entering 
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into the formal process of collective bargaining. 
In all of these countries, whether the system is formal through 
legislation or informal through voluntary guidelines, the 
government has played an active role in encouraging better 
labour-management relations as part of a much broader socio- 
economic plan. This tends to limit industrial conflict because 
the government has wide powers of moral suasion over all groups 
within their legal jurisdiction. 
The focus of employers and unions in the collective bargaining 
process has turned away from the more traditional issue of 
wages. Unions and employers tend to focus on issues related to 
work place participation, benefits and job security. Both 
parties in these countries recognize that the rewards for 
compromise far exceed the costs of conflict. 
Therefore^ it is expected that the following explanatory var- 
iables would not be significant in the "European-Ethnic"; (1) 
wages and (2) government policy. In the case of the four 
"European-Ethnic" countries, governmen,t policy is of no real 
significance in explaining industrial conflict, since govern- 
ment policy is geared to industrial peace and economic stabil- 
ity. 
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This leads to the conclusion, that in countries dominated by 
the "Anglo-Saxon ideology, the level of significance of the 
explanatory variables is much higher in comparison to the 
"European-Ethnic" ideology. In countries where a fully de- 
veloped and socially well-integrated industrial relations 
policy exists,the dependance on economic variables as factors 
in the collective bargaining has been greatly reduced. While, 
in general, these nations have far less industrial conflict 
and are progressing much further ahead, economically and soci- 
ally than the "Anglo-Saxon" nations. 
The last point to be made in this chapter focuses on the 
Hicksian "Accident Theory of Strikes." It is apparent that 
this theory is quite applicable in Canada, Australia, Great 
Britain and the U.S.A. It appears that strikes in these 
nations occur for reasons related to a breakdown in the col- 
lective bargaining process. Since the collective bargaining 
is the only formal industrial relations institution in place 
in each of these countries, strikes occur as a result of faulty 
negotiations where the demands of one side cannot be met by the 
other, or are in excess of what the other side wants to provide. 
Hicks (13) made the following points about trade unions, 
negotiations and employers: 
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"There is a general presumption that it will 
be possible to get more favourable terms by 
.i^gotiating than by striking. The reason why 
an employer is prepared to pay higher wages 
than he would otherwise have done, as a result 
of Trade Union pressure, is that it pays him 
to offer a certain amount of "Danegeld" to buy 
off the loss which would follow from a strike. 
Once a strike has begun, all he can buy off is 
the remainder of the strike; the loss incurred 
as a result of the stoppage has already taken 
place to fight out to the bitter end, only 
means going back upon the employer's terms..... 
V/eapons grow rusty if unused, and a union which 
never strikes, may lose the ability to organise 
a formidable strike, so that its threats become 
less effective. The most able Trade Union 
leadership will embark on strikes occasionally, 
not so much to secure greater gains upon that 
occasion (which are not likely to result) but 
in order to keep their weapon burnished for 
future use, and to keep employers thoroughly 
conscious of the Union's power. Under a 
system of collective bargaining, some strikes 
are more or less inevitable for this reason,* 
but nevertheless, the majority of actual strikes 
are doubtless the result of faulty negotiation. 
If there is a considerable divergence of opinion 
between the employer and the Union representatives 
about the length of time the men will hold out 
rather than accept a given set of terms, then 
the Union may refuse to go below a certain level, 
because its leaders beleive that they can induce 
the employer to consent to it by refusing to 
take anything else; while the employer may refuse 
to concede it, because he does not believe the 
Union can hold out long enough for concession 
to be worth his while. Under such circumstances, 
a deadlock is inevitable, and a strike will 
ensue; but it arises that the divergence of 
estimates, and from no other cause. Any m.eans 
which enables either side to appreciate better 
the position of the other will make settlement 
easier; Adequate knowledge will always make a 
settlement possible. The danger lies in ignor- 
ance by one side of the other's disposition|^2 
and in hasty breaking-off of negotiations." 
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Hick's analysis suggests that the collective bargaining 
process is the key to limiting industrial conflict. Lacking 
perfect information, if the negotiations were carried on in 
an atmosphere of mutual trust and mutualistic goals, industrial 
conflict can be substantially reduced. This has most definitely 
been the case in the four European-Ethnic nations. 
In four Anglo Saxon nations, where the collective bargaining 
process;has been maintained as a forum to express diverging 
opinions about all issues related to employer-employee relation- 
ship, the accident theory of strikes is relevant. Since the 
majority of information utilized in the collective bargaining 
process comes from outside the firm, i.e. from interpretation 
of socio-economic trends, rather than from a cooperative ex- 
change of pertinent information, there will undoubtedly be dis- 
agreements that lead to a breakdown of the process and strikes. 
One other point of relavance made by Hicks, is that unions 
strike to maintain the strength of their organizational ab- 
ilities. This may help to explain why strikes occur in the 
"European-Ethnic" nations, or why in some years, strike numbers 
in terms of man days lost are much higher than average. It 
will be necessary to illustrate this point by example. In 
1980, the LO in Sweden called for a national one-day strike 
to protest proposed changes to the national accord, end this 
one-day strike accounted for almost ninety-five percent of the 
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four million man days lost in 19^0. These four million days 
accounted for more than one half of the total man days lost 
in Sweden over the last twenty-seven years. Phis shows that 
unions do utilize their organizational abilities to strike 
as a means of keeping the government and employers conscious 
of their strength. 
Thus, it must be said that the Hicksian "Accident Theory 
of Strikes" will be of vital importance when industrial conflict 
is analyzed as a function of a breakdown in the collective 
bargaining process. 
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CHAPTER VII 
The present state of industrial relations in Canada is not con- 
ducive to industrial peace, labour management cooperation and 
economic growth when compared to the systems that have developed 
in certain Western European countries. The measures of economic 
performance utilized in this study, indicate that Canada's 
annual rate of inflation, unemployment and consistency of 
grov/th in G.N.P. over the past two decades, lags far behind 
those of Western European nations who have developed industrial 
relations systems which are geared more to cooperation than 
confrontation-nations like Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Austria and West Germany. 
Part of the reason why Canadian industrial relations has not 
developed in the same manner as the aforementioned nations, 
has to do with Canada's relative youth as a self governing 
nation, as well as Canada's close ties to its British heritage 
and American ally. Because of the very nature of these close 
ties; in terms of social and legislative developments, as well 
as economic institutions; Canada's political system and indust- 
rial relations institutions have developed within the context 
of being a British Dominion and having its constitution drafted 
in Great Britain and imposed on Canada in 186?. American influ- 
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ence has been over the developinent of Canada's economy with the 
focus being on the industrializtion of Canada, in order that 
that U.S. could obtain much needed resources, and through its 
direct influence on the early development of Canadian Unions. 
Combined with this was Canada's role prior to the 1850's, as an 
agricultural nation. This meant that the development of trade 
unionism was comparatively slow until well into the nineteenth 
century. The extreme specialization in agriculture and allied 
primary industries, the prevalence of domestic production in 
many fields, the small and scattered population, the limited 
industrial and urban development, and inadequate facilities of 
transportation and communication, all served to limit sharply 
the scope of labour organization. 
Unionism developed more rapidly in Canada during the 1850's 
to early 1870's. It was encouraged by rapid progress of the 
trade union movement in Great Britain and the United States, 
Much of the leadership and direction came from American unionists 
and from skilled workers from Britain who had previous union: 
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experience, 
During the next fifteen years, several attempts were made 
to organize a national body of trade unions which would 
promote the objectives of trade unionism. However there 
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were several disjointed attempts during the 18?0's, most 
notably the formation of the Canadian Labour Union in 1873. 
However this union was principally an Ontario based union and 
therefore it lacked adequate strength to survive the serious 
depression and unemployment of the mid 1870's. 
In 1883 the Knights of Labour - the first effective American 
Labour Congress - held an assembly in Toronto for the purpose 
of establishing an overall Canadian Labour Federation. Gut 
of this came the short lived Canadian Labour Congress, however 
a new federation was established on a permanent basis in 1886 
- the same year of the American Federation of Labour, AFL, 
was also established - and the new organization met annually 
from 1887 to 1891 as the Dominion Trades and Labour Congress. 
In 1892 it assumed the name Trades and Labour Congress of 
Canada (TLC) and continued to be known as the TLC until the 
"Merger of 1956" 
During this sam.e period the first major statutes of importance 
were also enacted by the federal parliament. The Trade Unions 
Act and the Criminal Law Amendment Act were both passed in 
1872, the year that m.eant the full beginning of legality for 
’’Combination of Workingmen ” (unions, collective bargaining 
and strike action}. ' They comprised essentially the same 
legislation as the British government had passed earlier, v/ith 
special clauses to meet Canadian requirements. The most 
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important provisions were those defining trade unions as 
legitimate voluntary associations and exempting them from 
charges of criminal conspiracy. Following Britains's lead 
also, a number of provinces enacted legislation designed to 
settle industrial disputes. Ontario passed an act in 1873 
which provided for local boards of conciliation to be set up 
on agreement between employers and workers. The provinces of 
Nova Scotia, Quebec and British Columbia followed suit within 
a few years. Most of these soon became inoperative or were 
repealed. A notable exception was the Quebec Trade Disputes 
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Act of 1901, which remained in force until 1964. 
During the period prior to I9OO, strikes focused mainly on 
work related issues; particularly daily working hours of work, and 
health and safety conditions of the work place. Howeveii the 
impact of strikes could easily be controlled through manage- 
m.ent tactics such as inductions, yellow-dog contracts, and the 
use of strike breaking organizations and the government con- 
tinued to rem.ain outside the realm of the relationship 
between union and employer. 
But the trade unions remained a relatively im^matur^ weak and 
disreputed part of the Canadian business scene. Part of the 
union’s many problems came as a result of union conflict in 
the United States. Almost as soon as the TLC was organized 
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it had to face the issue of "dual unionism." The AFI>, at its 
founding convention in 1886 had adopted the principle of 
exclusion jurisdiction of its member unions over workers in 
specific industries or trades, and elimination of any organ- 
izations that competed with its affiliates. From the outset 
AFL exerted pressure on the TLC to follow the same policy in 
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Canada. The friction which had developed in the united 
States between the AFL and the Knights of Labour reached its 
peak in Canada in 1902, when the TLC amended its constitu- 
tion to exclude from membership national and international 
unions of the AFI* and refused representation to any city 
central labour organization that did not have a charter from 
the TLC, This meant explusion of the district trade assemblies 
of the Knights of Labour, which were still organized in a 
number of cities, and exclusion from TLC ranks of a number of 
2 *^0 
purely Canadian unions. ^ 
Yet almost im.mediately after their expulsion in 1902, the 
Knights of Labour rebounded and were instrumental in the for- 
mation of the National Trade and Labour Congress, This 
organization consisted of various labour groups who were 
strongly opposed to the rigid policy adopted by the TLC, 
which they interpreted as one of subservience to the AFL,^^^ 
In 1.908 it changed its name to the Canadian Federation of 
Lat)our, or CFL. 
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opposition arose to the TLC in Western Canada. In the early 
1900*s, left-wing revolutionaries from the United States, 
organized several unions in British Columbia and Alberta, 
particularly amongst loggers, miners and railway workers. 
This new organization has some early temporary success in win- 
ning away affiliates from the TLC, however, they soon lost 
ground, after engaging in several bitter, long strikes that 
were condemned by a special government investigating com.mittee, 
as well as by the TLC. 
From these historical events it can be easily seen how the 
early development of unions and government related policies, in 
Canada, were influenced by Britain and the United States. Prior 
to 1900, the Americans had strongly influenced the formation 
of unions in Canada, while the British had provided the legal 
framework within which all future legislation and industrial 
relations institutions would develop. 
However, it is important ot remember that as industrialization 
continued to promote expansion in all sectors of the economy, 
unions, governments and employers had to develop initiatives 
that would allow Canada to develop as a self-governing inde- 
pendent nation, able to cope with its own internal matters. 
Yet, the government failed to do the types of things that 
would have allowed for a ’’made in Canada” industrial 
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relations system. In conjuction with this, unions continued 
to depend on the American unions for leadership and advise, 
and this could not be beneficial to Canada as a whole. 
"Rapid industrialization and economic growth,in many countries, 
including Canada, were accompanied by disruptive social 
changes, widening inequalities in income, growing concentrations 
in wealth, and indulgence in conspicious display. Unionism 
for the first time was becom.ing a m.ass movement in a real 
sense, with unskilled and semi-skilled labour becoming organized 
into broad "industrial type" unions on a national scale."^53 
Yet during 1900 - 1913» numerous strikes of large miagnitude and 
long duration accompanied these developments, and, in the face 
of intransigent resistance from employers and governments in 
m.any cases, generated widespread violence 
According to the Labour Gazette, there were fourteen large 
strikes in widely separate localities across Canada during 
the period from 1901 to 1913» in which one or more of the 
following occurred! riots and "mob violence"; extensive pro- 
perty damage; personal injuries, and in two cases death; read- 
ing of the Riot Act or proclamation of martial law; and arimed 
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intervention by militia or regular m.ilitary force. 
A specially favourable combination of circumstances made 
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possible an unusually rapid rate of economic growth from the 
mid 1890's to 1913* Immigration, population growth and capital 
investment reached record levels, while the manufacturing sector 
more than doubled its output under the stim.ulus of the mass 
migration of, and the set-tl;ementjof, the prairies and the building 
of two transcontinental railways. Inflation and a continual 
lag of wages behind prices accompanied these developm.ents. 
Organized labour in Canada underwent a process of rapid growth 
and change during this period. The general economic climate 
in Canada was favourable to union expansion, and the TLC 
enjoyed indirect support in money and organization personnel 
from the international headquarters of its main affiliates. 
By 1921, following the period of rapid industrial growth? 
labour shortages, inflation and serious wage-price lags during 
World War I and the immediate post war period, the total 
membership of the TLC attained a peak that it was not to reach 
again until well into World War II.^-^^ 
During the period between 1900 and 192?, prior to the begin- 
ning of economic havoc for most capitalist economies, the 
Government entered into the field of dispute settlements, a 
field that would continue to preoccupy the minds of Canadian 
Governments for decades to come. In 1900, Parliament passed 
the Conciliation Act which authorized the Minister of Labour 
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to appoint conciliation boards to help settle disputes when 
requested to do so byeitherof the parties involved. In 1903* 
the Railway Disputes Act was introduced to provide the right 
of conciliation to both parties. This act provided for a 
three-man board, one nominee chosen by each party to the dis- 
pute and a chairman chosen by these two. vVhere problems arose, 
the Minister of Labour was empowered to appoint members to the 
board. In I906 these Acts were combined to form the Conciliation 
and Labour Act,but one year later was succeeded by the Industrial 
Disputes Investigation Act of 1907, which applied to disputes 
involving emiployers of ten or miore persons engaged in m.ining, 
transport, comm;Unication and public utilities. The Act re.mained 
the backbone of Canadian industrial disputes legislation until 
well after World War 
The period after the war brought about the creation of a third 
major union the OBU or One Big Union. The CBU proclaimed the 
doctrine of the Industrial Workers of the World. The OBU 
launched a program, to organize workers by industries rather 
than by trades. The organization was catapulted into national 
prominence when the Winnipeg General strike broke out during 
the organizational m:eetings. The general strike gained vvide- 
spread support from many Western labour organizations including 
several important Councils to the TLC, which joined forces v/ith 
the OBU. However, after peaking with some 41,500 members in 
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1919 the organization some hegan a long decline amidst strong 
opposition from federal and provincial authorities as well as 
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from the TLC. 
During this period the CFL experienced a number of ups and 
downs. It gained strength with the aim of promoting the 
cause for nationalism, but soon lost what it had gained when 
the Knights of Labour assemblies dissolved. However, during 
the 1920's the fear of radicalism in the CBU and conservatism 
in the TIC,led another temporary revival in the CFL and a new 
peak in membership during 1923• Thereafter the federation 
shared in the general decline of union membership and bargaining 
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pow'er in Canada. 
In 192V there was soma evidence of the Anglo-Francophone spliti 
even in the labour movement. The organization, Confederation 
des Travailleurs Catholiques du Canada was formad in the pro- 
vince of Quebec^, but the majority of Catholics in Quebec were 
still affiliated with either the R.C. and CFL, later the FIG 
of ACCL and from. 19^0 on between the FLC and CCL. 
In 1927^the CFL and the OBU along with the Canadian Brotherhood 
of Railway Workers came together to form the All-Canadian 
Congress of Labour, (ACCL)• The ACCL experienced the same 
pattern of growth as the other major unions with early 
acceleration in membership and then the latter decline with 
the depression* 
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Prior to the partial economic resurgance of the 1920's, Canada’s 
unions still depended on its American affiliation for much of 
its guidance. The TLC was still dominated by its international 
affiliates, and continued to struggle for recognition from, 
employers and government. As World War I ended and the transi- 
tion back to a ’’nozynal” society began there was mounting unrest. 
Unrest due to the inflationary spiral, accom.panied by lagging 
wages, widespread suspicion of wartime profiteering and the use 
of emergency wartim-e legislation to restrict union activities. 
These led to widespread agitation and conflict. 
However, strike activity, governm.ent interventionism, and for- 
mal federal legislation declined during the decade of "eternal 
optimism" the 1920's. Strike activity declined for two reasons; 
1) the strike wave of 1919 - 1920 was followed by- the severe 
derression and unemployment in 1920 - 1921^^^ and this was of 
concern to unionist; and 2) the TLC becam-e more dominated by 
2 8^ 
international affiliates of the AFL. During the 1920's 
Canada becam.e more "Americanized" in terms of foreign ownership. 
Along with this foreign ownership came the policies of the major 
em.ployer organization in the U.S.A. The organizations carried 
put a-Well financed and coordinated "open-shop" campaign 
against unions, and this influenced em.ployer policy in Canada. 
In both countries there was a large scale rural to urban 
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migration and, in Canada, heavy immigration, with sharpened 
competition for jobs. At the same time, the major expansion 
on output and employment in both countries during the 1920's 
occurred in new and largely unorganized industries and/or in 
older industries that had successfully resisted effective 
unionization• There was also a major expansion of personnel 
employed in a wide range of white-collar, clerical sales, and 
service jobs. And finally, there were the absolescent and 
ineffective organizational structures of the dominant trade 
union bodies, the AFL in the U.S.A. and its counterpart the 
TLC in Canada. Dominated by a conservative craft union 
leadership and ideology, they were unable or unwilling to 
organize effective unions in more dynamic and rapidly growing 
sectors of the economy. 
This seemed to be the real end of the British influence over 
the development of any industrial relations institutions in Can- 
ada. Although the British North American Act still allowed for 
some aspects of legislative control; which were not 
utilized since the late nineteenth century and were formally 
abolished in 1981 when Canada received its own constitution; 
the British never formally exercised their legal right to 
interfere in m.atters of concern to Canada. This meant that 
the era of American domination of union philosophy, employment 
opportunities, and later, industrial relations legislation 
had begun. 
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During the decade prior to the "Great Depression," the Indust- 
rial Disputes Investigation Act (I.D.I.) was successfully 
challenged in the courts and the Privy Council, in 1925i on the 
grounds that the federal constitution did not guarantee the fed- 
eral absolute jurisdiction over such matters. The Canadian 
Parliament accordingly amended the act to make it apply to 
disputes coming under federal jurisdiction. The am^endment also 
provided that the I.D.I. could extent to operations within the 
jurisdiction of any province that passed enabling legislation. 
Provincial governments acted accordingly. Between 1925 and 
1932, all provinces, except Prince Edward Island, passed new 
laws allowing the I.D.I. Act to be brought into force within 
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their respective jurisdictions. 
Figures for the 1920*s and 1930's show the general state of 
affairs of union activity in Canada during that time. Total 
union membership declined by 1.?^ during the period 1920-1929» 
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and rose by only 1.2^ during the 1930’s. These figures 
are not surprising, given that unions tend to loose strength 
in their numbers during times of economic depression, which 
was definately the case during the 1930's. It can also be 
said that the conservative policies of the AFL and the TLC 
during the I920*s, were not conducive to industrial conflict. 
The 19^0*s would be the most dominant, in terms of the numbers of 
new members that joined the American: controlled unions, however 
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the 1930's will be the most remembered for the introduction in the 
U.S.A. of the Wagner Act, and the delayed effect that this Act 
had upon Canada. The Wagner Act of 1935 firmly established 
the well-known principles of guaranteeing workers the freedom 
to organize into unions of their own chosing, free from employer 
interference or attack; of establishing labour relations 
boards to investigate complaints of unfair labour practices, 
to prosecute offenders, and to conduct supervised elections to 
decide certification of unions representing the m.ajority of 
workers in appropriate bargaining units; and of requiring 
recognition and bargaining by employers with properly certified 
unions. Notably absent from the Act were measures to aid unions 
and employers to negotiate agreements, to regulate the contents 
. ^ b 9 
of agreements, or to restrict the use of strikes or lockouts. ^ 
“Government industrial relations policy in Canada, under pressure 
from organized labour and its supporters, followed slowly and 
reluctantly along the path charted in the U.S.A. The legis- 
latures of most provinces, during the latter 1930's, passed new 
labour statutes which varied v/idely in content and application. 
Kost of them retained in moderate form, the restrictions of 
the I.D.I. Act and a few added some provision of the Wagner 
Act, such as freedom of association and collective bargaining 
on the majority principle. Various gaps and ambiguities in 
such legislation, however, lack of proper machinery to enforce 
it, rendered most provincial labour statutes ineffective. The 
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federal government limited itself to amending the Criminal Code 
to prohibit the employers from discharging workers solely for 
reasons of union activity 
In 1939» an official survey by Grauer provided: 
'*The hostile attitude of many employers to col- 
lective bargaining has defeated the chief purpose 
of unions in organizing to bring about greater 
equality in bargaining power .Analysis 
of strikes and lockouts in Canada for six years 
...••shows that a considerable number of strikes 
and a substantial loss of working time has been 
occasioned by disputes over recognition of unions 
or dismissals for union activity; and that in- 
dustrial disputes resulting from these causes have 
increased rather than diminished in recent years. 
This statement shows that even though the legal framework for 
industrial relations had been well-established, employers still 
failed in many cases to recognize the basic guaranteed right 
of workers to have a union. This meant that unions had to con- 
tinue their struggle for recognition,.while obtaining few con- 
cessions, well into the 19^0's. 
The outbreak of World War II and the implementation of emergency 
wartime measures allowed the government to invoke great changes 
upon the industrial relations scene. The I.D.I. Act was extend- 
ed to include compulsory conciliation and "cooling-off” provis- 
ions. Yet, this did not deter industrial conflict. There was an 
unusually high incidence of strikes in Canada during the early 
years of the war.^*^^ Strikes reached a new peak in 19^3 in number 
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and in total workers involved. Most of these were of short 
duration, and the major issue in the vast majority of them was 
that of union recognition in the face of strong and widespread 
opposition from employers This could be attributed to 
outmoded labour legislation, with its inadequate provisions for 
union recognition, collective bargaining and dispute settlement. 
However, there were two trends that were common during the war 
yearss (1) the strength of all unions continued to grovj and 
(2) governm.ent continued to introduce new legislation that 
could cope with growing industrial relations turmoil. 
In 19^0, the ACCL formed an alliance with seven Congress for 
Industrial Organizations, (CIO), international unions to form 
the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL). The TLC and CCL both 
continued to expand during the wartime and post war eras. 
Fostered by full employment, rapid economic expansion, inflation 
and rising productivity, the affiliated unions continued to 
expand their organizations and win wage increases and other 
tangible gains for their members. Yet, there were growing 
pains caused by the shift in power bases in both of these 
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unions, particularly in the CCL. This was to culminate 
for the CCL in 1951* But these growing pains also enabled the 
CTCC to grow, particulaly because of rapid industrial expansion 
• 27 and urbanization in Quebec during the same period. ^ 
During the wartim.e period the government utilized its emergency 
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legislative powers to invoke several measures that greatly 
affected industrial relations. Special measures were invoked 
to impose wage ceilings, job freezes, and compulsory transfer 
or allocation of labour essential industries. Other measures 
included recognition of the right to join unions, encouragement 
of collective bargaining and compulsory conciliation of disputes. 
In this rather piecemeal fashion, a labour code of **sorts*' had 
developed on a nationwide basis by 19^2.^76 
*Vith the peak in industrial conflict in 19^3» more emergency 
measures were imposed including curbs and delays on union's 
freedom of action without giving them effective protection 
from employers. The national War Labour Board was also estab- 
lished to investigate the industrial relations crisis, and 
the Board managed to uncover a variety of opinions regarding 
what to do about the crisis. Later in that year, F.C. 1003 
was passed. This measure superceded previous legislation invoked 
during the war em.ergency, and brought the labour code more into 
line with the American pattern. It includedthe main principles 
of the Wagner Act and established much of the same type of 
machinery to enforce it; guarantees of labour's right to or- 
ganize; selection of units appropriate.-for-collective bargaining 
certification of bargaining agents; compulsory collective 
bargaining; and labour relations boards to investigate and cor- 
rect unfair labour practices. At the same tim.e it retained 
in amended form, the procedures derived from the I.D.I. Act 
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for preventing or settling disputes: compulsory conciliation 
of disputes and compulsory delay of strikes or lockouts pending 
investigation; intervention of a conciliation officer at the first 
stage of a dispute, and failing settlement, the establisment of 
a tripartite conciliation board. It also provided for com.pul- 
sory arbitration of disputes that were not otherwise settled 
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where agreements were in force. 
With an increase in industrial conflict in the two years im- 
mediately proceeding World War II, Parliament, after official 
termination of the wartime emergency, passed a new statute, the 
Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act (IRDIA) 
that retained most of the priniples and procedures of P.C, 1003» 
as previously outlined. It had, however, only limited powers 
over federal protective jurisdiction. The provinces, therefore, 
with the exception of Prince Edward Island, passed new labour 
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relations acts likewise modelled largely on P.C. 1003* 
Since 19^8, government industrial relations policy in Canada has 
been represented by eleven different authorities. The federal 
government's jurisdiction covers a little over five percent 
of the non-agricultural labour force, and the ten provincial 
governments are responsible for almost ninety-five percent. 
With very few exceptions^voluntary conciliation in Saskatchewan, 
Quebec^^and Prince Edward Island where there are restrictions 
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on union's freedom to negotiate closed shop agreements; ' 
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Canada has had a uniform national labour code. 
Industrial relations in Canada has not undergone any signi- 
ficant changes since the mid 1950 *s. The legal framev/ork 
has remained the same over the last four decades with the 
exception of minor alterations to the provincial statutes, 
alterations that focused mainly on the settlement of disputes, 
and the addition of portions of the IRDIA to the Canada 
Labour Code in 1966. 
From the union's point of view, there have been three items of 
importance since the late 1940's; (1) the trend in grov/th 
has been more towards national unions rather than international 
unions; (2) in 1956fthe dualism of Canadian unions was min- 
imized with the formation of the Canadian Labour Congress; and 
(3) industrial conflict has continued to be a major concern in 
Canada, particularly in the 1970's. 
Chaison and Rose ( 52 ) have illustrated the major growth patterns 
of unions in Canada. Focusing on the period 1925 “ 19?2, they 
noted that aggregate union membership rose from 374,000 to 
2,388,000 workers (or 638^). Correspondingly, the unionized 
component of the non-agricultural labour force more than dou- 
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The most significant trend noticed by Chaison and Rose, was the 
pace of unionization for both international and national unions 
after 19^0, but in particular the growth pattern of national 
unions in the period after 1950* 
The trend towards national unions, has continued to be a major 
influence on Canadian industrial relations. The national unions 
are more militant in terms of obtaining desired concessions 
from their employer. The national unions appear to be more 
interested in their goals as they apply to Canada and not some 
international body largely controlled by Americans. 
During the past 10-15 years, most attention given to international 
unions in Canada has been negative. The most fundamental criti- 
cism of international unions has been their alleged unwilling- 
ness to consider Canada's special needs or political realities 
Perhaps the most notable move to create a national union is the 
attempt by the Canadian wing of the United Auto Worker to break 
away and form a national union for its Canadian workers. 
Even today as nationalistic ideologies and talk of a sovreign 
state abound, Canada has yet to find a "made in Canada" industrial 
relations policy. Canadian governments have provided the basic 
legal framework for industrial relations based on British 
Heritage and American affiliations, hov/ever, unions have failed 
to fully utilize the scope of the legal framework for- self-advance- 
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ment, while employers have continued to bask in the limelight 
of laws geared towards their survival. Government has, in its 
infamous wisdom, always looked out for big business before it 
looked out for the ordinary person. 
Nothing could be more truthful when one looks at the implement- 
ation of wage and price controls in 1975 - 19?6 and later wage 
controls in 198I - 1982. Governments tended to emphasize the 
control of wages, while large companies continued to make absurd 
amounts of profit. The government stressed wage controls as 
means to control inflation. The mandate of wage and price controls 
in 1975 - 1976 was supposed to be dualistic, however, as one 
looks back, these controls were definitely more geared towards 
wages than prices, 
In response to the development of trade unions, the employers 
have responded by bonding together, in order that they can more 
effectively represent their own interests. There is no one 
management organization which speaks for all employers. There 
is the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, the Canadian Manufacturers 
A.ssociatiQn_'. and numerous industry associations, but none of these 
speak authoratively for all employers,^85 
There are a number of reasons as to why employers have formed 
associations for the purpose of collective bargaining, but the 
one common denominator, is the desire to avoid or eliminate 
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power deficiencies within their companies. Phillips describe 
the specific reasons for these types of associations: 
(1) to reduce competition between companies 
based on wage difference; the association 
has the power to negotiate uniform stand- 
ards and thus eliminate labour costs as a 
competitive item? 
(2) to discourage'*whimpering'practices f the 
association can prevent unions from set- 
tling with the employer with the weakest 
bargaining position, and then trying to 
extend these terms to other employers; 
(3) to discourage ruinous disputes; since a 
dispute must affect all operations, the 
potential adverse effects become much easier 
to recognize; 
(4) convenience; an employer association can 
negotiate master agreements with the unions 
representing each group of workers, 
providing employers with the security of an 
established agreement whenever they need 
a particular type of employee; 
(5) to provide specialized negotiations; an 
employer association can employ full-time 
negotiations of a much higher calibre 
than any individual firm could employ. 
These associations normally exist to carry out their activities 
in the following ways: 
(1) the lobbying association 
(2) the education association 
(3) the consultative association 
(4) the negotiating association 
(5) the administrative association 
(6) the mutual aid association. ° 
Employer's associations become accredited in one of three ways. 
The "extreme" scheme is similar to the process which applies to 
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union certification* the association has to win majority sup- 
port of the employers in a particular type of contracting, in 
a specified industrial sector and in a defined geographic area. 
Cnee this is accomplished, the accredited association would 
assume the right to bargain on behalf of all contractors within 
a particular trade sector and geographic area regardless of 
whether they were unionized or were members of the association. 
The "conservative" scheme gives an accredited association the 
right to represent its own members, only. The "compromise" 
scheme permits an accredited association to bargain on behalf 
of all contractors who were unionized at the time of accredita- 
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tion or after accreditation has been granted. 
In 1968 the Task Force Report on Labour Relations recommended 
that support be given to the idea that an accredition for an 
employer association be established along the lines of existing 
union certification procedures. The Report then goes on to 
clarify its position* 
"First, once accredited, an employer association 
would be granted exclusive bargaining rights 
for all firms within the appropropriate bargain- 
ing unit. Second, it should be made clear that 
any employer association accreditation plan would 
apply only to unionized firms dealing with the 
same union or group of unions. Third, consistent 
with what has been said about union security, the 
association v/ould be granted this security in the 
form of an automatic em*ployer-association- 
agency shop after the negotiation of its first 
collective agreement, unless the association 
was able to negotiate a more stringent form^Qj 
security with the union or unions involved. 
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The introduction of measures of this type would have been con- 
sistent with the trend towards improved labour-management 
relations. However, as with most government reports, little 
has been done, except an extension of the basic rights of 
association to employer groups in the construction industry, 
to promote the positive effects of employer organizations in 
all sectors of the economy, and under both levels of juris- 
diction . 
One reason has been that problems in such an association are 
unavoidable. The main problem has been that employers are 
reluctant to give up their rights to make individual decisions. 
Therefore, most associations permit members to opt out of 
certain agreements. Few things are binding in any legal sense. 
Another problem is that individual members may attempt to 
obtain some degree of control over their weaker competitors. 
Finally, these associations are voluntary and therefore policing 
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of constitution or codes of ethics is very difficult. ^ 
Therefore the role of the em.ployer association has been mini- 
mized, not only through its own inefficiencies, but because of 
a lack of guarantees from governments. The formation of 
employer associations tp do some thing other than lobby for 
changes, would be a first step in establishing a fully integrated 
industrial relations system. The mandatory use of employer 
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organizations could be utilized as a first step to promoting 
industry-wide bargaining rather than unit bargaining, which 
is still the principle association between labour and manage- 
ment in this country. 
Government should have realized the value of this type of 
association from the 1968 Task Force Report and should have 
implemented a plan to introduce employer associations, and 
this might have prevented the major outbursts in industrial 
conflict that occurred during the 1970*s. But governments 
have always maintained that their role should remain the 
same, “the outside influence." 
In Canada, government, has over the past seventy years, 
accepted the principle of correction rather than prevention 
as being the underlying basis of the industrial relations 
system. Canada’s legal framework - as has been quite exten- 
sively documented in this chapter - has developed around the 
ideology of correcting or helping to correct potential indus- 
trial relations problems. 
Most of the major legislation enacted, such as* 
(1) 1907 - Industrial Disputes Investigation Act which 
provided for federal government intervention 
in a labour dispute on the application of 
either party to the dispute, and for the 
appointment of a tripartite board to hold ^02 
hearings and recommend terms of settlement"^^ 
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(2) 19^3 ” P.C. 1003 was passed which provided a conciliation 
procedure for disputes and compulsory arbitration 
of disputes that that were not otherwise settled 
where agreements were in force. 
that focused on industrial relations, invariably assumed that 
the nature of labour-management relations were such that 
conflict was inevitable. Therefore governments have continued 
to support corrective methods rather than the adaptation of 
preventive measures. 
For the most part, the adaptation of preventive measures would 
be a controversial decision on the part of the party in power - 
be it the Conservatives or the Liberals. It would be seen as 
a measure in support of Labour and the New Democratic Party. 
Preventive measures, for the most part, are geared to allowing 
unions more rights at the level of the enterprise. Institutions 
like works councils, consensus decision-making, co-determina- 
tion, and parity commissions on prices and wages are viewed as 
being pro-labour. 
This means that the adaptation of such policies by a Conservative 
Government would be seen as "biting the hand that feeds you." 
Conservatives have long depended on the support of large 
Canadian and multi-national corporations for a m.ajority of 
their monetary and public support. Even adaptation of such 
policies by the Liberals, a party which has, in Canada, always 
been more center of right, could be detrimxental because the 
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middle income and lower middle class people who make up the 
bulk of support^ may construe' these actions as '‘selling-out" 
to labour. 
Therefore, no matter how badly Canada’s economy continues to 
flounder, there is not likely to be wide sweeping changes in 
government policy or legislature that would have any significant 
positive effects on the industrial relations. The reasons 
being: 
(1) it is viewed by the two major political 
parties, the two parties that have held 
the balance of power since Confederation, 
as being a form of political genocide. 
Instituing new arrangements would hurt 
where it counts the most, in terras of 
political support from influential sectors 
in this country; 
(2) in order to institute any form of industrial 
relations change, the government would have 
an overall extremely outdated legal frame- 
work which still believes, against all the 
positive data that has been received from 
the V/est European nations, that correction 
is far more viable than prevention; 
(3) the attitude of management and labour is not 
conducive to change. Management still ex- 
habits a hostile attitude towards trade 
unionism, while trade unions view any type 
of government or management initiative with 
grave suspicions, which invariably leads to 
a breakdown in communications between the 
three parties. 
Without implementing changes to the legal framework and in- 
stituting a government policy geared towards educating all 
Canadians to the benefits of a cooperative industrial relations 
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system, the system in place will continue to play havoc with 
an already weak economy. Joan Robinson said it best when pre 
dieting the inevitable failure of capitalist economiesJ 
"If we are to enjoy continue near full- 
employment, without changing the institutions 
and habits of industrial bargaining, we shall 
suffer from inflation. It is neither the 
fault of the trade unions, fulfilling their 
proper function of demanding a fair share in 
rising profits, nor of businessmen trying 
to preserve profits by raising prices when 
costs go up. It is the fault of an economic 
system inappropriate to the development of 
an economy. This seems ‘to be the dawning at 
last on official opinion.^^^'* 
It is evident that Canadian government, business and labour 
have failed to recognize the problems inherent in continuing 
with their path of allowing market forces, for the most part, 
to dictate wages and prices. The upward spiral of wages, as 
demanded by trade unions, has had the same inevitable effect 
on prices. These rising prices have stagnated the economy 
by contributing to higher unemployment, and lately, higher 
interest rates and low investment, which has meant limited 
annual growth in the economy. 
Therefore a whole new series of institutions and programs, 
not unlike the present systems of V/est Germany, Austria, and 
Sweden, must be initiated, if Canada is to begin a full scale 
economic revival based on low unemployment, continued low 
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inflation, much lower interest rates to spurn on investment, 
and a consistent, five to ten year, record of three or more 
percent, growth in the Gross National Product. The Canadian 
Government should discontinue its wasteful policy of studying 
everything to death through the use of "Royal Commissions," 
but rather the Canadian Government should act while all hope 
is still only fading and had not completely disappeared. 
The next few pages provide several useful questions that should 
be asked when looking into the future fo Canadian industrial 
relations, as well as some "Off-the-Wall" suggestions as to 
how the problem could be rectified. 
What about the future for industrial relations in Canada? How 
is government going to cope with the social dem.ands of labour 
as they evaluate their positions in terms of social policy, 
labour reforms and Canadian nationalism? How can the govern- 
ment effectively implement a "made in Canada" industrial re- 
lations policy that will help to ease the problems caused by 
the cyclical nature of the Canadian economy? How can the 
government maintain a high level of investment and an atmos- 
phere conducive to "Big Business" if it shows any level of 
favouritism towards labour? How will employers and unions 
cope with the task of implementing high technology equipment 
in order to compete in domestic and international markets? 
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How will unions cope with the task of developing nationalistic 
unions and strengthen the positions of unions in Canada. 
These are but a few of the many questions that are now facing 
all three parties to the industrial relations systemi as they 
struggle to cope with each other in light of the many socio- 
economic problems facing Canada, both now and in the future. 
Perhaps the most drastic, but yet most effective, method of 
accomplishing socio-economic stability through the use of 
industrial relations institutions, would be to eliminate all 
of Canada's previous ties to the British/American system of 
industrial relations. 
Perhaps to convene a meeting of the eleven leaders of our 
country, the principles of the CLC, the Canadian Manufacturers 
Association, other major unions and employer organizationsi as 
well as experts in the field of industrial relations, which 
would make recommendations to rid Canada of the many cobwebs 
that exist in the present legal framework, and replace it with 
a system that provides uniform benefits to unions and employ- 
ers and falls within the context of rebuilding Canada's once 
dominant economy. 
Canada should adopt mandatory legislation, similiar to that 
which is used in Germany, that would promote worker 
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participation at the level of the enterprise, without exception 
and provide for a fifty-fifty split with no favouritism shown 
towards management. The government could use new tax and 
withholding tax measures to allow for a more even distribution 
of income and profits between the employers and the union. 
This distribution must, however, continue to promote invest- 
ment in Canada. 
The government must maintain the rights to unionism, and, if 
necessary, make it mandatory for all workers to be unionized. 
It should also increase the role of enterprise level collec- 
tive bargaining regarding items like health and safety, hours 
of work, shifts, shift differentials, holiday time, vacation 
pay, etc. It should promote agreements that focus on these 
types of issues, and that would for periods of three to five 
years, A second agreement would be developed that could deal 
with wages, pensions, group benefits, and job security and 
would run for a time period that was mutually agreed upon by 
the two sides to the bargaining. The government must also 
maintain the provisions for third party intervention, and 
allow for binding arbitration of issues that focus on the 
future security and viability of an operation. This legis- 
lation would encompass issues such as the use of technological 
change at the level of the enterprise and would ensure the 
protection of workers jobs. 
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In this context a holistic approach to socio-economic im- 
provement has been developed through the use of several 
industrial relations programs* However, much more study would 
be needed to test the viability of implementing such drastic 
changes to the socio-economic balance of Canadian society* 
However, given Canada’s history of dealing with problems 
concerning industrial relations, it can be said that Canada 
has failed miserably in implementing any form of positive 
change that would be beneficial to all levels of society* 
Canada’s industrial relations system is based solely on the 
dualistic ideologies of the British and American systems. It 
is about time that Canada focused on shaking this stagnated 
enigma and move ahead to a more cooperative system that could 
be easily maintained and well-blended with the economic goals 
of the country* 
This history of industrial relations development in Canada 
shows little more than a token appreciation of the rights of 
workers* Canadians should, at all levels, recognize that 
people are our most vital resource, and therefore should be 
treated in the same manner as the rich women in Britain treat 
their precious poodles, with "kid gloves'*. Canada has failed 
dismally in the past, in terms of developing and implementing 
a viable industrial relations policy, and this has caught up to 
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all Canadians due to the costs associated with industrial 
conflict and a poor economic record over the past decade. 
It is time Canada altered her motherhood policies and de- 
velop a more mutualistic tripartite approach to industrial 
relations, 
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CONCLUSIOHS 
There has been some controversy over the use of the type 
of statistical model that has been developed and utilized 
throughout this study, Snyder makes the point that these types 
of models, the type used here and by authors such as Rees, 
Ashenfelter and Johnson, Skeels and Vanderkamp, are theoreti- 
cally incomplete and therefore misspecifiedIn particular, 
these models neglect labour’s organizational capacity to press 
its demands and to influence the political environment in which 
industrial relations occur as potentially important deter- 
minants of strike fluctuations 
Hov/ever, for the purpose of looking at the relationship 
between economic performance and strike activity, these models 
are more than satisfactory. The problem with analyzing these 
models, is that economists tend to look beyond the basic purpose 
of the model and try to relate what their results indicate to 
some theoretical base. Authors utilizing this type of model 
should avoid trying to build to much theory into the model be- 
cause it detracts from the model’s usefulness. 
Another problem with these types of models is that the 
author is normally trying to obtain meaningful results for 
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one country in particular, and therefore structures the assump- 
tions to help in obtaining these, results. By building a 
model that can be utilized in analyzing several nations, the 
author has provided a comparative basis from which to draw mean- 
ingful conclusions. 
The purpose of this paper has been to develop a model, which 
when removing the theoretical implications of the negotiation 
process in collective bargaining, can be applied to all nations, 
as a measure of the relationship between economic performances 
and industrial conflict. It is importan-t to remember that this 
model has been developed within the context of a tripartisan 
relationship, that should exist in every country as a means of 
developing and maintaining a successful industrial relations 
system? a tripartite relationship between labour, management 
and government. 
Each of the explanatory variables utilized in the model, reflects 
this tripartisan relationship, as each is interpreted, and acted 
upon by each party to the relationship. Each party focuses on 
issues, and makes decisions based on how they interpret a part- 
icular trend which will have a direct bearing of their future. 
For example, the unemployment statistic is important to all 
three parties in the following manner. If unemployment is lov/, 
that generally means that unions are going to be more militant, 
since there is a lack of qualified people available in the 
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short run, and the economy will be benefitting from an increase 
in aggregate demand because of the number of people working. 
In the case of high unemployment , union strength is restricted, 
employers are concerned about decreasing aggregate demand and 
possible production cut-backs, while government is concerned 
about plugging the holes that are causing leaks in the economic 
sys tern. 
This model focused on the pre-negotiation stages of the collective 
bargaining process, but limits itself to examining the effects 
that economic data can have oh the process. Phillips has shown 
that the collective bargaining process is a very complex and 
systematic exchange of all ideas relevant to the work place. 
This paper has suggested that the traditional position taken 
by Phillips can be amended to include relevant social and 
economic variables. 
The results of the model indicate that this type of model can be 
applied to nations that lack a formal system of mutualistic in- 
dustrial relations institutions. In countries like Canada, the 
U.S.A., the United Kingdom and Australia, this type of model 
has positive implications. The main reasons is that the col- 
lective bargaining process functions as the only formal industrial 
relations institution, and therefore the ability of labour, man- 
agement and government to de-emphasize industrial conflict 
has been greatly reduced. 
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The type of collective bargaining process employed in these 
countries has been assumed to be of the type described by 
Phillips and illustrated in Figure 1.1, The pre-negotiation 
information to be collected by all parties to the negotiation 
process has been described in Chapter Two, By limiting the 
role of the collective bargaining process,,by utilizing these two 
assumptions, the effectiveness of the model increases. Since the 
analysis of potential economic trends as well as the evaluation 
of present and proposed changes to the basic social programs, 
are a necessary part of the collective bargaining process, the 
pre-negotiation stage has assumed a new and more meaningful 
role • 
The model performed well in explaining the relationship bet- 
ween industrial conflict and economic performance, particularly 
in Canada, Australia, Great Britain and Japan where there ex- 
isted a significant relationship. In Canada, Australia and 
Great Britain, a lack of formalized industrial relations in- 
stitutions, as well as a long history "of poor labour-manage- 
ment relations, have directly contributed to the dependence on 
outside variables as a means of formulating opinions prior to 
entering into the collective bargaining process. 
In Japan, the formalized system of industrial relations in- 
stitutions have left the Japanese workers with monetary issues 
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as their only annual concern. The long standing tradition of 
”paternalistic" employers and consensus decision making on all 
issued related to the work plac^ has meant that monetary issues 
are the only real concern in collective bargaining# 
The model performed poorly in the other four countries, the 
most surprising of which was the United States. The institu- 
tional developments in the United States have been the most in- 
effective of any of the eight countries. Governments in the 
United States have always endorsed policies that have directly 
supported "Big Business,” and that includes policy decisions 
related to the work place. 
The model performed poorly in terms of the overall goodness of 
fit and the statistical significance of the equation, but yet 
there were three significantly significant variables, the most 
important of which was the wage variable. With the wage vari- 
able being significantly related to industrial conflict, ,, it 
is realized that money is still the most significant factor in 
the collective bargaining process for American workers. 
There is little to explain the reason why the U.S.A. equation 
lacked statistical significance. Perhaps the only viable 
reason lies in the fact that of all workers employed in the 
United States, less than thirty percent are unionized, and 
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with the strength of the American economy, historically 
speaking, it is much better at weathering the effects of walk- 
outs by unionized workers. 
The model performed poorly in Sweden, Austria, and West Germany 
for a number of reasons, the least of which has been interpreted 
as misspecification of the explanatory variables. In nations 
with as complex a system of socio-economic relations as exists 
in each of these countries, more emphasis could have been 
placed on developing a model that reflected the effects of 
those formal/informal arrangements• 
In Appendix VII, a series of articles have been highlighted 
that provide a variety of analyses, of the relationship bet- 
ween strike activity and -economic performance. In the more 
complex articles, authors apply theories of utilitiy, propen- 
sity theories and mathematical functions to derive variables 
which they relate to strike activity. Yet, most of these art- 
icles do arrive at one important conclusion, and that is, when 
strike frequency is used as the dependent variable, the results 
tend to be more significant and the coefficients more sta.ble • 
Another contributing factor to the results of the model, has 
been the hsitorical development of industrial rela~ions in- 
stitutions. All eight nations provide a basic legal framework 
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that provides for union rights, collective bargaining, employ- 
er associations and a basic labour code related to health and 
safety and minimum wages. However, four countries go beyond 
this realm and utilize past historical developments, that show 
a mutualistic tradition in industrial relations, in refining 
and further developing their present day systems. 
The idea of consensus decision making in Japan has arisen out 
of early paternalistic relationships that existed during the 
inter-war period. Companies provided a vast amount of benefits 
to their employees in return for their loyal and permanent em- 
ployment. The works council in West Germany and Austria can 
be traced back to the Weimar Republic, and both were imple- 
mented around 1920. The Swedish system has been developing 
since the 1930's, when the Social Democrats began their incred- 
ible streak as governing party. This reign has continued in 
association with strong support from the labour movement. 
In each of these four countries, the utilization of a coopera- 
tive industrial relations system has allowed these particular 
nations to more effectively weather the storms caused by the 
cyclical nature of the world's economy. With very few domestic 
economic problems, these countries have been free to concen- 
trate on improving the general social status of their nations, 
as well as refining industrial relations systems to focus on 
the ever changing world of the work place. 
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Cooperation at all levels has provided a backdrop for in- 
dustrial peace, although strikes do occur, they are not as 
frequent or as damaging as their counterparts in the "Anglo- 
Saxon” nations . Strikes normally focus on social issues in 
countries like Sweden, Austria and West Germany and are nor- 
mally utilized as a demonstrative form of protest. In Japan 
strikes, most of which occur during the "Spring Offensive," 
are directly related to monetary issues. 
Yet, in each of these countries, the historical development of 
mutualistic and cooperative industrial relations institutions 
has been the overriding factor in maintaining- over the last 
quarter century- industrial peace. 
The lack of a fully developed legal framework and a strong re- 
liance on "Big Business’? as the backbone of their particular 
economies, has directly contributed to the problems of industrial 
conflict that exists in Australia, Great Britain, Canada and the 
United States. The dependence on the collective bargaining 
system, where both sides distrust and are suspicious of one 
another', directly contributes to industrial conflict. There 
has been no attempt by either side to cooperate at the level of 
the enterprise, and where sporadic attempts have been tried, 
they have failed because of the lingering unfavourable climate 
that exists in these nations. 
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Therefore, it would be easy to see how a significant relation- 
ship could exist between economic performance, as an indirect 
element in the collective bargaining process, and man days 
lost. Since the collective bargaining process is central to 
industrial relations in the Anglo-Saxon nations, each side must 
prepare thoroughly prior to entering into negotiations. This 
will undoubtly include an analysis of the socio-economic 
trends of that nation, and how the union perceives its position 
of strength against the employer and visa-versa. This information 
will be essential in establishing targets that may or may not lead 
to an impasse, and strikes or lockouts. 
The process of collective bargaining is important in the 
"European-Ethnic" nations. However with continual consultation 
on issues affecting the work place and the development of more 
cooperative attitudes, the collective bargaining process in 
these nations becomes a place where the issues are reconciled 
and made binding upon both sides. 
In terms of. Canada, it is evident that the present system has 
failed and failed miserably. Evidenced by a poor economic 
record and a high rate of iridustrial conflict, it would be most 
appropriate to initiate changes in Canada's legal framework in 
order to help develop a mutualistic system of industrial relations. 
A system that is far overdue in Canada. But such a system to 
Page 223 
develop successfully, requires not only refonns in the legal 
framework, but also a change of attitudes through an appropriate 
educational system. 
"Finally, it is not a coincidence that an in- 
creasing number of prominent economists and in- 
dustrial relations experts have started to propound 
the establishment of incomes policies based on 
tripartite cooperation as well as the gradual 
introduction of participative bodies at the in- 
dustry level, but the collective realization that 
conventional fiscal and monetary policies and the 
institution of collective bargaining alone can no 
longer cope with the pressing problems of stag- 
flation and the anticipated acceleration of 
technological change. 
In a recent rethinking over incomes policy 
and industrial democracy as antidotes to conflict 
and instability, vindicates those in the minority 
who in the early years of the last decade, were 
warning the policy makers and the other interested 
parties of the impending crisis and the need for 
innovative solutions. It is only hoped that the 
collective warnings and recommendations will not 
remain unheeded this time."^^’^ 
In general, the following summary statements can be made about 
this study; in terms of the collective bargaining process, 
there appears to exist a relationship between economic perform- 
ance and break-downs in the process. However, the degree of this 
relationship varies based on the level of development of "collect- 
ive" industrial relations institutions, 
It has become clear that those countries which utilize a co- 
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operative system rather^ than the more traditional adversarial 
system, experience less industrial conflict as expressed in 
strike/lockout activity. This is primarily due to the fact 
that many of the issues that one could expect to be contentious 
during the normal process of collective bargaining, have been 
discussed and resolved at the level of the enterprise, i.e* conten- 
tious issues that would be related to the quality of working 
life rather than to monetary issues. This is the case in all 
four of the "European-Ethnic” nations. However, in Japan, the 
minimal amount of strike activity that does occur has been re- 
lated to the "Spring Offensive", (196? - 1976), where monetary 
benefits were the only issues at stake, and were subject to 
intensive collective bargaining. 
In Austria, V/est Germany and Sweden, strike activity has been 
utilized as a means of social protest as well as in the 
Hicksian manner of maintaining proper organizational capacities. 
Since the government plays a more active role in industrial 
relations and working conditions in each of the three countries, 
the power of legislative action has been utilized as a means 
of promoting more cooperation at the level of the enterprise, 
and as a means of monitoring these actions through specific 
government agencies that are responsible for socio-economic 
policies. By monitoring industrial relations through govern- 
ment agencies, national goals are easily obtained ans maintained 
over a long period of time. 
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In general, the West European system of legislation which is 
based on mutualistic traditions, has been the most successful 
means of controlling or limiting industrial conflict. The indust- 
rial relations system has developed and matured throughh.a legal 
framework which has always maintained the best interests of 
the nation at;heart. Manpower and incomes policies, mandatory 
participative policies, and in the case of Austria, a "parity 
commission", have all ensured that management, labour, and govern- 
ment reduce the incidents of industrial conflict. 
On the other hand, the Japanese system of paternalistic employers, 
loyalist unions and government cooperation, has led to the develop- 
ment perhaps of the most advanced private enterprise system in 
the world today. This system has integrated the traditions 
of Japanese society with the widespread use of technology to 
ensure economic success. The paternalistic employers, have provid- 
ed Japanese workers with all the necessary benifits which maintain 
an above average quality of working life, including the right 
to-participation in decision making, health benefits, various 
insurances, medical facilities, gymnasiums for sport activities, 
and even subsidized housing. Therefore, monetary issues, espec- 
ially in the ".Spring Offensive" years, was and still is the 
only area of the entire industrial relations system where the 
collective bargaining process may break down. Yet, on the 
whole, it has been generally conceded that the Japanese system 
of industrial relations has contributed considerably to industrial 
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peace. 
We may conclude therefore, that in general, the relationship 
between economic performance and break downs in the collective 
bargaining process, is much weaker in Austria, West Germany 
and Sweden. These three nations, have established legal frame- 
works which control, monitor and influence the industrial 
relations institutions in place. They help to ensure that 
cooperation and stability have become the trademark of each 
industrial relations system, and that collective bargaining 
functions as a system of ratification rather than tribulation. 
The very nature of this relationship, has greatly reduced the 
dependence on monitoring economic variables when preparing 
to enter the collective bargaining process. This has meant 
that countries with cooperative industrial relations systems, 
are less likely to experience industrial conflict as a result 
of a breakdown in the collective bargaining process. 
It has become clear, that countries which exhibit non-cooperative 
traits, and an over reliance on the traditional collective 
bargaining process (as a singular element in an industrial 
relations system), expeience more industrial conflict than 
those nations which have developed cooperative institutions. 
This is primarily due to the overbearing reliance on the collect 
ive bargaining process, as the only real means to solve problems 
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related to labour-management confrontation. 
In Great Britain, the United States, Canada, and Australia, 
governments have maintained, more or less a "hands-off" 
policy where labour-management relations are concerned} the 
exception in this group is Australia, where there exists a 
system of compulsory arbitration, yet, this system did not re- 
duce, as had been hoped, industrial conflict. The governments 
of these nations are content to allow market forces and the 
collective bargaining process determine wages, and when these 
processes are unable to determine wages without industrial 
conflict, there exists provision for corrective and not pre- 
ventive measures. 
In the four "Anglo-Saxon" nations, the relationship between 
economic performance and break downs in the collective bar- 
gaining process is much stronger. The only exception being 
the United States, where there exists a strong relationship 
between the rate of change in real wages and strike/lockout 
activity. Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom all ex- 
hibit a stronger dependence on economic variables because of 
the non-cooperative nature of their industrial relations in- 
stitutions. Management and labour, in these nations, have co- 
existed in an adversarial atmosphere; and this, which has been, 
combined with the continuing reliance on the collective 
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bargaining process has meant that there is some dependence 
on economic variables when preparing for negotiations. 
Labour has realized that management's traditional positions 
may not change, so they must continue to focus on the more 
traditional issues of wages. Therefore, it becomes essential 
for the union to utilize and properly interpret the various 
economic indicators that are available to them. 
Industrial conflict, in most cases occurs when management does 
not aggree with the union's viewpoint, and is not willing to 
compromise its position in order to obtain a more feasible 
contract for both parties. Since none of the governments in 
the aforementioned nations promotes cooperation through their 
legal frameworks, strike or lockout activity becomes a. means 
by which the two parties to the collective bargaining process 
attempt to reinforce their positions. But industrial conflict 
is considered by many as a rather frivolous exercise, which is 
costyl to everyone, and that it should be recognized as such . 
It is obvious that the system begs for substantial improvements. 
In retrospect, a non-cooperative legal framework and an anta- 
gonostic attitude amongst the key players in the "Anglo-Saxon" 
industrial relations system, has led to a dependence on moni- 
toring economic variables when preparing to enter into the 
collective bargaining process. This has meant that those 
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nations that have failed to recognize, and act upon the develop- 
ment of more cooperative industrial relations institutions, 
continue to experience a high degree of industrial conflict. 
In terms of the United States, the strong relationship between 
the rate of change of real wages and strike/lockout activity, 
suggests that a strong link exists between monetary issues and 
a unions propensity to strike. American unions have continually 
persued wage increases as the principle issue during collective 
bargaining, although the emphasis over the last ten years has 
begun to slowing shift to more non-traditional issues that 
are related to the future well-being of union members, over the 
majority of the last quarter century. 
Finally, the econometric model utilized in this study appears 
to have served its* purpose. It has allowed for a detailed 
study of industrial relations institutions in each of the eight 
nations. From this, the previous conclusions regarding the re- 
lationship between strike activity and economic performance 
were clearly drawn and hopefully well illustrated. 
If one refers back to the hypothesis which was presented in 
Chapter One, and compares it to the final results, only Japan 
does not conform, while the other seven nations appear to have 
fallen into place. 
Notes 
295, David Snyder, "Early North American Strikes* A Re- 
interpretation, " Industrial and Labour Relations 
Review 30 (April, 1977)* p. 325* 
296, Ibid, pp. 3.25-326. 
297, Chris Jecchinis, Tripartite Cooperation and Consensus in 
Incomes Policies and the Fight Against Stagflation* 
Certain European Experiences and the Prospects for 
Canada, Montreal* Canadian Industrial Relations 
Association, I98O, p, 395* 
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APPENDIX I 
The following tables provide all the empirical data that was 
utilized in the computerized econometric model which has formed 
the quantitative base for this thesis. 
The majority of data was taken from the following sourcesi 
1. 1982 Yearbook of Labour Statistics, International Labour 
Organization 1982, 42^ issue; 
2. 1972 Yearbook of Labour Statistics, International Labour 
Organization 1972, 32^ issue; 
3* 1966 Yearbook of Labour Statistics, International Labour 
Organization 1966, 26^ issue; 
4, i960 Yearbook of Labour Statistics, International Labour 
Organization i960, 20^ issue; 
5» 1984 International Financial Statistics, International 
Monetary Fund, Volume 37 Number 3 March, 1984; 
6, 1983 Yearbook of International Financial Statistics, 
International Monetary Fund, Volume 36» 1983* 
Where gaps existed in the data, a floating average method of 
interpolating these statistics utilized, or, other available 
data such that when remedial mathematical techniques were 
applied, one was able to find the appropriate figures. Explan- 
ations of these happenings:have been made at the bottom of each 















1050.8 18.56 *2 0.6.4 *3 
901.6 41,02 1.5 « iRai 0.6'; « 
1010.8 48.21 4020 0.67 * 
1121.4 45.61 lii. 4097 n 
680.2 46.76 1.5* 41.08 0.72 * 
^39.9 ^7.51 4i ■'.8 * 0.72 * 
165.0 • 6 * 4229 
725.1 54.54 1.5* 4429 * Jl^ 
606. B 54.11 1.5 * 4028 * 
508.8 57.77 1 A * 4^ 46 * n QP * 
581.6 61.59 iiiL 4272 * 
911.4 61.27, JLLi 4495.6 1 .27 
815.9 69.18 1 ■ 5 4628.0 1 .88 
712.1 71.06 1,1,6. 4760.6 1.40 
705.3 75.26 4880.4 1 .48 
1079.5 80.89 1.^ 5001 .4 1.57 
1958.0 86.84 51 50.9 1 .66 
2398.7 1*6 5829.2 J-.JZ2. 
8068.0 95.54 2.0 5424.5 2.04 
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1980 = 100 
POPULATION EXCHANGE RATS IRl 
IN MILLIONS 
OF PEOPLE 




1953 21.4 8.85 
4 
1.1210 0 0 
22.0 8.99 .u.n.^Q- 0 
1955 22.2 9.20 1.1185 0 0 
1956 22.8 9.43 1.1120 0 0 
_1957 24.2 9.64 1.1205 0 
1958 24.4 9.84 .i.-.iiii 0 
1959 24.0 10.06 1.1175 0 
i960 26.4 10.28 1.1190 0 
1961 26.8 10.55 1.1205 0 0 
1962 27.0 10.74 1.-1185 0 
1963 27.8 10.95 1.1160 0 0 
1964 28.8 11.17 1.1140 0 0 
1965 29.4 ils-22. 1.1185 0 
1966 30.4 11.60 1.1140 0 
1967 31.^ 11.80 1.1210 0 0 
1968 32.3 12.01 1.1100 0 0 
33.7 12.26 1.1180 0 0 
1970 35.3 12.51 1.1150 0 
1971 37.5 12.94 1.1910 0 0 
1972 40.3 13.18 1.2750 0 
1973 45.2 13.38 1.4880 0 0 
1974 53.0 13.60 1.3270 0 0 
1975 61.7 13.77 1.2571 
1976 70.2 13.92 1.0864 0 0 
1977 76.6 14.07 1.1414 0 0 
1978 82.0 14.25 1.1505 
1979 89.8 14.42 1.1055 0 
1980 100.0 14.62 1.1807 0 0 
1981 109.2: 14.86 1.1279 0 0 
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AUSTRIA 











,2Z50.2. 9.0 1884.0 8.26 
iLO. 801.01 7.9 1940.3 8.65 
58.0 332.92 2031.8 9.06 
15UL 355.80 2114.6 
Mil 377.56 4.9 2145.2 10.01 




























537.34 M2. 2332,9 20.29 











,18.3. 647.52 2.8 2313.3 28.50 
26.6 692.34 2.4 2344.3 30.19 











































































C.P.I. POPULATION EXCHANGE RATE IRl 1R2 1R3 
1980 = 100 IN MILLIONS IN TERMS OF POLICY VARIABLES 





















































































































































MAN DAYS LOST UNEMPLOYMENT RATE TOTAL EMPLOYMENT WAGE RATE 
IN THOUSANDS 
OP DAYS  
IN BILLIONS 
OF CURHHNCY 






1324.7 90.81 3260 1.36 
147^.2 89.69 Z.2. 3238 1.41 
1873.4 ■2^„L2 ■6.6 532S. 1.43 













738.7 119.08 3902 1.79 
1333.1 122.46 2A1. 6033 1.83 
1417.9 X3Q...81 IJLSL 622-^ 1 .88 
917.14 n2.,55. 637 3 1.93 
1380.6 146.78 4jJL 66f)9 2.02 
2349.9 136.36 6862 
3178.2 167.43 7132 2.23 
3974.8 172.92 4.1 7379 2.40 
3082.7 182.88 4.8 ■2.52Z 2.38 
7751.9 192.22 4.7 7780 2.79. 











5776.1 241.19 3.6 3598 3.83 











3307.9: 272.39 8.1 9648 6.38 
7392.8 282.30 8.4 9972 6.84 
7334.2 290.49 7.5 10369 7.44 
8973.4 291.87 7.3 10655 8.19 
8878.5 300.98 7.6 10933 9.17 
CANADA 
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YEAR C.P.I. POPULATION EXCHANGE RATE 1R1 \ 1R2 1R3 
1980 =100 IN MILLIONS IN TERMS OF POLICY VARIABLES 
OF PEOPLE UjS.A.  
1953 28.4 14.93 0.9744 0 0 1 
1954 28.9 13.33 0.9663 0 0 1 
1955 29.1 15.74 0.9991 0 0 1 
1956 30.1 16.12 0.9597 Q 0 1 
1957 30.7 16.68 0.9347 0 0 1 
1958 31.2 17.12 0.9641 0 0 1 
1959 31.8 17.52 0.9528 0 0 1 
1960 32.2 17.91 0.9960 0 0 1 
1961 32.4 18.27 1.0434 0 0 1 
1962 32.8 18.61  1.0772 0 0 1 
1963 33.4 18.96 I.O806 0 0 1 
1964 34.3 19.33 1.0738 0 0 1 
1965 35.4 19.68 1.0750 0 0 1 
1966 36.9 20.05 1.0838 0 0 1 
1967 38.4 20.41 1.0306 0 0 1 
1968 39.7 20.73 1.0728 0 0 1 
1969 41.5 21.03 1.0728 0 0 1 
1970 43.3 21.32 1.0112 0 0 1 
1971 44.7 21.59 1.0022 001 
1972 46.9 21.83 0.9956 oof 
1973 51.2 22.07 0.9958 0 0 1 
1974 59.1 22.40 0.9912 0 0 1 
1975 65.4 22.73 1.0164 0 0 ^ 
1976 71.6 23.03 1.0092 0 0 1 
1977 76.7 23.28 1.0944 0 0 ^ 
1978 81.6 23.49 1.1860 0 0 1 
1979 90.0 23.70 1.1631 0 0 1 
1980 100.0 23.96 1.1947 0 0 1 
1981 110.1 24.34 1.1859 0 0 1 
JAPAN 
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1341.2 29.077 1.1 39.120 
16309/48.7 927.8 30.776 39620 
1033.3 33.496 1.6 40880 ^1?A3.4 
1098.3 35.937 lil 41720 
18348 /50.2 
13S6.8 38.6I4 1.2 42840 19259/I;O.2 
1279.4 40.781 lii 43120 ^9180/.Q.2 
1213.9 A,4o6 43700 ^°^92/^0.3 
22630/4^.3 4912.2 50.327 1.0 44610 
6149.9 57.612 0.8 43130 
27256/4^.7 3400.4 61.637 0.9 43740 
2770.4 63.109 ik£ 461 30 39^°V43.3 
3163.3 77.060 0.8 46730 33089/43.2 
3669.4 83.731 0.8 47480 36106 744.3 
2741.7 94.843 0.9 48470 40510/44.6 
^5568/44.g 
1830.0 103.083 lil 49200 
li£ 118.446 1.2 30020 
526^ 744.6 
.1633,1.6.. 133.004 1.1 50400 ^1'^^^/43,9 
^1^^P43.3 3914.8 146.121 1.2 30940 









9662.9 179.143 1.4 52370 
154967 740.0 
3013.8 183.480 52230 177213 738.8 
3233.7 193.231 2.0 32710 
200242 740.2 
1513.3 203.482 2^ 53420 
2196204^.^ 
1357.3 213.897 2.2 34080 
235378/40.6 
"'^^909/4,., 
930.3 223.083 2.1 34790 
263386/4^.g 
1001.2 233.334 2.0 55360 
279096/4^.0 
553.7 244.878 2.2 55810 
JAPAN 
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YEAR C.P.I. POPULATION EXCHANGE RATE IRl 1R2 1R3 
1980 = 100 IN MILLIONS IN TERMS OF POLICY VARIABLES 
  OF PEOPLE U.S.A. 
1953 24.3 87.45 360.80 0 0 1 
1954 25.4 88.76 360.80 0 n 1 
1955 25.7 89.82 360.80 0 0 1 
1956 27.1 90.76 360.80 0 0 1 
1957 28.7 91.56 359.66 0 0 1 
1958 28.3 92.39 359.70 0 0 1 
1959 29.1 - 93.29 359.20 0 0 1 
1960 30.8 94.10 358.22 0 0 1 
1961 33.2 94.95 361.77 0 0 1 
1962 34.4 95.83 358.20 0 0 1 
1963 35.9 96.81 , 361.95 0 0 1 
1964 37.5 97.83 358.30 0 0 1 
1965 38.1 98.88 360.90 0 0 1 
1966 40.0 99.79 362.47 0 0 1 
1967 42.3 100.83 361.91 0 0 1 
1968 44.5 101.96 357.70 0 1 0 
1969 46.6 103.17 357.80 0 1 0 
1970 50.0 104.34 357.65 0 1 0 
1971 52.6 105.70 314.80 0 1 0 
1972 55.4 107.19 302.00 0 1 0 
1973 62.0 108.71 280.00 010 
1974 74.8 110.16 300.95 010 
1925 80.6 111.57 305.15 0 1 0 
1976 85.7 112.77 292.80 1 0 0 
1977 90.6 113.86 240.00 1 0 0 
1978  94.8 ‘ 114.90 194.60 1 0 0 
1979 97.2 115.87 239.70 1 0 0 
1980 100.0 116.73 203.00 1 0 0 
1981 102.6 117.65 219.90 100 
SWEDEN 
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26.2 211.72 2.8 371 4.11 




2^ 370 5 
70^ Q •» 
4.46 
5.04 
1.6 244.14 1.9 3707 5.34 
0.08 2 51.20 2^ 3709 6.67 
1.18 264.05 2.0 371 5 * 
18.5 272.84 1.4 ^,7 3 7 * 6.82 
2.1 237.38 1.2 12:12. 6.82 
ItO. 298.42 iil 3675 ■L.J9 
25.0 816.17 12L 8727 ■7.91 
84.0 337.71 1.6 3653 8.57 
4.1 350.62 1.2 3692 9.45 
351.6 357.96 1.6 3733 10.26 
0.4 370.01 2.1 3695 11.10 
1.2 538.49 2.2 3737 11.83 
112.4 402.69 1.9 3768 12.85 
155.7 428.76 1. 5 38 54 14.28 
839.0 432.10 lii. 3860 15.79 
10. 51 44l.43 2.0 3862 16.76 
11.8 458.60 1.9 3879 18.19 
57.6 478.44 3962 20.30 
365.5 488.98 1.4 4O62 23.79 
24.7 494.72 1.2 4o88 27.01 
87.2 484.94 1.2 4099 29.22 
37.1 491.40 1.6 4115 
28.7 512.45 4l80 35.75 
^^^78. 5 522.47 1.4 4232 39.30 
209.1 518.90 ^22,5 42.87 
SWEDEN 
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YEAR G.P.I, POPULATION EXCHANGE RATE IRl 1R2 1R3 
1980 = 100 IN MILLIONS 
OF PEOPLE 
IN TERMS 0? 
U.S.A. 
POLICY VARIABLES 
1953 21.0 7.19 5.1800 0 
195^ 21.1 7.23 5.1800 0 0 
1955 22.0 7.26 5.1800 0 0 
1956 23.1 7.32 5.1800 0 
195? 24.2 7.37 5.1800 0 0 
1958 24.8 7.42 5.1730 0 0 
1959 25.1 7.45 5.1810 0 0 
i960 26.4 7.48 5.1800 0 0 
1961 27.3 7.52 5.1850 0 
1962 28.5 7.56 5.1880 0 
1963 28.9 7.60 5.2000 0 0 
1964 30.2 7.66 5.1480 0 
1965 32.0 7.73 5.1800 0 0 
1966 J4a 7.81 5.1800 0 
1967 35.8 7.87 5.1650 0 0 









1971 42,9 8.10 4.86 50 0 0 
1972 46.0 8.12 4.7430 0 0 
1973 49.3 8.14 4.5875 0 0 
1974 53.^ 8,16 4.0805 0 0 
1975 61.3. 8.19 4.3855 0 
1976 68.4 8.22 4.1265 0 0 
1977 75.7 8.25 4.6695 0 0 
1978 83.3 8.28 4.2955 0 0 
1979 89.9 8.29 4,1465 0 
1980 100.0 8.31 4.3728 0 0 
1981 109.8 8.32 5.5710 0 0 
UNITED KINGDOM 
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MAN DAYS LOST GNP UNEMPLOYMENT HATE TOTAL EMPLOYMENT 
IN THOUSANDS IN BILLIONS EXPRESSED IN AN IN THOUSANDS 




2184 117.00 1.7 
2457 121.39 1.4 
3781 125.88 1.1 
2083 128.02 1.2 
8412 130.51 1.5 
3462 130.50 2.0 
5270 135.57 2.2 
3024 141.92 1.6 
3046 146.71 1.5 
5798 147.95 2.1 
1755 153.98 2.6 
2277 162.16 1.8 
2925 166.18 1.6 
2398 169.65 1.6 
2787 174.10 2. 5 
4690 131.53 2.6 
6846 184.32 2.6 
10980 188.29 2.7 
13551 193.30 3.6 
23909 197.60 3.8 
7197 211.97 2.7 
14750 209.73 2.7 
6012 208.41 4.1 
3234 215.93 5.7 
10142 218.70 6.2 
9405 226.76 6.1 
29474 230.54 5.7 
11964 226.18 7.4 




























































YEAR G.P.I. POPULATION EXCHANGE RATE IRt 1R2 1R3 
1980 = 100 IN MILLIONS IN TERMS OP POLICY V.AJ^IABLES 
OF PEOPLE U.S.A.    
1953 1^.5 50.86 2.8112^ 0 0 '1 
1954 i4.7 51.05 2.7850 0 0 1 
1955 15.2 51.20 2.8038 0 0 1 
1956 16.2 51. M 2.7856 0 0 1 
1957 16.8 51.63 2.859^ 0 0 1 
1958 17.5 51.84 2.8025 0 0 1 
1959 17.8 52.13 2.8000 0 0 1 
1960 18.0 52.35 2.8038 0 0 1 
1961 18.6 52.81 2.8081 0 0 1 
1962 19.3 53.27 1.8025 0 0 1 
1963 19.7 53.54 2.7966 0 0 1 
1964 20.4 53.85 2.7901 0 0 1 
1965 21.4 54.18 2.8028 0 0 1 
1966 22.4 54.50 2.7902 0 0 1 
1967 23.1 54.80 2.4063 0 0 1 
1968 24.0 55.05 2.3844 0 0 1 
1969 25.3 55.27 2.4007 0 0 1 
1970 27.1 55.42 2.3937 0 0 1 
1971 29.7 55.61 2.5525 0 0_ ^ 
1972 32.2 55.78 2.3481 0 0 1 
1973 34.5 55.91 2.3232 0 0 1 
1974 39.6 55.92 2.3485 0 0  ^ 
1975 50.3 55.90 2.0235 0 0 1 
1976 57.7 55.85 1.7024 0 0 1 
1977 65.7 55.84 1.9060 0 0 1 
1978 72.9 55.88 2.0345 0 0 1 
1979 83.9 55.95 2.2240 0 0 1 
1980 100.0 55.83 2.3850 0 0 f 
1981 111.9 55.83 I.908O 0 0 1 
UNITED STATES OP AMERICA 
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23300 1112.6 2.9 62213 1.77 
22600 1099.2 5.6 61238 1.81 





















19100 1315.3 5.6 66681 2.26 
16300 1349.9 6.7 66796 2.32 
18600 1427.9 5.5 66702 2.39 
16100 1485.3 5.7 67762 2,46 
22900 1563.7 5.2 69305 2.53 
23300 1658.1 4.5 71088 2.61 
25400 1757.1 3.8 72895 2.72 
42100 1804.5 74372 2.83 
49000 1887.9 3.6 75920 3.01 
42869 1940.5 3.5 77902 3.19 
66414 1936.9 4.9 78627 3.36 











47991 2223.7 5.6 86794 4.24 
31237 2197.4 8.5 8 5846 4.53 
378 59 2316.3 7.7 38752 4.86 
35822 2443.8 7.1 92019 5.25 
36922 2566.8 6.1 96048 5.69 
34754 2639.6 5.8 98824 6.16 
33289 2631.7 7.1 99303 6.66 
24730 2700.9 7.6 100397 7.25 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
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YEAR C.P.I. POPULATION EXCHANGE RATE IRl 1R2 1R3 
1980 = 100 IN MILLIONS 
OF PEOPLE 
IN TERMS OF 
U.S.A. 
POLICY VARIABLES 
1953 32.9 160.18 0 
195^ 33.3 163.03 0 0 
1955 3^.1 165.93 0 0 
1956 35.1 168.90 0 0 
1957 36.3 171.98 0 0 
1958 37.0 17^.88 0 0 
1959 37.8 177.83 0 0 
i960 38.5 180.68 0 
1961 38.8 183.69 0 0 
1962 39.5 186.5^ 0 
1963 40.1 189.24 0 
1964 40.7 191.89 0 
1965 4i .6 194.30 0 
1966 43.0 196.56 0 0 
1967 198.71 0 
1968 46.2 200.71 0 
48.6 202.68 0 0 







1973 59.2 211.91 0 
1974 64.4 213.85 0 
1921 70.4 215.97 0 0 



















1981 109.4 229.81 0 0 
WEST CrERmm 
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2 544 3 
2 3 ♦ 
1.80 
1.84 
856.8 491.1 5.1 25646 * 1.96 
1580.2 526.9 4.0 5733 2.14 
1071.8 556.7 3.4 24213 2.34 
782.3 577.5 3.5 24354 2.49 
6l. 8 619.6 2.4 24559 2.62 
37.7 720.0 1.2 25954 2.90 
60.9 75^.9 0.8 26248 3.09 
450.9 788.5 0.7 26382 3.23 
1846.0 812.9 0.8 26455 3.46 
167.0 866.9 0.7 26523 3.74 
48.5 914.1 0.6 26699 4.12 
27.1 938.3 0.7 26601 4.42 
398.6 937.8 2.1 25803 4.60 
25.2 995.3 1.5 25865 4.79 
249.2 1070.1 0.8 26337 5.28 
93.2 1124.0 0.7 26705 5.96 
4483.7 1159.9 0.8 26673 6.66 
66.0 1207.9 1.1 26125 7.24 
563.1 1262.9 1.2 26201 8.03 
1051.3 1268.7 2.6 25688 8.94 
68.7 1248.9 4.7 24798 9.69 
533.7 1318.2 4.6 24556 10.35 
23.7 1354.7 4^ 24511 11.14 
4281.3 1401.6 4.3 24700 11.73 
483.1 1457.5 3.8 25041 12.36 
128.4 1484.1 3.8 25302 13.18 
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POPULATION EXCHANafe RATE IRl 1H2 1R3 
1980 =100 IN MILLIONS IN TERMS OF POLICY VARIABLES 















































































































































































The asteriked f3.gure unemployment has been calculated 
by using a ten year floating average. 
The asteriked total employment figure was calculated 
as a fixed multiple of total employment in 
manufacturing. This ratio has remained constant 
over the last quarter century. 
The asteriked figure wage rate v/as derived by taking 
the wages per week in manufacturing and dividing 
this by the hours per week worked in manufacturing. 
The Australian currency is expressed in terms of U.3, 
dollars per Australian dollar. 
The average wage rate in Japan has been calculated by 
taking the wages per week in manufacturing and 
dividing this by the hours per week worked in 
manufacturing. 
The asteriked Total Employment figure for Sweden has 
been calculated using a ten year floating average. 
The British exchange rate is expressed in terms of 
U.S. dollars per Brithish pound. 
8, The asteriked Total Employment figure in West Germany 




This appendix provides tha cost analysis data for the eight 
countries. This first table provides the annual cost of a 
strike in actual U.S. dollars. Table II. 2 provides the 
annual cost of a strike in constant 1980 American dollars, 
while Table II. 3, which is the basis of our hypothesis in 
Chapter One, details the average annual cost per employee 
of a strike in constant 1980 dollars. 
Table II._3 "two average calculated, an average over the 
entire time period of this study - 2? years - and one for the 
last 25 years. It is noticed that, with the exception of 
Austria, the twenty-five year average is marginally higher 





























APPENDIX TABLE II. 1. 
To calculate monetary cost' to a nation of a strike in actual $ 
man days lost (wages rate 8) = j^early cost of strike 






























































































































































































































































APPENDIX TABLE II. 2 
Page 251 
o 
Cost of a strike in constant 1980 $ (utilizing previous 


















































































































































































































































APPENDIX TABLE II, 3 
Page 252 





































































































































































































463.5252 9.9517 846.2656 161.7898 112.1657 374.6lM 584.4669 
' 27 27 27 27 27 27' ^ 27 
= 17.1676 0.3686 31.3432 5.9922 4.1543 13.8746 21.6469 
449.2575 9.0747 822.6366 160.2493 112.1174 365.9614 541.7966 
2:5 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Average cost over the last quarter centuryi 


































$14.64 $21.67 $0.88 
APPENDIX III 
The primary purpose of this Appendix will he to provide a 
closer examination of the statistical results obtained when 
the dependant variable was set-up in a singular equation 
system utilizing each of the explanatory variables as a 
singular independent regressor. 
The equation was established as follows 
Y* = A + ^X* 
Where is the dependant variable 
is the constant 
is the coefficient of estimation, and 
is the explanatory variable 
Since this system has been established to test the statistical 
significance of the explanatory variables, interest lies 
only in making a comparison of the t-statistics being the 
above equation (called T - 2) and the original equation 
system (called T - l). 
The following tables provide the means to make the compari- 
sons, however it is important to note that the benchmark 
t-statistic was this second series was I.708. Those explana- 























































































































































































As one can clearly see, only eighteen of the fifty-six explan- 
atory variables were significant utilizing the T - 2 system. 
However of these nineteen, only nine were repears from the 
first run. This means that an additional ifo of the explan- 
atory variables have some significance which brings our total 


















































































Second = 18,^^ 
First = 23^ 
Neither = 43';^ 
Table • 9 Comparative Analysis for T-statistics 
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The comparison points out some problems in the models that 
will be discussed in Chapter Five, and it coincides with 
the hypothesis in that Austria, Sweden and West Germany as 
well as the United States, have very weak explanatory vari- 
ables in terms of their statistical significance, while the 
remaining four countries with the possible exception of 
Great Britain which is borderline, all have relatively 
strong explanatory variables. 
APPENDIX IV 
In Kmenta (21) the comment was made that one can choose to do 
one of two things with Durban-Watson statistical results that 
are inconclusive. One could leave them alone or choose to 
correct for the problem. In the case of this paper it has 
been choosen to correct for the problem by utilizing the 
Cochrane-Orcutt iterative process. 
In general, since neither the order of the autocorrelation 
structure nor the value(s) of the parameter(s) is known, the 
generalized least-squares estimates cannot be computed directly. 
They may, however, be approximated by one of the various 
methods available. Since the stated intention of this paper 
is to use the Cochrane-Orcutt method, this illustration which 
provides a meaningful explanation as to how it will be used. 
If = oti + € 
I p I < i 
E(E^E^_j_g) = For all t and s = 0 
and S(S-t®t4-s^“ ^ s 5*^ 0 
If the relation is transformed, 
- p^t-i = (i-p) ^ - p^t-P 
which has a scalar dispersion matrix. Denoting estimates of 




where the summation can run from 1 to n if one is given 
X ,Y , but otherwise must be restricted to the range 2 to n. 
00 
The direct minimization of the above equation with respect 
to a, h, and r leads to nonlinear equations, so that analytic 
expressions for a, b, and r cannot be obtained. 
One method of approximating the values of a, b, and r which 
minimizes the sum of squares is the Gochrane-Orcutt iterative 
process. Starting with arbitrary values for r, say r^, 
minimizes the sum of squares with respect to the parameters 
a and b, obtaining values a^ and b^• Then keeping a and b 
fixed at a^,b^, minimize the sum of sq_uares with respect to 
r^ obtaining a new value V2 and keeping this fixed in turn 
minimize once again with to a and b obtaining new values 
a^ and ^2* Continue this way until successive estimates 
differ by arbitrarily small amrounts. Once the iterations 
converage a completely new set of statistical results is 
obtained. This new set of statistical results was the pri- 
mary reason for choosing this convergence method. 
The next step will be to compare the results of the seven 
equations that had to be corrected using the Gochrane-Orcutt 
methods with the results from the previous original set of 
results. These results will be tabled over the next few pages. 
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Table IV, l Comparing the Coefficients of Multiple 
Determination 



















West Germany «0.3017 -0.2165 
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-0.8001 -1.5961 
^ O ;'j. - O * 7 7 7 7 / L * 
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-1,8108* -7,7109* 
-0.0115 0.5173 
7,1 7 7 # 2 ,4 ^ 2 * 
0.0713 -0.4422 
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West Germany 0.1392 0.3644 
Table IV. 4 Comparing the P-statlstics 
Country T-ti:0/W's C/o D/V/'s 









Sweden 2.3346 2.1599 
West Cermany 2.1470 2.2504 
Table IV. 5 3urban-Watson statistics 
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Tables IV.1 to IV.5 provides us with :the following results 
regarding the use of the Cochrane-Orcutt interative process j 
I. even though there were many numerical differ- 
ences between some of the statistics, there 
were only a limited number of noticable 
changes;" a) the F-statistic for Sweden was 
significant after the use of t]pe C/O process, 
b) the number of significant t“-statistics 
decreased by one - employment in the U.S.A. ^ 
and there were no new t-statistics 
the relationship between the dependant vari- 
able and seven of the explanatory variables 
changed - these were probably do to the fact 
that the first observation had to be dropped 
in order to complete the C/O process 
J. the C/O process was able to converge for each 
of the seven equations in a relatively short 
number of iterations, however the resulting 
statistics still showed inconclusive results 
for the 0-urban-Watson, which would lead on 
to believe that the results obtained by the 
original equations will suffice for the pur- 
pose of this paper. 
All of these facts and statistics bring the inevitable 
conclusion that perhaps one could have taken the other of 
Kmenta's suggestion and accepted the original results by 
choosing not to do anything. 
The decrease of one significant t-stastic corresponds to 
the slight decrease in the significance level of the ex- 
planatory variable, and a corresponding increase in the 
cut-off point for the t-statistic. 
Appendix V 
Adaptive Expectations 
Adaptive expectations are based on the idea that expected 
future values depend on some weighing of past values. 
Decision units form their expectations from past experience 
in accordance with some logical rules* They may for example 
assume that income has been changing and believe it will 
. . . 1 continue to change along a specific path, 
**An example of adaptive expectations can be found in 
estimates of how past income effects the expected life- 
time income from which decisions to consume are made. 
Some models may show that expected disposable income is 
a weighing average of a limited number of past levels 
YD® = W^YDQ W2YD-1 + W^YD_2 where YD is 
expected disposable income. 
If YD® = .7YDQ + .2YD_I + then 
this equation says that expected disposable income depends 
on disposable income of the current and past two periods, 
2 
with most of the weighing coming from the current period,'* 
If one were to apply adaptive expectations to price theory 
in a similar manner, then, if prices have increased by six 
percent in 1980, twelve percent in 1981 and nine percent in 
1982, and if the expected weights were 0.75 I’or 1982, 
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0.15 ^or 1981 and 0,10 for 1980, one would expect the price 
level to be; 
P^e = A,P^ + ^t-2 A3- I 
P^e = .75(.09) + .15(.12) + .10(.06) 
^ = .0675 -»■ .018 + .006 
4= e0699 or 6.99^ 
If one wanted to show the adaptive price expectations model 
in mathematical notation, then 
V = [Azte. ^ 
Which is the expected nominal price level and if one 
wanted to measure the expected rate of change 
APt^ XAP,-, , ^ 
A 
where A is the weights and 1 and ^ weights equal one 
AP is the actual rate of change of prices, and 
^'Z 
AP^l, is the expected rate of change of orices 
In the case of adaptive expectations, the longer the value 
of \, the more information is said to be available in the 
model. 
Expectations theory has been principally utilized when con- 
sidering how wages are determined using price expectations. 
One can diagramatically represent adaptive price expectation 
in the determination of wages in the labour market. It is 
important to note that if one compares Figure V, 2 with 
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Figure V, 1, which is the static price expectations in the 
determination of wages in the labour market, that the change 
from W* to * is smaller in the 
and the change from N* to * is 
expectation diagram. This leads 
static expectations diagram, 
much greater in the static 
to the conclusion that 
where Ng = labour supply curve 
NQ = labour Demand surve 
P* = expected price level 
pQ = Actual price from 
previous period 
W* = wage level 
N* = labour market 
equilibrium 
If price increases, then the MP, also increases. This leads 
to shift to however nothing has happened to because 
pW = b 
Figure V. 1 .Static Expectations in the Labour Market 
P^e = expected price level 
P^l = actual price level 
In this case labour is able to react to an increase in prices 
by shifting its supply curve upwards in anticipation of the 
increased prices. 
Figure V, 2, Adaptive Expectations in the Labour Market 
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therefore, the method, the variables and the manner in which 
the hypothesis in this study have been dealt with coincide 
with many of the previous works done on similiar topics. 
Notes 
Sherman Maisel, Macroeconomics» Theories and Policies 




This Appendix has the results of two additional* models that 
were used to verify information that has been utilized in 
developing arguments in Chapter Six* 
Model I - utilizes the same data as the original model, 
however the time series has been changed to 
correspond with Pederson and Paldam's results of 
analyses relating number of strikes to real-wage 
increase, unemployment model (1) for the period 
1956 - 1975* is important to note that 
Pederson and Paldam experienced data problems with 
Austria and West Germany and therefore have no 
results for these two countries} and that they used 
number of conflicts as their dependent variable 
rather than man days lost. The Pederson and Paldam 
equation was structured as follows; 
where = rate of unemployment 
= real wage rate 
the results from their model of the remaining six 
countries are as follows* 
(t-statistics in parenthesis) 







Constant + b^u 
11.83 (6.0) -1.40 (1.5) 
8.93 (I-.O) .52 (0.4) 
















19.70 (2.2) -4..87 (1.0) 
+ b^u + b, DW 
.00 (0.0) -.05 .32 
t4.03 (6.7) - .49 (1.4) -1.06 (2.6) .22 .37 
17.20 (1.2) -2.69 (0.4) - .83 (0.5) 
Table VI. 1 Results of pederson - Paldam Model 
.02 .81 
The results, from rerunning the model with this 










Constant Inflation Wages Unemployment 





























Table VI. 2 T-statistics for time period 1956 - 1975 
Model II - restructures the data from West Germany, Sweden and 
Austria under the assumption that the results 
from the original model - although statistically 
accurate - have been distorted by a number of 
large industrial disputes that have occurred during 
the last quarter century. This part had been made 
earlier in Chapter Five and again in Chapter Six, 
when it was noted that by removing several of the 
large figures from the series, results could be 
obtained that more accurately reflected the 
institutions and widesoread use of industrial 
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relations in countries like Sweden and Austria, 
Statistics 
R - Squared 
Adjusted R - Squared 
r - Statistic 
Durban - Watson Statistic 
Sum of Residuals 






































H - Squared 
Adjusted R - Squared 
F-' — Statistic 
Durban - Watson Statistic 










Table VI. 2 Comparative 





























Statistics Original Pvlodel 
R - Squared 0.04378? 
Adjusted R - Squared -O.301660 
? - Statistic 0.139214 
Durban - Watson Statistics 0.727596 E-11 

































Table VI, 3 Comparative Results for West Germany 
APPENDIX VII 
The purpose of the appendix is to provide additional informa- 
tion regarding several of the previous models that have been 
conducted for Canada, the United States, Australia and Great 
Britian and utilize frequency via number of conflicts or 
alternatively man days lost as the dependent variable. The 
principle focus will be on.studies that includes relative 
information on man days lost as the dependent variable. 
Canadat 
1. . Vanderkamp ( 96 ) aimed to provide a s3,/-stematic explanation 
of the time pattern of industrial conflict in Canada between 
1901 and 196S. Vanderkamp utilizes time-loss as his measure 
of strike activity because it is the most meaningful measure 
from an economic viewpoint. '* 
Vanderkamp says that a theoretical indeterminancy exists when 
trying to utilize bargaining theory in such an analysis'^ and 
therefore a more traditional cost analysis anproach must be 
utilized, particularly because the cost of a strike can have 
great effects on a firm. 
Vanderkamp also makes the point that the bargaining process 
has a dual purpose; l) to influence the other partv’s percep- 
tion of your own utility function, and 2) to communicate your 
perception of the other party’s utility function.^ The author's 
main focal point is that a strike will have a greater disutility 
on a firm when economic activity is low. 
To prove this, Vanderkamp established the following equations 
1) V/here = constant dollar GMP 
2) + Vl + W + C 
Where is the rate of change in prices 
V/D is the war dummy variable 
C is the constant 
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Since the focus has been on the post World War II era the 
statistical results of that equation have been reproduced - 
(t-statistic in parenthesis) = 
0.0021 (0.0013) 
0.0078 (0.00^8) 
c — i.ii.372 (0.4426) 
-- 0.5007 
Yanderkamp concludes that for the time period 1946 - 1.966 that 
at least fifty percent of the variance time-loss measure is 
left unexplained by these two vaiables; the aggregate cost of 
strikes, as measured by time-loss has not increased over time; 
and the weak statistical relationship shows that economic 
activity may be statistically significant in explaining 
strike activity but that is is not thg dominating influence 
as suggested by some earlier studies. 
2. Walsh ( 97 ) wanted to re-examine the Canadian industrial 
dispute experience over the 1952 - 1922 period using three 
separate^measures of strike activity; frequency, duration 
and size^ and then developing a relationship with economic 
conditions. 
Walsh's equation was structured as follows: 
SM. = a- + a. + u7 + a«P+ + + ai.PI. + a^t t 0 1 t 2t 3 ^ ^ t-1 5 
Where SM = the particular strike index 
U = the unemplo:'nnent rate 
P = the year to year change in the Consumer 
Price Index 
V7 = the year to year percentage change in 
average weekly wages and salaries in the 
industrial composite 
PI = the year to year percentage change in 
total after-tax corporate profits 
t = time in years (1952 = 1) 
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(-0.5046) ( 0.9574) 
361.0157 5.3328 














































Table VII. 1 Regression Analysis of Strike Activity and 
Economic Conditions, Canada, 1952 - 1972. 
In concluding Walsh states ‘‘Overall, these regressions 
support the position that each of the main dimension of 
strike activity differ in their degree of responsiveness 
to the pattern of aggregate economic activity .... the 
relationshin betwee^ time-loss m.easures of strike activity 
is relatively weak. '* 
United States: 
1. Edwards ( 6l ) examines two very distinct approaches: 
the first predicts strike activity from economic variables 
such as the unemployment rate and the rate of change of 
real wages and the second criticizes the approach for 
failing to take account of certain institutional parameter 
which set the framework within which economic factors 
operate. 
Edwards utilizes the number of strikes in a year as his 
dependent variable and uses two business cycle indices 
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known as trough and peak; changes in prices, nominal and real 
wages rate changes as the independent variables. The results 
indicate a much better for the periods 1900 - 1939 and 19^6 - 
1972 and a significance level for all variable at the 
t-statistic level. 
Kov/ever, Sdwards results gain some minimal strength when 
a variable index is added to look at the ratio of trade 
unionists to non-agricultural workers, however when the poli- 
tical variables are added the model suffers are far as the 
total amount of variance explained by the regressors, and 
most of the t-statistics in both time periods became insigni- 
ficant. 
In his conclusions, ^Edwards makes the following statements: 
"the results show that, although strike frequency seems to be 
quite strongly related to economic conditions. qThe strength 
and direction of economic variables fluctuates.'"” 
2. Skeels { 89) intented in his article to study the inter- 
relationships among the various measures of strike activity, 
Skeels wanted to reduce disparity that existed by examining 
the eight most common measures of strike activity on a quarterly 
basis during recent years, 1952 ~ 1968. 
The eight measures utilized in the study are: 
a) number of strike beginning in a quarter; 
b) number of workers involved in strikes beginning in a quarter; 
c) percentage of v/orkers in total labour force involved in 
strikes beginning in a quarter; 
d) number of strikes in progress in a quarter; 
e) number of workers involved in strikes in progress in 
a quarter; 
f) percentage of workers involved in strikes in progress 
in a quarter; 
g) man-days idle; 
h) percent of available man-days idle. 
Skeels then structured his equation with the measure of strikes 
as the dependent variable and the following explanatory variables 
1 ) economic variables - unemployment, output, price and 
earnings and there were three measures of output tested 
a) real GNP 
b) an index of unfilled orders, and 






two measures of unemployment * 
a) rate of unemployment 
B) rate of layoffs 
and two price indexes: 
a) consumer price index and 
b) profit rates 
2) political variables of which there were three* 
a) political party in power in Congress 
b) presidential election year, and 
c) party of the President 
3) public attitude variable which separated the pre and post 
Landrum - Griffith Act years, 
4) Seasonal variables which measured the likelihood of a 
strike in warmer rather than colder weather, and 
5) a trend variable v/hich can be viewed as a learning 
function of the bargaining process or as institutional 
accomodation,^ 
Regression Coefficient (t-values) 
Strike Measure 
Number of Strikes 
beginning 
Number of Workers 
^Involved - beginning 
^-Percentage of Workers 
Involved - beginning 
Number of Strikes 
in progress 
V'. 
^Number of Workers 
Involved - in progress 
Percentage of Workers 
Involved - in progress 
Nvlan-Davs Idle 
ty 






















(-2.31) ( 2.55) 
0.074 0.029 
( 0.92) ( 0.77) 
0.075 0.029 
( 0.92) ( 0.79) 
-0.069 0.017 
(-3.57) ( 1.96) 
0.009 -0.026 
( 0,11 (-0.66) 
0.011 -0.024 





0.014 -0.045 -0.040 



























































Number of Strikes 
beginning 
plumber of Workers 
involved - beginning 
Percentage of workers 
Involved - beginning 
Number of Strikes 
in progress 
^Iumber of Workers 
Involved - in progress 
Percentage of V/orkers 
Involved - in orogress 
Man-Davs Idle 
Man-Days Idle as 
%a.^e of available work time 
Regression Coefficient (t-values) 
Qo Qo A T R' 
Man-Days Idle 
per worker 
liable VII. 2 
2 -3 
0.576 0.514 0.180 -0.030 0.945 4.89 
(19.57) (15.22) (3.63) (-5.28) 
0,617 0.631 0.640 -0.107 0.713 -1.33 
( 5.21) ( 4.64) (3.22) (-4.79) 
0.610 0.618 0.666 -0.114 0.726 -8.01 
( 5.19) ( 4.58) (3.37) ( 5.12) 
0.336 0.367 0.274 ap.025 0.931 5.98 
(11.83) (11.24) (5.73) (-4.60) 
0.289 0.398 0.892 -0.111 0.689 -0.52 
( 2.28) ( 2.74) (4.19) (-4.64) 
0.284 0.386 0.920 -0.118 0.675 -7.17 
( 2.23) ( 2.64) (4.30) (-4.88) 
0.196. 0.330 0.996 -0.100 0.590 2.63 
( 1.17) ( 1.71) (3.53) (-3.15) 
0.203 0.338 1.029 -0.093 0.555 -6.25 
( 1.19) ( 1.72) (3.59) (-2.88) 
0.153 0.267 0.861 -0.0830.567 1.83 
( 1.01) ( 1.54) (3.39) (-2.91) 
Regression Coefficients for Determinants of Various Strike 
Measures United States, 1952 - 1968.1D 
> Skeels concludes "statistically, number of strikes, both a 
flow and a stock, is different from other measures of strike 
activity. Its reponsiveness to the independent variables used 
in this study was much higher than that of other measures 
examined. The significant explanatory variables differed 
somev.'hat. This trading should be no surprise, since number 
y of strikes is a measure of decision making about strikes while 
the other measures are to a greater or lesser extent indexes 
^ of strike impact - all are variants of hov/ many employees are 
involved and how long.”^*^ 
^ Australiai 
1) Bentley and Hughes ( 3^) have tried to show whether or not 
the cyclical nature of the economy has any profound effect 
on strike activity. The authors point out that the nature of 
business fluctuations has been much smaller in Australia, Then 
► in the United States for the post-Keynesian period 1949 - 1961, 
TfiRny due to the fact that these fluctuations were centered around 
a much fuller level of employment in Australia. 
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The nature of wage settlements in Australia has been diminished 
by the environment of compulsory arbitration that does exist, 
and therefore unions cannot be coerced into v/age settlements, 
which is something that can and does happen in the United States. 
The dependdent variable in their equation is the frequency 
of strikes since both Rees and Forchheimer found that this 
statistic lended itself '’fairly distinctly to the cyclical 
pattern^2” Although, they do make some comments about the rela- 
tionship between man days lost and the cyclical nature of the 
economy later in the paper. 
The explanatory variables used in the Bentley and Hughes 
equation(s) are* unemployment, and changes in unemployment, and 
two control variables, a time trend and seasonal dummies. The 
result of this estimation is provided in Table VII. 3 where; 
a is the constant 
b is unemployment 
c is change in unemployment 
d is time 
e is seasonal variables representing first three 
quarters 
SD is seasonal variables for all four quarters 
Sector 
Regression Coefficients (t-statistics) 
a b c d e. 
1 A - C 
3. A - 
4. 
5. A - G 
Quarterly 
6. A - C 
Semi - Annual 
7. A - C 
Annual 
























-46.2 -26.1 3.7 14.9 
(5.47) (1.26) (16.33) (1.26) 
-28.2 23.9 -3.^ 8.6 





-17.7 1.2 XXX 
(3.08) (0.09) XXX 
-0.188 1.067 -0.013 
(1.13) (2.88) (3.28) 
-0.316 0.813 -0.024 
(1.53) (3.27) (2.71) 
-0.717 0.379 -0.053 






































































Regression Coefficients (t-statistics) 
2 
Sector 
1, A - C 
SD 















































3.567 4.016 4.164 2.849 0.73 
(5.64) (6.36) (6.30) (4.59) XXX 
, 1.928 1.096 1.346 0.772 0.73 
Semi - Annual (3*84) (2.19) (2.33) (1.62) xxx 
XXX XXX XXX xxx 0.62 
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 
4.14 6.13 5.07 6.09 0.44 
(1.57) (2.33) (1.86) (1.37) xxx 
xxx xxx xxx xxx 0.58 
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 
5. A - C 
Quarterly 
6. A - C
7. A - C 
Annual 
































where A - C is non-coal enterprises 
C is coal enterprises 
and #1-4 frequency regressions 
#5-7 non-coal duration regressions 
#8-10 are employee loss regressions 
Table VII. 3 Regression Coefficients for Determinants of 
Various Strike.Measures for Australia 
1952 - 1968.^^ 
In their conclusions Bentley and Hughes make the following 
statements* Where time loss has been used, '*our regressions did 
yield negative coefficients between unemployment and magnitude, 
but the t-values and coefficients were not large enough to 
inspire confidence in the estimates^ " However their results 
for the frequency statistic were more or less what they had 
expected because the level of statistical significance 
was much higher and therefore corresponded to the previous 
studies. 
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Great Britian (U«K«)i 
1• Shorey ( 87 ) has decided to examine the statistical rela- 
tionship between strike frequency and several surely theore- 
tical variables. Shorey develops a model to explain vari- 
ations through time in the probability, ?(S)®.^that a single 
bargaining unit, i, will experience a strike; ^ It is 
assumed that all strikes result from the breakdown of 
negotiation which directly or indirectly are concerned with 
wages,■ 
The strike probability will, on the demand side vary posi- 
tively with the frequency of wage claims and the size of the 
claims workers submit. On the supply side it will vary 
negatively with the costs of strike action for either side, 
positively with the extext or recent external militancy and 
negatively with the size of the offers employers make during 
negotiations•' ' 
The three principal determinants of the frequency of negotia- 
tions and the size of workers' wage claims at any point in 
time are; recent changes in the amount of effort required 
of workers, the extent to which established v/age differen- 
tials have recently been distured, and the current rate of 
change of prices, On'^the supply side, employers* wage offers 
varywith the rate of change of productivity and conditions 
in local labour markets. Strike costs for workers are related 
to their foregone earnings per unit of strike time, the costs 
of job mobility, the extent of their expenditure commitments 
and their expectations of strike duration. Employers' strike 
costs are related to the firm's foregone earnings per unit 
of strike time and theirexpectations of strike duration. 
Therefore the functional relationship that emerges is 
P(s)^ = P(A, K, LM, WD, P, FEE, FEW, CJM, ECW, DURW, DURE, EM) 
Where A:^ = 
= ^2 
Li'/It = 
WDi = P,. 
^t = ^5 
FEE^ = F^ 
FEW:^ = F,^ 
= level of effort of workers 
= increases in productivity 
= state of labour markets 
= recent disturbances to established 
differentials 
= recent changes in prices 
= firms foregone earnings per strike 
day 
- workers foregone earnings per 
strike day 




CJM^ “ ^9 ~ costs of job mobility 
DURV/^ = Q = workers' expected strike durations 
DURE^ “ ^11 “ employers' expected strike durations 
EM^ ~ ^12 ~ recent external militancy 
and F^2 ^ ® 




The theoretical model 
tional equation 
SOM^ = ^0 + + 
b^W3t + bgY^ + 
was transformed in the following opera- 
^9^2 ^lO^t-1 ^1.1 ^^t-1 ®t 
where* level of activity became (-—)t» 'the level of profit; 
disturbance to differentials became » P^t average 
wage rate changes; state of labour maricets became U, 
national unemployment rate; changes in productivity 
became k^, the rate of change of labour productivity; 
prices change became P^, rate of change in retail 
prices; foregone earnings by employer became Tf , 
rate of change of money profits; foregone earnings 
by workers expenditure became Y. and Y^, expendi- 
ture in quarters one and two leading to vacations and 
then Christmas; expected strike duration became » 
a common factor for both sides; and extent of mili-"“ 
tary frequency became S., the level of total non- 
mining strike freq.uency^in the previous quarter. 
Since the main thrust of this paper focuses on the post 
World War II era, the only results that will be reported 
deal with period from 19^S - 1966. The r-squared for this 
model was 0.89 and the t-statistics - in brackens - were 
significant at the 95^ level for six of the seven explanatory 
variables. 
Results were S0M^. = -291.7 + 81.8Y, + 158.I % - 18.2W, , 
^ (5.2) (7.3)^ (5.^) (2.3)^'^ 
+ 12.9P+ , + 1.2P+ + 0.48S0M, , + e 
(1.8)^"^ (2.2I (5.3) 
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The model showed very good statistical results, even though 
the author does make you aware of the problem of autocorrela- 
tion. However, the development of an econometric model based 
on theoretical implications can cause many difficulties in 
interpretation# This is a very unique example of how one 
author has tried to utilize theoretical implications to 
formulate a model, and perhaps at some later point these 
types of assumptions could be integrated into a three-level 
collective bargaining process model. 
2, Davies (58) has essentially extended the analysis of 
Shorey and others. The purpose of his paper was to develop 
a model of the collective bargaining process that incorpor- 
ated a more precise theoretical specification of those 
variables which play a key explanatory role in the strike 
decision. The author later incorporates the effects of incomes 
policies into the model with the view of producing a more 
precise and comprehensive specification of the latter’s impact 
on strike activity and then he wanted to extend the model 
beyond the 1969~i97i strike wave to be able to measure these 
effects. 
Davies model looks at the probability of a strike as being 
a function of the unions initial demand, managements initial 
offer and the bargaining attitude of both sides. Unions wage 
demands will be a function of the excess demand for labour, 
the expected rate of price inflation, workers current wage 
expectations, and the level of profits. Wage expectations 
will be a fuction of current -settlements and the rate of 
erosion of net take home pay. 
This model was then applied to the British economy and was 
tested against strike frequency data from 1966-1975• .The 
reults obtained were sufficient in that they showed the 
significance of supply and demand in the labour market and 
the importance of perception to labour prior to entering 
into the collective bargaining process. The statistical 
results for most of the variables in this model were signifi- 
cant . 
Multi-Nation Studies 
1. Snyder (90) in this paper has decided to challenge the 
earlier works of authors such as Ashenfelter and Johnson, 
Rees, Skeels and Vanderkamp for the notion that strikes 
result from economic forces. In this paper Snyder challenges 
economic explanations of strike activity and wants to expand 
upon the theoretical notions of such models. 
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This model is developed and applied for two time periods, 
1900 - 19^8 and 19^9 - 19?i« Since this study only focuses on 
the post World War II time period, only these results will 
be analyzed. Snyder also utilizes two strike indices, 
frequency and number of worker involved in the U.S. and adds 
man days lost for Canada. 
The Synder equation, which utilizes many of the assumptions 
that have been seen in Shorey and Davies, as well as 
number of socio-political assumptions about the United States, 
is as follows I 
+ b £JD , 
^WD 
+ bgT + 
where = unemployment indicator of labour tightness 
^^t-1 ” wage change specification 
M. = union membership as percentage of civilian 
labour force 
party of President ) 
) 
percent Democrats in Congress ) in the 
) United States 
linear time trend ) 
L. = oercent Liberals in Parliament ) 
^ ‘ ) 
V/D^ = war dummy variable ) 
Regression Coefficients (standard errors) 
nited States of America 
quation ^ 
umber of -512.3 -5^2.6 -222.i*’ -645.6 - 64.3 - 30.7 -693 1.99 
trikes (109.2) (206.1) (346.0) (4?4,2) ( 33.6) (128.3) 
OO's of wor 343.1 -848.9 379.7 41.6 - 36.7 98.4 . 
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Table VII. 4 Estimated Regression Coefficients foe Economic, 
Organizational and Political Determinants of the 
Number of Strikes, Workers Involved and Man Days 
Lost for Canada and United States by O.L.S. Estima- 
tion for 1949 - 1971.^ 
This paper again shows that strike frequency, even when applied to 
a theoretical framework, provides the best results. If 
t-statistics were to be tested here, one would quickly notice 
that only wages is significant in Canada for all three examples, 
and that the sign of the coefficient would be negative in 
all three cases. And it is the man days, lost model that is 
most significant for this study. 
2. Hibbs ( 66 ) in his model utilizes the same premise as 
this study in that strikes are measured by man days lost. 
Although the main intention of the Hibbs paper is the develop- 
ment of a number of theoretically plausible statistical 
models to explain short term fluctuations in strike volumes. 
For the purpose of the study Hibbs' strike volume index will 
be analyzed as well as his examination of post v/orld War II 
strike trends. 
Hibbs' strike volume (SV) is 
SV = Man days lost = Frequency x 
per 1000 wage pp 
and salary workers'^'' 
= Strikes  
1000 workers 
Duration x Size 
X Man days lost x Strikers 
Striker Strike 
and this is the same statistica that can be found in Table 
5.1 and 5*2 of this study. Hibbs' says that this volume 
would be useful in developing the statistical models to 
explain short-run post war fluctuations^*^ because what is 
needed is a single^geries that capture the act damage or 
impact of strikes. 
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Hibbs study of the ten countries, five of which are in this 
study indicates that between 1950 and 1969 the level of 
industrial conflict, as measured by his strike volume, has 
been declining. However any assumptions or explanations that 
Hibbs has offered for the trends must be considered obsolete 
given the trends that developed during the 1970's and earlier 
1980's. 
This Appendix has offered some insight into the many articles 
that have been written into the relationship between strikes, 
economic activity and the collective bargaining process. The 
simplistic model developed for this purposes of this study has 
been constructed along the lines of Ashenfelter and Johnson, 
Pederson and Paldan, Vanderkamp, Walsh, Skeels and Bentley and 
Hughes, This model has neglected the theoretical implications 
that several variables could have on the formation of one 
variable being utilized to explain a particular relationship. 
It is important to note that the theoretical explanations and 
assumptions do allow for a mors logical development of the 
reasoning for this particular analysis in the context that 
one equation must be universally applied to eight different 
countries. The theoretical assumptions and explanations that 
have been utilized in the models by Shorey, Davies, Hibbs, 
Snyder, etc have all been applied to one particular country 
and could not be applied to another country without significant 
modifications. 
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